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Defenders of the welfare state are struggling to revive social citizenship, the theory
articulated by British sociologist T.H. Marshall that public well-being in a democratic
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society depends on rights to economic security as well as on political and civil rights.'
Against this social citizenship ideal stands the powerful and pervasive neoliberal (free
market) ideology 2 asserting that state abstention from economic protection is the
foundation of a good society. 3 Neoliberalism, the core of law-and-economics theory,

1.According to Marshall, civil rights include "the rights necessary for individual freedomliberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice"; political rights include "the right to
participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political

authority or as an elector of the members of such a body"; and social rights "range from the
right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the
society." T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10-11 (1950). For examples of recent
efforts to apply (and improve) Marshall's theory in the context of debates about the
contemporary welfare state, see CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OFT.H.
MARSHALL (Martin Bulmer & Anthony M. Rees eds., 1996) [hereinafter CITIZENSHIP TODAY];
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE

BRIAN S. TURNER, CITIZENSHIP AND CAPITALISM: THE DEBATEOVER REFORMISM (1986);
Desmond S. King & Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of
Welfare Provision, 18 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 415-43 (1988); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman,
Return of the Citizen: A Survey ofRecent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352 (1994).
See also Lawrence M. Mead, Citizenship and Social Policy: T.H. Marshall and Poverty, 14
SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y 197 (1997) (amending Marshall's theory to support a change from social

(2001);

citizenship rights to social citizenship obligations).
2. "Neoliberalism" refers to the contemporary reincarnation of the nineteenth-century
"laissez-faire" liberalism that advanced the primacy of "the market" over "government
regulation." See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS 15-16
(1998) (favorably presenting this new "liberalism" as a reassertion of nineteenth-century ideas

about the primacy of the market and the importance of property rights); Lisa Philipps, Taxing
the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 115 (2000) (defining "neoliberalism" and discussing its effect on

Canadian tax policy). In American legal scholarship, the term has gained currency primarily to
describe how this ideology has been applied to international development policy, particularly
the "structural adjustment" programs imposed on Latin America by the International Monetary
Fund. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J.OFINT'LL. 517, 518 (2001)
(describing neoliberalism as a "program for increasing the wealth of nations"); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Human Rights in InternationalEconomic Law: Locating Latinas/os in the Linkage
Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361, 384 (1997) (explaining neoliberalism as a
discourse masking and promoting political and economic subordination based on race and
class). The term is more commonly used outside of the United States, perhaps in part because
American scholars and policy analysts tend to present neoliberal international policies simply as
"globalization" (rather than as one choice among many alternatives for structuring the global
political economy) and to present neoliberal domestic policies simply as uncontested economics

rather than as the product of ideology or political movement.
3. Joel Handler insightfully discusses how the recently powerful conservative economic

orthodoxy provides an ideological basis for efforts to undermine social citizenship in the U.S.
and Europe. Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 765,796800 (2000). Handler analyzes three parts of the "reigning message of. orthodox liberal
capitalism": first, the theory that the efficient market is a matter of neutral, value-free laws;

second, that "government" is the problem and privatization, decentralization, and deregulation
are the answers; and, third, that victims of poverty are at fault for their problems, not structural
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establishes economic efficiency-represented by the "free market"-as the primary
route to public well-being. 4 In this view, unfettered market competition produces
incentives for maximizing overall resources and individual responsibility, thereby
making society better off in the long run in spite of harsh short-term effects on some
people.5
Supporters of social citizenship should squarely contest this neoliberal ideal at its
flawed foundation. Two leading responses to neoliberal ideology, communitarianism
and pro-welfare liberalism, both attempt to support economic equity alongside
efficiency as a separate and complementary societal value. But the problem with the
neoliberal emphasis on efficiency is not that it promotes individual self-interest over
community solidarity, or economic growth over social equity. Instead, neoliberalism
embraces a racialized, genderized, and class-biased vision of social equity and
community solidarity that favors the interests of the most privileged members of
society. 6 Welfare state advocates should directly reject, not balance or accommodate,

economic conditions. Id. at 796-97. See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE
RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 13 (1998) (asserting that "one of the most distinctive
neoliberal traits" is the belief that the welfare state is "the source of all evils"); Michael
Ignatieff, The Myth of Citizenship,94 QUEEN'S Q. 966, 982 (1987) ("It should be clear that the
market solution is an attack on citizenship and democracy."); Philipps, supra note 2, at 113-14
(criticizing the shift from Marshall's ideal social citizenship to "market citizenship").
4. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Globalization, Robert P. Maxon Lecture at
George Washington Univ. (Dec. 3,2001), in Fed. News Serv., Dec. 3, 2001, availableatLEXIS
FEDNEW file (rejecting the view that "free markets" lack moral or civic virtue by explaining
that neoliberal policies "reflect the value preferences of consumers," maximize these mostvalued resources, promote quality and excellence, and facilitate "greater political freedom"); see
also Jon D. Hanson & Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311, 312 (Dennis Pattersen ed., 1996) (stating that now "the vast
majority of law and economics scholarship assumes without hesitation that the goal of law
should be efficiency."). For a discussion of the role of law-and-economics in promoting
neoliberalism, see Daniel T. Rodgers, The Revival of Market Ideology, in THINKING THROUGH
THE SEVENTIES (Casey Blake & Kenneth Cmiel eds., forthcoming 2003). This neoliberal
idealization of an efficient market fits comfortably with--or is even enhanced by-its approval
of a supporting role for "redistribution." See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
5. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 13 (reporting the move away from government
economic involvement "toward reliance on competition in the marketplace as a more efficient
way to protect the public"). For examples of neoliberal legal arguments, see generally RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1997); see also Steve P. Calandrillo,
Responsible Regulation:A Sensible Cost-Benefit,Risk Versus Risk Approach to FederalHealth
and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957,984 (2001) (asserting that regulatory policy should
adopt the goal of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency because it "intuitively feels closest to serving our
nation's best interests by seeking the greatest good for the greatest number"); John 0. McGinnis
&Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,114 HARV. L. REV. 511,521-27 (2000)
(confidently asserting as a "well established" premise that neoliberal "free trade"-as regulated
by the World Trade Organization-promotes countries' overall social welfare in the long run
despite harms to "special interests"). For an opposing view, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF
RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET

30-31 (Richard Nice trans., 1998)

(describing and criticizing the neoliberal message of economic productivity as the ultimate
human goal and the route to universal liberation).
6. I do not mean to suggest that the benefits and the harms of neoliberal policies fall
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neoliberalism's vision of hierarchical citizenship status promoted in the guise of
efficiency.
Citizenship defines relationships between society, government, and individuals:
who belongs to the "public" and what obligations and rights membership in that
"public" confers.7 On the surface, neoliberalism claims to trim the role of government
so that the state functions primarily as a value-neutral facilitator of individual choices.
In this vision, citizens' primary role is to maximize their private rational self-interest as
buyers and sellers in market exchanges. 8 Social well-being flows not from government
enforcement of moral ideals, but from unimpeded private pursuit of individual
preferences and interests.
Accordingly, neoliberal public policy centers on the goal of economic efficiency:
maximizing aggregate resources, as represented by the sum of individual cost-benefit
calculations in the (presumably free) market. 9 Neoliberalism distinguishes this

absolutely or strictly along hierarchical class (or gender, race, or other status-based) lines, but
only that the privileging of economic elites (structured in part by race and gender) is central to
neoliberalism's overall purpose and effect.
7. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF T.H. MARSHALL 31 (Martin Bulmer &Anthony M. Rees eds.,
1996) (defining citizenship as "the rights and obligations associated with membership in a social
unit of society, and notably with nationality). J.M. Barbalet describes citizenship as "both a
status and a set of rights" and explains that citizenship rights attach to a person "by virtue of a
legal or conventional status." J.M. BARBALET, CrIZENSHIP: RIGHTS, STRUGGLE AND CLASS
INEQUALITY 15-16 (Frank Parkin ed., 1988). See also Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of
Citizenship, in DISSENT 33, 37 (1997) ("It is in citizenship that the personal and political come
together, because citizenship is about how individuals make and remake the state.").
8. See Ignatieff, supranote 3, at 981 (stating that the rise of market ideal has determined "the
very language of political community" so that both left and right political rhetoric "addresses
the electorate not as citizens but as taxpayers or as consumers"); Philipps, supra note 2, at 11516 (explaining how just as neoliberalism reimagines the state's role, it reimagines the "terms of
citizenship" to focus on "individual self-reliance, competition, and consumer choice").
Journalist Naomi Klein describes growing resistance to what she sees as neoliberalism's
substitution of consumerism for citizenship. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: MONEY MARKETING,
AND THE GROWING ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT 441-42 (1999); see also Susanna Lobez,
Selling Ourselves Short, SUNDAY HERALD SUN, Feb. 10, 2002, at 73 (quoting Klein's warning
that "'citizens [are] rebranded as empowered consumers who are nothing more than a collection
of their shopping habits'). Another example of the neoliberal transformation of citizenship is

the idea that Americans should express their patriotism in response to the attacks of September
11, 2001 by going shopping. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, Madison Ave. Grappleswith Post-Sept. 11

Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001 at Cl.
9. See POSNER, supra note 5, at 18 (defining efficiency). This definition of efficiency reflects

what is more technically called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency: resource allocations in which aggregate
gains outweigh aggregate costs (despite losses for some individuals). See id. In contrast, Pareto
optimality is a more ideal version of efficiency that occurs when resource allocations increase
aggregate gains without imposing costs on any individual according to that individual's own
subjective cost calculation. See id. But true Pareto optimality is at worst a tautology and at best
of little use in policy debates. By definition, Pareto improvements are only possible when no
policy debate exists-and if a policy truly has no net costs, it would be logical to assume it
would already have happened. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 120
(1987) (describing Pareto efficiency as a "banal" concept); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness
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efficiency goal from the goal of social equity, which represents the redistribution of
resources according to particular fairness or equality values.' 0 In the conventional
view, efficiency is about expanding the societal pie; redistribution about dividing it.l"
This fundamental-and fundamentally flawed-division between redistribution and
efficiency is the linchpin that enables neoliberals to turn social citizenship from a
public benefit to a public threat. By distinguishing rights to economic security as
"redistribution," those rights become implicitly (if not explicitly) suspect and
subordinate.' 2 If the free market is by definition the system that maximizes overall
societal well-being (and individual freedom), then redistribution-which by definition
diverges from that market-inherently risks detracting from overall societal well-being
(and individual freedom).' 3 Neoliberalism's disadvantage is not, as most critics worry,

of Pareto:CarryingCoase Further,100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991) ("[A]ny given society is

always or will immediately arrive at a Pareto optimal point" without the need for analysis or
criticism.). Though some use efficiency narrowly in the sense of wealth maximizing (sometimes
limited to monetary gain), I use the concept broadly to encompass nonmonetary "resources."
10. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
11. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTnON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed. 1989).
12. See Martha T. McCluskey, SubsidizedLives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 122-23 (2000) [hereinafter McCluskey, Subsidized Lives]

(comparing the skewed efficiency versus equity opposition to the skewed equal treatment versus
special treatment opposition in equality theory); see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of
Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 657, 717-18 (1998)
[hereinafter McCluskey, Illusion] (explaining and criticizing the implicit favoring of the
efficiency side of the dichotomy). For example, one scholar explains that because T.H.
Marshall's social rights count as redistribution, they should be subordinated to political and
civil rights. Jytte Klausen, Social Rights Advocacy and State Building: T.H. Marshall in the
Hands of Social Reforms, 47 WORLD POL. 244, 245 (1995) (ignoring the inherently
redistributive nature of political and civil rights).
13. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5 (giving arguments for the theory that equalizing income
through government welfare programs often has efficiency costs); POLINSKY, supra note 11, at
127 (concluding that "income redistribution generally is costly, whether it is accomplished by
the tax and transfer system or by the legal system") (emphasis in original). This is not to say that
neoliberalism necessarily rejects redistribution, only that it requires that it be restrained. For

example, law-and-economics scholarship has devoted much effort to keeping redistribution's
risks safely in place by segregating it in the "tax and transfer system" so that it will not "distort"
legal rules. See POLINSKY, supra note 11, at 9-10, 124-27; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why
the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 667 (1994). Of course, law-and-economics reasoning also criticizes the "distorting"
effects of using the tax system for redistribution. See POLINSKY, supra note 11, at 120; Duncan
Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 613
(1982) (explaining that any real-as opposed to theoretical-system of taxation will involve
exactly the same kinds of supposedly wasteful behavior changes as direct regulation of
behavior). And once redistribution is relegated to the position of direct charity outside the
supposed normal operation of law and market, neoclassical economic analysis shows that it
must be further restrained to avoid distorting supposedly normal market rights. See Part I infra
(discussing neoliberal criticisms of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the classic direct
transfer program).
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its inattention to redistribution, 14 but to the contrary, its very obsession with
redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from
efficiency. 5
The preoccupation with extracting redistribution from efficiency grows out of
neoclassical economics's early-twentieth-century quest for a formal and objective tool
for measuring societal well-being that could establish economic policy analysis as a
science. 16 Economic historian Mark Blaug explains that, although this goal of a
scientific division between equity and efficiency has proved elusive,' 7 without faith in
the equity/efficiency distinction, the whole "elaborately constructed apparatus" of
modem economic policy evaluation "collapses like a house of cards."' 8 From the start,
non-neoclassical economists have questioned the fundamental efficiency/equity
division as false, 19 and have explained, "[T]he whole point is that global welfare

14. See Hanson & Hart, supra note 4, at 311,330 (reporting that the most common objection
to law-and-economics is its failure to consider distribution); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 594 (1985)
(criticizing what he describes as law-and-economics's characteristic "disregard of the
distributionaldimension of any given problem") (emphasis in original).
15. For insightful arguments and examples showing that the problem of contemporary legal
discourse is not the focus on economics per se, but instead the "dichotomization of economics
and politics" as a strategic means of "resist[ing] the democratization of both the state and the
economy," see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets,Racial Spaces, and the Role of Critical
Race Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An InstitutionalClass
Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1037, 1072-73 (2000). See also Martha T. McCluskey,
Deconstructing the State/Market Divide: The Rhetoric of Regulation from Workers'
Compensationto the WTO, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha A. Fineman

&Terenqe Dougherty eds., forthcoming) (using literary analysis of the "dangerous supplement"
to discuss the relationship of government redistribution to the imagined free market in
contemporary economic rhetoric).
16. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 549-93 (5th ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1996) (discussing the history of general welfare economics as a struggle to find a measure
of efficient outcomes separate from distributive judgments); YUVAL P. YONAY, THE STRUGGLE
OVER THE SOUL OF ECONOMICS 150-53 (1998) (explaining contested attempts to construct

neoclassical economics as a science using an objective standard of efficiency). By purporting to
formally measure efficiency gains separate from distributional changes, the concepts of Pareto
optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency helped solidify faith in the distinction by mid-century.
See BLAUG, supra, at 573-79 (discussing Pareto optimality and the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
approach). See supra note 9 (defining these concepts).
17. BLAUG, supra note 16, at 575 (noting that the "long discussion" of efficiency criteria
among various theorists Such as Pareto, Hicks, and Kaldor "brought us no further" toward
"purely 'positive' grounds" for distinguishing efficiency from equity).
18. See id. at 592-93 (discussing the history of welfare economics and accepting its
assumption of an equity/efficiency division).
19. See LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (Warren J. Samuels & A.
Allan Schmid eds., 1981), cited and discussed in NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.MEDEMA,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 119 (1997); YONAY, supra note
16, at 153-56 (discussing early-twentieth-century institutionalist critics of neoclassical
positivism); see also Calabresi, supra note 9, at 1227-28 (distributional analysis is an
"inevitable and hence essential" part of efficiency analysis); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems:A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 420 (1981) (explaining
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maximization is meaningless." 20 Nonetheless, most mainstream economics and policy
analysis continues to take this equity/efficiency distinction on faith and to focus instead
on dissecting the relationship between the two separated goals. 2 1
With this neoclassical distinction as its ground, neoliberalism asserts that
redistributive policies replace individual market freedom that promotes the public gain
with paternalist government protection that generally benefits particular groups.22 From
this problematic premise follows the deduction that redistribution tends to be the mark
of non-citizens or subordinate citizens: those who are deemed inadequate to assume
the responsibilities of freedom because of their incapacity or incivility. 23 In short,
neoliberalism revives the Lochner-era view that social citizenship is an oxymoron.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts often ruled that federal
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection prohibited social and
economic regulation designed to change market conditions affecting workers and
consumers. 24 But cases such as Muller v. Oregon25 reasoned that the Constitution only
permits legislative protection against market risks (maximium hour regulations, for
example) for those who. do not count as fully responsible citizens, such as women,

that "the notion of a 'tradeoff' between the 'hard' datum of efficiency and the inherently
subjective, 'political' datum of equity is apologetic nonsense"); McCluskey, Illusion, supra note
12, at 657 (using the example of workers' compensation to show how the distinction between
efficiency and redistribution is not grounded in objective logic or fact, but instead amounts to a
rhetorical and political strategy).
20. A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, in LAW

AND

ECONOMICS 69 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989).
21. See Suzanne Elise Shanahan & Nancy Brandon Tuma, The Sociology ofDistribution and
Redistribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 733, 734 (Neil J. Smelser &

Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (concluding that the prevailing dichotomy between market
distribution and government redistribution appears arbitrary and part of classical Western
economic thought's false attempt to construct markets as more natural than governments, but
nonetheless accepting this division as fundamental to social science).
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce Power,73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1431 (1987) (questioning child labor legislation as paternalism or as anticompetitive
protection of some employer interests at the expense of others). For a discussion and
modification of the conventional theory, see Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency ofPaternalism,84 VA.
L. REV. 229 (1998).
23. In his discussions of neoclassical economics in law, Neil Duxbury explains that Milton
Friedman qualifies his arguments against government intervention in the market by saying that
paternalism is acceptable for those who cannot be responsible individuals, like children and the
insane. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 369 (1995) (citing MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 33 (1982, original publication 1962)). T.H. Marshall
distinguished twentieth-century social citizenship from earlier efforts to grant minimal social
protections detached from the status of citizenship. "The Poor Law treated the claims of the
poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them-as claims
which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word."
MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 24.
24. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hour law
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights).
25. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a minimum wage law for women on the ground of their
special need for protection).
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26

children, or immigrant miners.
Of course, changing politics and jurisprudence after 1937 repudiated the Lochnerera view that social and economic rights were unconstitutional,clearing the way for
some citizens to exercise their political rights to create a "New Deal" that included
extensive labor, consumer, and antipoverty protection. With the demise of Lochner
came the rise of legislation establishing (limited) social citizenship rights in the United
States. 27 From T.H. Marshall's mid-century vantage point, centered on Britain and
neglecting pervasive race and gender stratification, such social rights seemed to have
2
taken firm root alongside civil and political rights as essential to a "civilized" society. 28
8
In the United States, however, the resounding renunciation of Lochner worked to
impede as well as to advance the cause of social citizenship. The prevailing
jurisprudential criticism of the Lochner era centered not so much on its substantive free
market ideology as on its procedural choice of judicial over legislative and executive
power. 29 The famous ghost of Lochner helped stifle enthusiasm for expanding

26. Lochner, which struck down a maximum hour law for bakers, reasoned that
[t]here is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to
assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state,
interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in no
sense wards of the state.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. In contrast, the Court distinguished a case upholding a similar law for
miners by explaining that the "character of the employees insuch kinds of labor [was] such as to
make it reasonable and proper for the state to prevent the employees from being constrained by
the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor." Id. at 54 (discussing Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366 (1898)). Similarly, the Lochner-era Court upheld antipeonage legislation
prohibiting contracts for debt service (enacted in part to address African American involuntary
servitude) on the ground that the particular people protected were not capable contractors. Risa
L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J.
1609, 1650 (2001). See also Aviam Soifer, The Paradoxof Paternalismand Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism: The United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 249 (1987)
(discussing Lochner-era rulings permitting labor market regulation for sailors, Native
Americans, and peons).

27. Important New Deal social and economic rights were designed to primarily benefit white
male workers and their families. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 253-85 (1994); ROBERTC. LIEBERMAN,
SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1998). Furthermore, the
New Deal legislation actually enacted fell far short of the rights many workers supported.
William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-61 (1999).
28. In response to neoclassical economist Alfred Marshall's admonition that "measures
designed to raise the general level of civilisation of the workers must not interfere with the
freedom of the market," T.H. Marshall answered, "[o]bviously this limitation on policy had
since been abandoned. Socialist measures, in Marshall's sense, have been accepted by all
political parties." MARSHALL, supranote 1,at 80-81. By using the term "civilized" to designate

the cultural conditions that citizens should share, in place of Alfred Marshall's ideal of the
"gentleman," see id. at.7, T.H. Marshall implicitly builds on a racialized ideal even as he rejects
an explicitly class-based and gendered vision of citizenship.

29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874, 882 (1987)
(explaining that in addition to the "received wisdom" criticizing Lochner for its "judicial
activism," Lochner can also be criticized for its substantive choice of a common law baseline for
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constitutional rights-and in particular placed social and economic regulation outside
constitutional concern.3 ° In the U.S., therefore, the kinds of broad social citizenship
rights that Marshall envisioned-ensuring basic income security, education, health
care, and housing, for example 31-never became elevated to the status of constitutional
rights on par with constitutionalized political and civil rights. Although courts and
scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s took some tentative steps in that direction,32
by the end of the twentieth century, the accepted wisdom in American law pushed
constitutional social citizenship rights "'off the table' and 'off the wall'," as William
Forbath and Jack Balkin critically note.33 Forbath quotes Lawrence Lessig's 1996
comment, for example, that one "uncontested 'background assumption"' of American
constitutional law is the principle that "'our constitutional tradition' is indifferent to

constitutional law).
30. The classic case for the post-Lochnerrule on economic legislation is Williamson v. Lee
Optical,348 U.S. 483 (1955) (establishing the minimal rationality test, which places economic
and social regulation outside the scope of judicial scrutiny as long as it is hypothetically
rational). See generally Robert G. McCloskey, EconomicDue Processand the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34. The choice to reject the Lochner-era
restrictions on Congressional powers by restricting individual constitutional rights rather than
by expanding constitutional rights for workers was not inevitable, but rather was produced in
part by the relative power of legal professionals over grassroots labor activists. James Gray
Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of
American ConstitutionalLaw, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2002) (tracing activists'
unsuccessful attempts to construe federal labor legislation as the enforcement of fundamental
human rights grounded in the Civil War Amendments).
31. See MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 48-66 (discussing British social citizenship rights to
legal aid, housing, education, and income security).
32. See Harperv. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ("Lines drawn on the basis
of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored."); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

755 (3d ed. 1996) (giving examples of equal protection arguments in

the cases Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ("In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."); William E.
Forbath, ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1821, 1856-67 (2001) (discussing advocacy for due process rights for welfare
recipients); see also Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (developing a theory of a constitutional
right to "minimum protection").
33. Forbath, supra note 32, at 1824; J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objectsof
Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1733 (1997). In contrast, socioeconomic rights are
commonly constitutionalized outside of the U.S. and are incorporated into international human
rights law. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 221-37
(2001) (discussing example of socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution).
However, even where these constitutional or international human rights protections are
supported in theory, in practice these rights tend to be irrelevant or ineffective, in part because
global financial structures often have increased the costs of enforcing these rights. See HEINZ
KLUG, CONSTITUTING

DEMOCRACY: LAW,

GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL

50 (2000) (noting that the globalized capitalist economy imposes challenges
for new movements for democracy, but rejecting the view that democratic nation states are
powerless in the face of these international constraints).
RECONSTRUCTION
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'economic inequality.'

34

But the rise of neoliberal ideology in the last decades of the twentieth century has
done more than throw extra dirt on the grave of constitutionalsocial citizenship rights.
Neoliberalism digs up a deeper challenge to social citizenship by undermining the
legitimacy of nonconstitutionalrights to economic security for workers, consumers,
and families in poverty. To justify their constitutional rulings, Lochner-era courts
conferred on some economic interests the status of property and liberty rights grounded
in prepolitical universal principles while relegating other economic interests to the
subordinate status of contingent government policy judgments. 35 Lochner v. New York,
for example, construed some employers' and workers' interest in making labor
contracts unrestricted by maximum work hour laws as a natural right to personal
liberty. 36 Lochner did not consider, however, whether others' interest in maximum
hour laws could also reflect individual political rights or different contractual rights;
instead, the court debated only whether the law promoted the legitimate policy of
public health or the illegitimate policy of labor market regulation. 37 In an infamous
Lochner-eracase,the New York Court of Appeals invalidated that state's workers'
compensation law by claiming such legislation reflected "philosophical or scientific
speculation" or perhaps "commendable impulses of benevolence or charity," in
contrast to what it claimed was a conflicting "right of property" that "has its foundation

34. Forbath, supra note 32, at 1825 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constitutional
Theory: Fidelity as Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1507, 1509-10 (1997)).
35. See Sunstein, supranote 29, at 884-86 (explaining that Lochner'sconstitutional theory
rests on prior definitions of property and liberty interests as neutral and natural baselines).
Sunstein criticizes Lochner for naturalizing nineteenth-century common law rights at the
expense of statutory rights. Id. at 885. But these nineteenth-century common law ideas of
property and contract themselves were hardly static or uncontested. See, e.g., MORTON J.
HORWlTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) (describing changes
and controversies in common law definitions of property and liberty during the nineteenth
century); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY

226-27 (1990) (explaining

that the Lochner era's treatment of common law property rights as prepolitical, sacrosanct limits
on government policy coincided with active judicial transformation of these rights in response

to historical changes). While this construction of property rights was deeply intertwined with
class politics, many scholars have concluded that the purpose and effect of this jurisprudence
was more complex than a simple judicial favoring of "big business" over "the people." See
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 248-50, 270 (1997) (arguing that this era's
constitutional due process decisions fostered a shift toward an understanding of property as
market commodity rather than as a device for social ordering).
36. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may
labor in the bakery of the employer."). Of course, this decision stood in the face of a long
tradition of heavy regulation of labor contracts in Anglo-American law, and even the
nineteenth-century move toward "free labor" was a product of social and economic legislation
that paradoxically restricted contractual rights. See ROBERTJ. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT,
AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(2001) (analyzing historical development of

regulation of criminal and pecuniary sanctions for breach of labor contracts).
37. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64.
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in the fundamental law." 38 Similarly, Coppage v. Kansas invalidated a law forbidding
"yellow dog" contracts by characterizing the law as government "interference" with the
"nature of things" that necessarily and normally requires contract and property rights to
39
produce "inequalities of fortune."
Mainstream law and policy still rejects Lochner's theory that social citizenship
legislation aimed at reducing economic inequality counts as policy that breaches the
Constitution.40 Nonetheless, mainstream law has thoroughly embraced the neoliberal
framework, built on Lochner's foundations, that counts social citizenship laws as
government policy that potentially breaches a naturalized market. Although the
mainstream view claims to have debunked the Lochner-eramyth of prepolitical rights
to property and contract, it sustains this myth by generally assuming a prepolitical (or
at least apolitical) market. 4' This contemporary myth continues Lochner's substance by
contrasting social citizenship's "redistributive" policies with a presumptively normal
market distribution, though the ground of the market has shifted from natural "human
.43
rights42' to natural laws of economics.

38. Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 439-40 (1911).
39. 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
40. The project of resurrecting Lochner is not "off the table" of prominent scholarly
discussion or powerful legal activism, though it is still mostly at the margins. For an explicit
endorsement of Lochner's theory of economic liberty, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:

5 (1985). The Institute for Justice was
established in 1991 in part to revive Lochner's theory of economic liberty through the
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Clint Bolick, Dismantling
Liberty's Slaughter-House, at http:/www.ij.orglslaughter%5Ffolder/SlaughteiClint.html
(reprinting paper presented 1995). Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas affirmed this effort
in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999). See also William Greider, The
Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century, NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN

(analyzing new corporate rights to be free from certain economic regulation under Chapter 11 of
the North American Free Trade Agreement as part of a systematic legal strategy for restoring

Lochner-era corporate rights to be free from social and economic regulation); Steve Louthan,
Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The Constitutionalityof NAFTA Chapter11, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 1443, 1445 (2001) (describing "the most significant evisceration of state police
power" since Lochner).
41. Political theorist Jennifer Nedelsky explains that the Legal Realist critique of Lochner
has partly taken hold: "Virtually everyone pays lip service to the political nature of the law."
NEDELSKY, supra note 35, at 255.
But in ways that remain somewhat mysterious to me, mainstream legal scholarship
manages to hold those views and proceed comfortably ahead with . . .
presumptions such as the sharp split between the public and the private that are

only fully intelligible if law, and property in particular, is something other than a
set of policy choices backed by the power of the state.

Id. "[Tihe tacit denial that property is a social construct is the foundation for everything from
the public/private distinction to the ongoing market versus regulation debate and the debates
over redistribution." Id. See also Warren J. Samuels, Commentary: An Economic Perspectiveon
the CompensationProblem, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 193-94
(Warren J. Samuels & A. Allan Schmid eds., 1981) (criticizing conventional law-and-economics
for failing to recognize that "[flights are made and remade, through both the law and the market;
they are not found").

42. See Coppage,236 U.S. at 17 (describing the "right of private property" and "freedom of
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Many have followed T.H. Marshall's lead in imagining this purported opposition
between market rights and social rights can be bridged through delicate balancing."
But, echoing Lochner, neoliberalism threatens such a balance by reducing social
citizenship rights to policy calculations-arguing that claims to such rights obscure the
underlying questions about the costs and benefits of particular governmental choices. 45

contract" as human rights that the Constitution protects from state interference).
43.
The virtually uniform usage treats the distribution arising from market transactions
as a given and asks whether reallocating that distribution is justified.... Even
egalitarian liberals adopt the language that implies that it is rearranging the
distribution of "the market" that requires justification. This discourse makes sense
only if the rules of the market are not themselves the product of collective choices,
but neutral and apolitical.
NEDELSKY, supra note 35, at 259. See also Warren J. Samuels, Maximization of Wealth as
Justice: An Essay on PosnerianLaw andEconomics as PolicyAnalysis, 60 TEx. L. REV. 147,
168 n.145 (1981) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981))
(explaining that the law-and-economics critique of "redistribution" is premised on the
"fallacious assumption that distribution... is independent of the law"). In his book defending
equity over efficiency as a guide to law and policy, Cass Sunstein insists that "markets should
be understood as a legal construct" neither natural nor voluntary and that "there is no opposition
between 'markets' and 'government intervention."' CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 5, 384 (1997). At the same time, Sunstein reinforces Lochner's rhetoric of a
choice between market freedom and government constraint by presenting the problem as a
matter of weighing the costs of "government interferences" to promote social justice (in part
through "command-and-control regulation") against the benefits of "market ordering" which he
associates with "flexibility, respect for individual autonomy and initiative, and productive
potential." See id. at 271, 386.
44. See MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that the rise of social rights has not
eliminated the market, just kept it within limits); SUNSTEIN, supranote 43, at 386 (advocating a
balance between "market ordering" and "social justice" that nonetheless gives social justice the
priority); Patricia Hewitt, Social Justice in a Global Economy?, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OFT.H. MARSHALL 249, 260 (Martin Bulmer & Anthony M. Rees
eds., 1996) (searching for ways to make social rights complementary rather than contradictory to
civil rights in the global market).
45. For a discussion criticizing how the prevailing emphasis on cost-benefit analysis
dominates and trumps social citizenship's attention to rights, see Robin West, Rights,
Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1921 (2001). In an example of

the neoliberal argument, Klausen reduces social rights to "redistributive policies" by reasoning
that social rights are unique in their dependence on a state's fiscal capacity and because they
represent not individual freedoms against the state but coercion of other citizens through
taxation. Klausen, supra note 12, at 245-46. Political and civil rights, however, also inherently
depend on substantial government taxing and spending (reliable courts, domestic and
international law enforcement, and voting machines are not cheap), as well as on private

coercion (property rights confer power to restrict others, not just rights against the state).
A parallel critique of rights from postmodern jurisprudence has perhaps reinforced law-andeconomics's selective cynicism about economic and social rights. Postmodern theory joins with
law-and-economics in recognizing that rights are regulatory mechanisms that impose costs and
restrictions as well as freedoms on their recipients. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541 (2001) (using example of regulatory effects of post-Civil War social

and economic rights for African Americans to question contemporary feminist advocacy for
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The right to health care, for example, boils down to a decision to divert dollars from
taxpayers' income or employers' productivity, or perhaps education spending or
environmental quality-and therefore is best debated as a calculation of the relative
costs and benefits (health and otherwise) of such a policy. 46 Implementing neoliberal
ideology, law-and-economics scholarship uses the market yardstick of efficiencypurporting to measure the aggregate net societal benefits--to strike at the legitimacy of
social and economic regulation as rooted in subjective moral bromides and partisan
politics rather than in rigorous and objective rational principle.47
. Neoliberalism therefore capitalizes on Lochner's legacy in two ways. First, it
inherits the mantle of process-over-substance that embodies the legal system's
rejection of Lochner-but shifts the measure of neutral process from democratic

social citizenship rights for family caretakers). See also BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO
EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC CmZENS AND OTHER SUBJECTS (1999) (exploring how citizenship

rights discipline as well as empower the subjects they constitute). In theory, such postmodern
analysis could also challenge law-and-economics's claims that objective cost-benefit
calculations constitute a freedom-promoting alternative to rights reflecting power distributions
fixed in some inevitable natural state beyond the reach of law. But I worry that postmodern legal
scrutiny of liberal rights tends not to go far enough to similarly challenge the prevailing
neoliberal alternative to liberal rights. Without doing so, postmodern critics risk implicitly
promoting the neoliberal illusion that a rights-free zone without (or with fewer) regulatory
effects awaits those who reject liberal rights claims. For example, in her criticism of feminist
advocacy for greater economic rights for family caregivers, Katherine Franke agrees that the
prevailing construction of dependent care as a "private" part of a "natural" family unregulated
by state or market is fiction. See Franke, supra, at 1544. Yet she nonetheless seems to build in
this fiction and its mystification of existing economic rights by warning about the disciplinary
effects of "inviting greater involvement from both state and market actors" into what she
describes as private family rule. Id. See also Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and
Foucault!,15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327, 327, 357-58 (1991) (criticizing Foucault's postmodernism

for incorporating a pre-realist understanding of the law that partly undermines its potential to
debunk the (neo)liberal mystification of the market).
46. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? (1997) (arguing that rights to health care mistakenly obscure inevitable tradeoffs); see
also Hanson & Hart, supra note 4, at 329 (summarizing arguments in defense of the prevailing
law-and-economics cost-benefit approach to policymaking). Criticizing the classic law-andeconomics arguments about the superiority of cost-benefit calculations as circular reasoning,
economist Warren Samuels explains that costs are in turn a function of the existing system of
rights. Samuels, supra note 43, at 159.
47. See Greenspan, supra note 4; Armond M. Cohen, High-Tech Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV.
919, 922 (1986) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984))
(criticizing Ackerman for adopting law-and-economics's false positivism by quoting his
statements against "muddled efforts to improve upon the invisible hand" and legal realism's
"loose talk of 'public policy,' 'unconscionability', 'unequal bargaining power' and the like" and
his preference for the "hard analytic work" of scientific policy analysis); see also Kennedy,
supra note 19, at 420 (explaining that "the notion of a 'tradeoff between the 'hard' datum of
efficiency and the inherently subjective, 'political' datum of equity is apologetic nonsense");
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275, 1283 (1981)
(criticizing cost-benefit analysis for its false scientism and for blocking more realistic
approaches to public policy that would go beyond the typical neoclassical economic claim that
"real explanation" of "why things are the way they are" is that "they have to be that way").
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governance to the market, which supposedly impartially reflects the aggregate of
individual subjective preferences.48 Second, and more covertly, it embraces Lochner's
substantive stand by embedding other social and economic rights in a naturalized
market as baseline civil rights-and therefore not subject to the scrutiny of economic
process.49
The recent growth in interest in social citizenship theory, in legal scholarship and
beyond 50° reflects in part a dissatisfaction with the primacy of process ideals in the
post-Lochner era. Many legal experts and advocates have lost faith, for example, in the

48. Legal scholar Edward Rubin discusses how legal process theory, which dominated
American legal scholarship between the New Deal and the 1970s, resurrected from Lochner's
grave the ideal of law's neutrality by presenting the majoritarian political process as the solution
to the legal Realist's critique of law as politics. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395

(1996). Rubin traces the demise of this legalprocess theory to the rise of law-and-economics
along with critical legal scholarship (and related strands of critical "outsider" jurisprudence),
each of which differently attacked the process school's faith that law can transcend subjective
private interests. Id. at 1398-403. However, Rubin accepts law-and-economics's basic premise
of a nonpolitical resource-maximizing market, and overlooks critical scholars's arguments that
market efficiency is incoherent (not just inequitable), because it rests on a false economic
positivism that masks the political and distributive goals inherent in "efficiency." See id. at
1402, 1430-31 (describing law-and-economics as focused on efficiency goals separable from
and potentially complementary to critical scholarship's focus on equality). As a result, Rubin
misplaces law-and-economics, both by overstating its distance from the legal process theory's
illusion of formal neutrality, and by overstating its proximity to realist and critical scholars'
efforts to expose law's formal principles as products of social context that further particular
utilitarian goals. For some references to critical scholarship deconstructing efficiency concerns
as logically indistinguishable from equality concerns, see KELMAN, supra note 9, at 142 ("The
CLS claim, quite simply, is that there is absolutely no politically neutral, coherent way to talk
about whether a decision is potentially Pareto efficient, wealth maximizing, or whether its
benefits outweigh its costs."); McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 666 n. 18, 722 n.256. See
also DUXBURY, supra note 23, at 302-11 (explaining that realism and law-and-economics have
only superficial affinity).
49. See Iglesias, supra note 2, at 384-86 (explaining that neoliberalism aims to make Third
World human rights dependent on market wealth, rather than making market wealth dependent
on human rights-but that the neoliberal market depends on government protection of elite
property rights); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 566-70 (explaining the market's so-called freedom
of contract as produced from a background of substantive legal rights); Duncan Kennedy, The
Role ofLaw in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV.

939, 959 (1985) (explaining that efficient market outcomes are not "natural" but "decidedly
artificial and manipulable" and inherently inseparable from distributive policies); Arthur Allan
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 480

(1974) (criticizing law-and-economics scholarship for selectively removing some governmentenforced distributions of resources from its "economic" scrutiny as rights that form "an
unquestionable grundnorm upon which to base efficiency analyses"); Samuels, supra note 43, at
155-56 (criticizing Richard Posner's claim to "efficiency" as the standard for law and arguing

that the concept of efficiency itself depends on unstated normative decisions to treat certain
interests as rights).
50. See, e.g., Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 1 (discussing recent increase in political
theorists' interest in citizenship); see also sources cited supra note 1.
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promise of formal equality principles to ease the divisions and hierarchies that have
long snarled the hopes of American democracy. 5 1 And although many share the
neoliberal belief that the majoritarian political process has lost much of its postLochner luster as a beacon for the public good, many nonetheless find the neoliberal
market a pale substitute.5 2 For some law and policy analysts, T.H. Marshall's vision of
substantive socioeconomic rights has cast new light into the perceived formal
emptiness of political and civil rights. 3
By picking up the thread of social citizenship, and exploring its possibilities for
escaping neoliberalism's restraints on the welfare state, I aim to affirm this movement
back to substantive values as the ground of law and policy. Yet framing the debate
over economic welfare questions as social citizenship risks solidifying the exclusionary
boundaries of national citizenship that reflect some of history's biggest moral
failures.54 I intervene in the debate over social citizenship in hopes that T.H.
Marshall's vision of citizenship can move beyond its nation-state limits to a vision of
inclusive membership in a global human society. 55 As neoliberalism has pursued a
vision of global market rights for elite capital owners, questions of social citizenship
protecting others' economic security similarly should take on global dimensions.
The supposed triumph of the neoliberal global market 56 brings new urgency to T.H.
Marshall's concern with the potential tensions between what he identified as twentiethcentury social rights and nineteenth-century market rights.5 7 But the debate over the

51. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
(1989) (proposing a theory of equality centered on eliminating the substantive
harms of social caste); ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

(2001) (criticizing the dominant liberal and formalist conception of

equality).
52. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 318-25 (describing the failures of the New Deal
ideal of a regulatory state that protects the public interest, but arguing for efficiency-oriented
reforms that also preserve and improve democratic processes and public deliberation).
53. See, e.g., Ignatieff, supra note 3, at 976 (invoking T.H. Marshall's model of social
citizenship as an important correction to "purely formal" notions of civil and political
citizenship).
54. See Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship & the Problem ofAlienage, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
963 (2000) (criticizing new interest in Marshall's citizenship concepts for failing to address
questions of rights for aliens); Nora V. Demlietner, The Fallacyof Social "Citizenship, "or the
Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35 (1997) (detailing the increasing exclusion of
resident aliens from welfare programs); Gerald L. Neuman, Rhetorical Slavery, Rhetorical
Citizenship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1276 (1992) (criticizing the rhetorical strategy of promoting
human rights "by enriching the conception of citizenship" because it risks reinforcing exclusion
of noncitizens from important rights).
55. See Ignatieff, supra note 3, at 984 (advocating expanding citizenship to recognize a
universal human subject in a world community and rejecting the old citizenship distinction
between citizens and barbarians); Hewitt, supra note 44. Powerful national governments,
however, are critical to the project of promoting and protecting global human rights. Ignatieff,
supra note 3, at 984-85.
56. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 16 (reporting the "apparent triumph" of "the
market" over government in the newly liberalized global economy).
57. See Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theory of Citizenship, in 1 CITIZENSHIP: CRITICAL
CONCEPTS 199, 220-21 (Bryan S. Turner & Peter Hamilton eds., 1994) (describing citizenship
as "a pressing theoretical issue" in light of global economic changes); Hewitt, supra note 44
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tensions has focused on the appropriate balance between these rights without
sufficiently exploring the underlying question of how this division itself shapes and
limits citizenship ideas. From Lochner to twenty-first-century neoliberalism, opponents
of the welfare state have aimed not just to defend the market, but also to construct a
particular substantive vision of the market-and of political and civil rights-by telling
stories that identify some elite economic interests as natural and necessary to the public
interest.
The two leading strands of social citizenship arguments in response to this recent
neoliberal challenge, communitarianism and pro-welfare liberalism, both mistakenly
build on, rather than deconstruct, neoliberalism's Lochner-era myth of a natural and
neutral market. By taking neoliberal free-market rhetoric at face value, these responses
tend to misdirect their attention to reforming social citizenship rights in hopes of
preserving that naturalized market while neoliberals (like their Lochner-era
predecessors) actively restructure the market itself.
First, communitarian critics tend to misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to
promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social
responsibility and community morality. Many communitarians argue that a new
emphasis on public morality and individual obligations is the key to renewing or
revising social citizenship. But this communitarian defense of the welfare state fails to
understand that neoliberal efficiency redistributes rather than rejects community
responsibility and moral commitments.
Second, contemporary pro-welfare liberals misconstrue the neoliberal project as one
that favors overall public well-being at the expense of individuals who lose out in the
market. These pro-welfare liberals argue that a good society requires attention to
shorter-term individual well-being, as well as to the longer-term aggregate gains of the
market. This view attempts to revive social citizenship by striking a balance between
the purported aggregate concerns of market efficiency and the individualized concerns
of social equity. But this liberal response to neoliberalism fails to understand that
neoliberal efficiency goals do not objectively promote the overall good at the expense
of some individuals. Instead, neoliberalism promotes a vision of the public good based
on the interests of the wealthiest individuals at the expense of the majority.
This Article will explore the neoliberal arguments which have helped mobilize
restrictive reforms in two U.S. income security programs during the 1990s: first, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), and second, workers' compensation.
These two programs represent opposite sides of the line between redistribution and
efficiency: AFDC is the classic redistributive program, while workers' compensation is
the classic model of an efficiency-based welfare scheme. In both of these programs,
however, the division between efficiency and redistribution serves to undermine
rationales for social citizenship. For each program, I will analyze how neoliberal
reform arguments use this division to obscure and reinforce a hierarchical vision of
citizenship. 58 I will then examine how communitarianism and pro-welfare liberalism

(discussing challenges facing social citizenship rights as global market rights expand).
58. T.H. Marshall believed the term "citizenship" inherently expressed egalitarian principles.
"Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is
endowed." MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 28-29. I follow others who instead recognize that
citizenship ideals may not only exclude noncitizens, but also can embrace status hierarchies in
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respond to neoliberal reform efforts. I argue that, for each social program, both of
these citizenship visions end up reinforcing, rather than resisting, the antiegalitarian
values of neoliberalism.
I. AFDC
In the United States, the debate over social citizenship has focused on the former
federal program known as AFDC, which provided income support for single parent
(and some unemployed two-parent) families in poverty. AFDC developed from the
1935 Social Security Act's program called Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC"); 59 it
then expanded in the 1960s and early 1970s as part of the Great Society's "war on
poverty. 6 ° In its early years, political and public opinion largely (though tenuously)
accepted ADC as a program consistent with social citizenship ideals on the theory that,
by providing economic security for children, ADC would cultivate and protect the
future citizens on whom society's long-term well-being depends. 61 The government
committee that initiated the plan for ADC explained that freeing mothers from wage
earning would help them "rear [their children] into citizens capable of contributing to
society."62 A congressman explained the value of ADC (along with other child welfare
programs) by imagining a "careworn, dejected widow" kissing away her children's
tears as she tells them they will now have the financial aid to buy books and clothes so
that they can go to public school and Sunday School.63 A 1946 government handbook

which duties and rights are distributed unequally among members of different societal groups.
See ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 2

(1997) (analyzing a long history of American law "shot through with forms of second-class
citizenship, denying personal liberties and opportunities for political participation to most of the
adult population on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and even religion"); CITIZENSHIP TODAY,
supra note 1, at 275 (criticizing Marshall for failing to recognize the prevalence of partial
citizenship status, particularly as applied to women).
59. See GORDON, supra note 27, at 253-85 (discussing the development of the legislation
producing ADC).
60. See MICHAEL K. BROWN, RACE, MONEY AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 205-322
(1999) (analyzing the development of the 1960s War on Poverty); see also RICKIE SOLINGER,
BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION AND

WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (2001) (summarizing the dramatic increase in

AFDC

expenditures and number of recipients from 1958 to 1977).
61. See GORDON, supra note 27, at 253-55, 293-303 (stating that ADC was among the least
controversial parts of the 1935 Social Security Act because it was literally equated with the
presumed benefits of motherhood); see also Linda C. McClain, Careas a Public Value: Linking
Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1702 (2001)
(explaining the idea of social contribution as "an important root" of AFDC). Nonetheless, this
consensus in favor of ADC did not prevent itfrom being designed to provide meager benefits as
a second-tier welfare program that reflected and reinforced women's subordinate citizenship
status.
62. 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY
OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT 56 (Alan Pifer & Forrest Chisman eds., 1985).
63. GORDON, supra note 27, at 254-55 (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 5862 (1935) (statement of
Rep. Claude Fuller of Arkansas)).
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on ADC emphasized the. social value of giving an impoverished mother the
opportunity to choose to reject wage work in favor of "staying at home to care for her
children. ' 64
But by the end of the century, AFDC had become a prominent symbol of social
pathology inimical to good citizenship. 65 In 1996, the movement for "welfare reform"
culminated in the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, 66 which eliminated AFDC and substituted a more limited and
restrictive welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF").67
What transformed AFDC from a means to social citizenship to its antithesis? Many

scholars have analyzed how popular and political support for AFDC eroded as the
program moved away from its original discriminatory focus on white widows and their
children to provide increased benefits to women of color and to nonmarital children of
all races-a change that accelerated with the civil rights movements of the 1960s.68 In
short, the story of shifting political support for AFDC exemplifies how dominant
visions of citizenship in the United States link economic rights to race, gender, and
sexual status.69 The persistently powerful view that the good society rests on
maintaining the political, economic, and social dominance of white men tends to limit

political support for broad-based economic equality. 70 The original ADC's minimal

64. BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK
OF PUB. ASSISTANCE Part IV, §§ 3401, 3401.1 (1946), discussed in SOLINGER, supra note 60, at
148.
65. See KATz, supra note 1, at 1 (describing AFDC as the most disliked public program in
America by the 1990s); DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 174 (2002).
66. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105..
67. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 317-28 (discussing the political and social events that led
Congress to end AFDC and enact TANF).
68. See KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE
CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR 17-35 (2001) (analyzing the scholarly literature attributing
declining support for welfare to gendered racism); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE:
How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 117-34 (1994) (analyzing how the 1960s
expansions of AFDC were undermined by white resistance to African American struggles for
equality); ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 16 (explaining that beginning in the 1960s, "[tihe image
of the welfare mother changed from the worthy white widow to the immoral Black welfare
queen.").
69. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J.
1563, 1566 (1996) ("Black citizenship is at once America's chief reason for and impediment to
a strong welfare state."); see also CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 111-15 (1997) (analyzing how race played a
"'bridge' role" in breaking apart the New Deal coalition and shifting popular opinion against
1960s welfare state expansions).
70. See QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 4-5 (concluding that Americans have sacrificed an
adequate welfare state as the price Of excluding African Americans from the national
community); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 38 (concluding that all poor people are
hurt by the fact that "many whites today will not lend any support to government programs that
they even suspect might be targeted at helping 'those undeserving' black people"); id. at 31
(summarizing their thesis that the stigmatization of African American women on welfare is a
part of a process of racial control to defend white hegemony and patriarchy).
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support targeted at the marital children and widows of white men somewhat eased
economic inequality among white families while maintaining a social order stratified
by race, gender, and sexuality. 71 Efforts to expand AFDC's support for families of
color and for white women and children outside of male controlled families directly
threatened this hierarchical social order. 72 White supremacist and misogynist politics,
media images, and popular prejudices-both intentional and unconscious-have been
73
central to efforts to restrict AFDC from the 1960s through the 1990s.
Nonetheless, facially neutral rationales have been critical to the political success of
efforts to change AFDC from an accepted part of social security to a major social
threat. It is this ostensively neutral ground that I aim to excavate. In particular, a
change in prevailing economic ideology has covered and legitimated caste-based
opposition to ADFC by making race, gender, and class stratification seem scientifically
justified as "efficient."

71. For descriptions of the pervasive race and gender discrimination in ADC, the precursor
to AFDC, see GORDON, supra note 27, at 275-85; LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 118-61;
NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 46-59; QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 119-20.
72. See, e.g., QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 128 (explaining that Nixon's proposed family

income support expansion failed because Southern politicians recognized its potential to
undermine black subordination in southern labor markets and in other political institutions of
white privilege); George Gilder, The Coming Welfare Crisis, 11 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV.
24, 26 (1980) (stating that the "most fundamental" problem with AFDC is that it tends to
"destroy the key role and authority of the father").
73. In the 1960s, AFDC benefit restrictions were used as part of explicit strategies by white
politicians to maintain racial segregation and white political dominance in Louisiana,
Newburgh, New York, and Washington, D.C. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 69-114.
The prevailing media images of the poor changed from white to black in 1965, right after the
1964 War on Poverty and Civil Rights legislation (and far out of proportion to the actual racial
distribution of poverty). See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA,
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 113-16 (1999) (surveying magazine pictures of the
poor in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Rep. from 1950 through 1992 and finding an
increase in pictures of blacks from 27% in 1964 to 49% in 1965). From the mid- 1960s through
the 1990s, the mass media continued to disproportionately identify welfare use with African
Americans and to single out African Americans to illustrate negative coverage of welfare
(especially welfare fraud) but to use European Americans to illustrate the deserving poor. See
id. at 121-32. Polling data for the late 1980s through the 1990s show persistent (and sometimes
increasing) white stereotyping of African Americans as lazy, unwilling to work, and
undeserving of welfare. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 133-34 (summarizing various
surveys); Roberts, supra note 69, at 1566 ("white Americans have resisted the expansion of
welfare precisely because of its benefits to Blacks"). For a discussion of how discussions of
AFDC policy have relied on and reinforced patriarchal ideology, see MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 106-25 (1995); SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 67-68; GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S

END 36-42, 79-87

(1998).
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A. Reconstructing the Economics of Redistribution

1. The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism
Defenders and critics across the political mainstream traditionally have agreed that
AFDC is a classic example of a policy that represents government redistribution rather
than market efficiency. 74 However, AFDC's rise and fall tracks a dramatic change in
prevailing economic views about the relationship between these two apparent goals. As
part of the 1935 Social Security Act's income support programs, ADC developed
under the growing influence of Keynesian economics, which dominated U.S. theory
and policy from the mid-1930s through the early 1970s.75 Keynesianism accepted the
neoclassical economic premise of a scientific division between redistribution and
efficiency, but it modified neoclassicism's tendency to support laissez-faire "free
market" policies by repositioning equitable redistribution as a means toward economic
efficiency. 76 In particular, Keynesianism predicted that the size of the overall economic
pie (efficiency) sometimes could be increased by aggressive public spending aimed at
increasing income among the working class and poor.77 According to Keynes, under
certain conditions, this increased income would promote mass consumption-a rise in
demand-that would lead to expanded production and investment.78 As historian Alan
Brinkley has explained, policymakers in the late 1930s and early 1940s "fused the idea
of the welfare state to the larger vision of sustained economic growth by defining
social security mechanisms as ways to distribute income and enhance purchasing
power., 79 Embracing the theory it would reject a half-century later, the 1944
Democratic Party platform presented aggressive spending on social welfare programs

74. See, e.g.,

ALAN

S.

BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS: TOUGH MINDED ECONOMICS

(1987) (noting AFDC as an "explicitly redistributive" policy).
75. Keynesianism is named for the work of John Maynard Keynes, especially his book THE

FOR A JUST SOCIETY 28

GENERALTHEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936). See Alan Brinkley, The New
Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 96100 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (describing how, in his second term, President

Roosevelt justified new government economic protections for workers as beneficial to business,
reflecting a shift toward what would become known as Keynesian economic ideas); see also
BLAUG, supra note 16, at 642 (stating that "[w]ithin the space of about a decade, 1936-1946, the
vast majority of economists throughout the Western world were converted to the Keynesian way
of thinking"); GODFREY HODGSON, THE WORLD TURNED RIGHT SIDE UP: A HISTORY OF THE
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY IN AMERICA 186-203 (1996) (describing the challenges to

Keynesianism during the late 1960s and early 1970s that led to its demise).
76. See YONAY, supra note 16, at 10-11 (summarizing historical arguments about
Keynesianism as both a revolution against and a continuation of neoclassicism).
77. See Brinkley, supra note 75, at 97-98 (explaining that, although government subsidies
had been a central pre-New Deal strategy for promoting economic growth, Keynesian policies
shifted the focus of government economic development subsidies from production (capital

owners and farmers) to consumption (workers and the poor)).
78. For a summary of Keynes's theory of how consumption can drive economic growth, see
Amy Koritz & Douglas Koritz, Checkmating the Consumer: Passive Consumption and the
Economic Devaluation of Culture, 7 FEMINIST ECON. 45, 50 (2001).

79. Brinkley, supra note 75, at 109.
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as a central means to overall prosperity.
But in the 1970s, amidst global economic changes that confounded standard
Keynesian policy prescriptions and amidst a white backlash against government
support for racial equality, a well-funded neoliberal movement coalesced to position
efficiency more firmly against equity.8 1This movement aimed to replace Keynesian
demand-side government stimulus policies with increased emphasis on "private
market" incentives and "supply-side" stimulus policies, including tax cuts, deregulation
of business, reduced government social spending, and constricted money supply.8 2 This
newly prevailing economic theory predicted that "free market" policies benefiting
wealthy capital owners at the expense of others would promote economic growth that
would, in the long run, trickle down to benefit society as a whole.
While claiming mathematical ground, anti-Keynesian economic ideas drew on and
helped refurbish moralistic and antiegalitarian resistance to the 1960s erosion of a
social order grounded in racial and sexual control. 83 For example, in 1977, Nobel
Laureate economist James Buchanan and coauthor Richard Wagner warned that the
Keynesian policies favoring inflation over unemployment contributed to "increasingly
liberalized attitudes toward sexual activities, a declining vitality of the Puritan work
ethic ... [and the] explosion of the welfare rolls. '84 Anti-Keynesian economic rhetoric
about the failures of "big government" took root in a sociopolitical context that linked
a strong federal government with equal protection for African Americans (in contrast,

80. Id. at 110.
81. See HODGSON, supra note 75, at 186-215 (explaining "The Strange Death of John
Maynard Keynes"); ROBERT KUTrNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE 34-35 (1997) (describing the

intellectual counterrevolution of the 1970s). Godfrey Hodgson describes how major Fortune
500 corporations formed the Business Roundtable in 1972, which joined with a group of
conservative foundations to attack Keynesian economic policies and to instead advance the
interests of wealthy capital owners. HODGSON, supra note 75, at 206-08. For a summary of
conservative think tanks' effective marketing of opposition to Keynesian welfare state policies,
see THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS &

TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS

167 (1991); KATz, supra note 1, at 21-23;

JEAN STEFANCIC &

RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS

CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 82-95 (1996). For an analysis of Keynesianism's failures

as a problem of insufficient rather than excessive attention to equity, see James Crotty, The Rise
andFallof the keynesian Revolution in the Age ofthe GlobalMarketplace, in CREATING ANEW
WORLD ECONOMY 163-80 (Gerald Epstein et al., eds. 1993).
82. HODGSON, supra note 75, at 194-203 (describing promotion of antitax theories and
monetarism); see also DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE REVIVAL OF MARKET IDEOLOGY IN THINKING
THROUGH THE SEVENTIES (Casey Blake & Kenneth Cmiel ed., forthcoming 2003). Some of the
supply-side policies and theories were quickly discredited, but the general shift in economic
theory away from Keynes persisted. See HODGSON, supranote 75, at 214.

83. See HODGSON, supra note 75, at 213 (discussing the "interweaving of developments in
the world of academia and the intellectuals, on the one hand, and the turning tide of national
politics"). For discussions of the centrality of mathematical reasoning to economics in the
second half of the twentieth century, see Robert M. Solow, How did EconomicsGet That Way
and What Way Didit Get?, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. (Winter 1997) 55-56; YONAY, supranote
16, at 185-90.
84. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT 64-65 (1977)
(discussed and criticized in BLINDER, supra note 74, at 50-51).
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Keynesianism had flourished during a period when the growth in the federal
85
government often accommodated and sometimes strengthened white supremacy).
From the late 1970s through 1990s, a substantial portion of prominent experts and
popular opinion targeted criticism of government spending toward the few (and
comparatively meager) programs disproportionately aiding racial minorities.8 6 Rightwing political activists strategized to join this new economic policy with conservative
social policies as a means of building a new coalition between wealthy beneficiaries of
"free market" economics and working-class white men threatened by race and gender
equality.87 Robert Kuttner observes that economic scholarship alleging a scientific
basis for favoring resource distribution through "free markets" rather than "politics"
was often heavily subsidized by elites who were simultaneously engaging in concerted
political action to redistribute government power in their favor.8 8
Well-organized and well-funded lobbying by organized capital and corporate
interests helped drain political support for government antipoverty programs, for
example by promoting policies shifting more of the tax burden for welfare programs
from corporations and capital owners to low and moderate income workers.8 9 As newly

85. See generally NOBLE, supra note 69, at 111-15 (explaining how white opposition to the
spread of the civil rights movement helped promote resistance to federal government spending,
weakening support for New Deal liberalism); QUADAGNO, supra note 68 (showing how a white
backlash against the civil rights movement defeated attempts to extend New Deal government
antipoverty spending); see also SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 142-43 (suggesting that, as federal
government spending became linked to the civil rights movement, many white Americans came
to identify federal social programs with the negative image of the "welfare queen").
86. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supranote 81, at 152-53 (analyzing public opinion poll data to
explain antigovernment sentiment in 1980 as white opposition to programs specifically
perceived as aiding Blacks and Hispanics); ROBERT RECTOR & WILLIAM F. LAUBER, AMERICA'S
FAILED $5.4 TRILLION WAR ON POVERTY 44 (1995) (focusing discussion in this highly
influential think tank paper almost entirely on AFDC while combining its relatively small costs
with many other welfare state programs to come up with enormous cost figures); STEFANCIC &
DELGADO, supra note 81, at 82-95 (analyzing think tanks and foundations that promoted
intellectual experts' attacks on AFDC in particular). The Reagan Administration's social
spending cuts were focused on the programs serving a large percentage of African American
beneficiaries and often employing a large percentage of African American staff. EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 81, at 192. In contrast to conservative intellectuals, experts and their
funders more sympathetic to welfare state programs may have devoted less effort to promoting
programs like AFDC associated primarily with African Americans (in part out of belief in the
need to accommodate racism or sexism and to instead focus on more universalist welfare
strategies). See, e.g., BLINDER, supra note 74 (making unemployment reduction the centerpiece
of his "soft-hearted" answer to economic insecurity and defending government social spending
without discussing race or gender inequality or AFDC in particular); see Roberts, supra note 69,
at 1588-93 (summarizing and criticizing liberals' universalist strategy for defending AFDC).
87. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 81, at 141 (giving the example of a 1977 speech by
Ronald Reagan on the importance of linking conservative economic and social issues).
88. See KUTTNER, supra note 81, at 341-42 (criticizing public choice and law-and-economics
theories).
89. See NOBLE, supra note 69, at. 129 (noting that, since the 1960s, both political parties
have adopted this upwardly redistributive change in the tax burden); see also EDSALL & EDSALL,
supra note 81, at 160-61 (giving data showing how this shift in the tax burden helped
Republicans and also redistributed the tax burden from whites to blacks during the 1980s).
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mobilized and newly mobile employers seized a larger share of economic gains from
workers, 9° influential pro-welfare liberal intellectuals joined conservatives in blaming
most Americans' economic insecurity on government intervention in the market rather
than on the particular market and government changes driving American 1970s
stagflation. 91By 1980, as historian Michael Katz notes, "Keynesian economics, which
had sustained the welfare state, appeared dead. 92 A new consensus has formed for the
view that social welfare programs generally exact a tradeoff from overall economic
disagree about the degree to which equity should be
growth-though many still
93
sacrificed for efficiency.
2. The Triumph of the Neoliberal Double Bind
This post-Keynesian economic orthodoxy continues to present a policy choice
between the goals of efficiency and redistribution, now simply rearranged as generally
competing values. 94 But neoliberal ideology, which embraces efficiency as the superior
goal, recognizes and reinforces an implicit double bind in that choice.95 The
96
neoclassical framework inherently devalues redistribution as a goal bound to fail.
Based on the definitional opposition between redistribution and efficiency, neoclassical
economics posits that redistributive policies redirect resources away from efficient
allocations that maximize aggregate resources to instead increase the share of
resources received by a particular segment of society. But, in exchanging a bigger
"pie" overall for a bigger slice for some, the prevailing economic theory predicts that
redistributive policies will affirmatively increase overall costs by producing incentives
for further inefficiency. Distorted market price signals risk shrinking the "pie" even
more. As a result, the beneficiaries of the redistribution may end up with a smaller slice

90. See NOBLE, supra note 69, at 106-08; see also HODGSON, supra note 75, at 302-04.
91. See KU'ITNER, supra note 81, at 34-38 (discussing how liberal intellectuals joined
conservatives in rejecting Keynesianism and promoting the belief that free markets are superior
to government intervention).
92. KATZ, supra note 1, at 24 (citing HODGSON, supra note 75, at 214).
93. See KurrNER, supra note 81, at 35-37 (describing ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND
EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975) and CHARLES SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE
INTEREST (1977); see generally ROBERT KUTrNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION (1984) (challenging
Okun's assumed equity/efficiency tradeoff).
94. See, e.g., BLINDER, supra note 74, at 30-31 (describing what he sees as an ethical choice
between principles of equity and efficiency); see POSNER, supra note 5, at 275 (asserting that
efficiency is "just one value" choice that can be weighed against the competing value of just

distribution); Hanson & Hart, supra note 4, at 329-30 (concluding that while many reject the
law-and-economics premise that "efficiency should serve as the goal of law" many or perhaps

most agree that efficiency should be one goal of the legal system to be weighed against
competing goals such as equity) (emphasis in original).

95. See McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 12, at 124-25 (explaining how both
choices in the efficiency/equfty framework work as losing choices for many women, just like the

losing choices presented by the equal treatment/special treatment dilemma in equality theory).
96. Id. at 125 (showing how the efficiency/redistribution choice is skewed against
redistribution, just like the equal treatment/special treatment choice is skewed to privilege
"equality" over "difference").
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than they would have without that redistribution.97 Moreover, those most in need of
redistribution may be the ones most harmed by the shrinking economic "pie" that
redistribution supposedly produces. 98
In contrast to this double bind, efficiency goals tend to offer a double benefit, in
prevailing neoclassical economic theory. By neoclassical definition, efficiency means
internalizing costs so that the total societal costs are taken into account, thereby
producing price signals that produce incentives for further maximizing resources.
Efficient policies increase net aggregate gain regardless of the particular distribution
among individuals or subgroups. Although some may lose out in the short run,
neoliberal theory asserts that in the long run, a larger pie will also make it easier to
make up for those losses with larger slices for all.99 In neoclassical economic theory,
and the neoliberal ideology that embraces and promotes this theory, efficiency (rather
than egalitarian redistribution) best leads to long-term equity as well.' °
Two prominent post-Keynesian approaches to reviving social citizenship,
communitarianism and pro-welfare liberalism, join the general consensus by accepting
the basic neoclassical economic assumption of a tough tradeoff between efficiency
versus equity. These approaches try to carve out a space for redistribution within the
neoclassical double bind by taking steps to minimize the harmful societal effects of
redistribution it predicts. But those strategies for accommodating equity with efficiency
end up reinforcing rather than resisting the double bind that makes welfare seem so
costly. Instead, defenders of welfare should challenge the double standard underlying
the neoliberal double bind, and the hierarchical vision of citizenship it both obscures
and promotes. This double standard identifies some people's interests in increasing
their share of the pie as part of an efficient and naturalized market that benefits the
public, while others' interests in increasing their share of the pie are instead labeled
redistributive, and therefore potentially harmful to the public well-being.
In Part I.B below, I will analyze how the neoliberal double bind operated to
promote and rationalize the welfare reform movement that led to ADFC's demise. I
will end this Part by contrasting the neoliberal vision of citizenship that underlies this
double bind with three alternative (but not politically prominent) citizenship visions
that directly reject the dichotomy that has constrained both Keynesian and postKeynesian welfare policy. In Parts I.C and I.D, I will then explore the two more
prominent responses to the neoliberal critique of AFDC and show how they fail to
escape the neoliberal double bind.

97. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Reality of Redistribution, in POVERTY & INEQUALITY:
ECONOMICS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 127-31 (Jon Neill ed., 1997).
98. Id.

99. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich-a leader of efforts to end AFDC-argued "that
emphasizing redistribution is a dead loser in helping the poor, compared to focusing on the
production of wealth ..
" Newt Gingrich, Remarks at Progress and Freedom Foundation
Conference (Jan. 22, 1996), availableat LEXIS, News Library, Fed. News Service file. The
objective, historic long-term fact is "that societies which focus on getting rich bring everybody
up at a dramatically faster rate than societies which focus on redistribution succeed in raising the
bottom." Id.
100. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 719-20 & nn.248-49 (discussing and
criticizing this theory).
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B. Neoliberal Citizenshipand Welfare Reform

1. AFDC as Moral Hazard
In particular, neoliberalism has used the seemingly technical economic tool of
"moral hazard" to reposition AFDC from social virtue to social vice. This concept is at
the center of arguments that AFDC benefits do not spill over from individual recipients
to enhance society as a whole (as originally claimed), but instead produce larger
negative effects that damage society. 10' "Moral hazard" appears to shift such
arguments linking welfare to social pathology away from their timeworn foundations in
to instead ground them in seemingly more neutral
race, gender, and sexual status
02
1
conduct.
costly
of
questions
The term "moral hazard," which developed from insurance industry practices and
has been incorporated into neoclassical economic analysis, 103 refers to the problem that
those who are "insured" (protected from bearing costs) tend to take less care to reduce
1 4
those costs, to the extent those costs remain under the "insured's" control. 0 While

efficient market incentives "internalize" social costs so that self-interested individuals
also act in the interest of society as a whole, redistribution (by neoclassical definition)
alters the cost-benefit calculations faced by individuals so that their self-interested
actions diverge from the overall interest of society. Moral hazard describes the
problem that those who are protected by redistribution against the costs of certain
actions will tend to increase those activities more than they would if they faced the full
costs.
Applying the moral hazard theory to AFDC, critics often argued that by giving
needy families income support, AFDC made more families needy.1°5 In the
conventional economic analysis, AFDC's income protection for poverty-stricken single

101. This Article benefits from Tom Baker's groundbreaking critical analysis of the use of
moral hazard in arguments for welfare reform. See Tom Baker, The Genealogy of Moral
Hazard,75 TEx. L. REV. 237, 237-40 (1996).
102. For example, Lawrence Mead argues that white opposition to black welfare recipients is
motivated not by white opposition to blacks' citizenship status, but by white opposition to
blacks' dependency behavior. Lawrence M. Mead, The Politics of Conservative Welfare
Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 207-08 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds.,
2001). 1 will show below how this shift from status to conduct runs back to status. See infra
Parts I.B.2-I.B.3. For discussions of the slippage between status and conduct in the history of
the insurance industry's use of the term "moral hazard," see Baker, supranote 101, at 250-62;
CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN

INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985). Scholars of other legal shifts from status to conduct have traced
a similar slippage, similarly recognizing the interdependence of these two concepts. See, e.g.,
JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 126 (1999)

(discussing how antigay policies "render status a sign of conduct and vice versa").
103. For thorough and excellent analyses of moral hazard, see generally Baker, supra note
101; HEIMER, supra note 102.
104. Baker, supra note 101, at 239.
105. See, e.g., RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 86, at 3. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 319
(discussing and criticizing these arguments). See generally Baker, supra note 101 (explaining
and criticizing the moral hazard rationale for reducing welfare programs).
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mothers (who are the vast majority of beneficiaries) reduced their incentives to avoid
the costs of single motherhood by staying in the wage labor market, by avoiding
pregnancy and child-rearing, or by marrying wage-earning men. °6 This moral hazard
theory explains that AFDC created a cycle of dependency whereby more women are
encouraged to take less care to escape their poverty.10 7 As a result of these "perverse
incentives," according to this theory, in the long run the increasing
reliance on welfare
08
support hurts both its beneficiaries and the public in general.1
The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation replacing AFDC with TANF aimed to
reduce this moral hazard by reorienting the program to a more market-oriented
approach that minimizes protection from the need to seek wage work. 0 9 For example,
the replacement TANF program requires states to establish five-year lifetime
cumulative time limits for receiving welfare (with some exceptions) to ensure that
families in poverty use income support only as a transition to wage work, not as a longterm substitute for wage income. " 0 The reforms explicitly state that welfare assistance
is no longer an entitlement owed by the federal government to all qualifying citizens,
but instead is a state-controlled program contingent on funding availability."' In
addition, TANF requires a substantial portion of each state's welfare recipients (50%
by 2002) to participate in thirty hours a week of nonfamily work activities (including
waged work, unpaid 2workfare, high school education, or short-term job training) while
receiving benefits."
2. Double Standard of AFDC's Moral Hazard
Neoliberalism's emphasis on economic efficiency overturns the social citizenship
rationale of AFDC not because its economic view brings to light previously
unrecognized incentive effects, but because neoliberal economics values longrecognized incentive effects differently, based on a different vision of citizenship.
Deborah Stone explains that incentives produced by protection against losses can be
"moral opportunities" rather than "moral hazards."" 3 To construct AFDC's incentives
as public harms, rather than as public gains, the neoliberal "moral hazard" critique
builds on status-based moral and political judgments.

106. See, e.g., OKUN, supra note 93, at Ill (noting such incentives as an example of the
efficiency costs of AFDC).
107. See RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 86, at 3.
108. See McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 12, at 125-26, 138-49 (explaining and
criticizing this theory).
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (purpose statement); see KATZ, supra note
1, at 324 (stating that, as a result of the TANF legislation, "market models now pervaded the

goals, administration, and philosophy of welfare").
110. See 42.U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000 & Supp. 2002); JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL
HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, & WELFARE 7 (1997).

111.42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (2000).
112.42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000 & Supp. 2002); see HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at
6-7.
113. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard:InsuranceasMoral Opportunity,6 CONN.
INS. L.J. 11 (2000).
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a. Recipients' Bargaining Power

First, the incentive effects neoliberalism calls "moral hazard" boil down to
questions of relative bargaining power. As one party to a transaction gets more
bargaining power in relation to another, that party is better able to shift the costs of the
transaction to the other party. Bargaining power depends on relative elasticity of
supply and demand: a party with relatively elastic demand for a particular product can
buy less as the price rises-using substitute products as protection against increased
costs-while a party with relatively inelastic demand for a particular product will
absorb more of any price increase. The standard moral hazard principle that protection
against the costs of certain choices induces more of those costly choices can be restated
as the theory that protection against the costs of certain choices induces fewer costly
alternative choices.
By providing a partial substitute for wage work (or for wage-earning spouses),
welfare programs like the former AFDC can increase impoverished parents' bargaining
power-that is, their relative elasticity of demand for wages (or for wage-earning
spouses). That means welfare makes impoverished single mothers more sensitive to the
costs of wage income (or marriage): they become less captive "customers" in the labor
(or marriage) market, able to reduce wage labor (or marriage) as the costs of that labor
(or marriage) rise so that they are able to hold out for higher quality jobs (or spouses or
other intimate relationships)." 4 This change in bargaining power that enables families
to avoid rather than absorb certain costs decreases those families' incentives to reduce
the costs of poverty by marrying or earning wages-the so-called moral hazard effect.
Of course, these incentive effects exist only to the extent that impoverished single
mothers have control over jobs (or spouses), and only to the extent that income support5
1
such as AFDC provides a substitute for wage income (or for wage-earning spouses).
Nonetheless, to some extent and in some contexts, welfare benefits potentially give
recipients more bargaining power with which to refuse work or family arrangements
that interfere with their perceived well-being (whether economic, social, physical, or
emotional).
The purportedly economic term "moral hazard" begs the inherently political

114. See, e.g., ANN CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT
JOB INTHE WORLD IS SILL THE LEAST VALUED 114 (2001) (giving examples of mothers who
chose not to leave abusive husbands because of lack of sufficient alternative income supports).
Similarly, AFDC can improve impoverished mothers' bargaining power in the adoption and
foster care markets. Family income support policies are thoroughly interwoven with adoption
and foster care policies, as Dorothy Roberts expertly explains. See generally, ROBERTS, supra
note 65. For some impoverished women, relinquishing parental rights has been a substitute
(however inadequate, painful, and undesired) for parental income as a means of meeting the
financial demands of raising children. Changes in ADC and AFDC availability to white
unmarried mothers have been directly related to the "supply" of white American babies for
adoption. See SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 20-32, 76-77, 124-25. The recent welfare reforms
replacing AFDC with TANF have directly reduced impoverished mothers' ability to retain
parental rights to their children, and have sharply increased the breakup of African American
families in particular-transferring many black children into foster care, and to a lesser extent,
into the (often subsidized) care of wealthier adoptive parents. See generally ROBERTS, supra
note 65; see SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 183-95.
115. See infra Part I.D.2.
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question why any particular change in bargaining power is a dangerous moral problem
rather than a valuable moral opportunity. Throughout the history of AFDC and its
precursor ADC, the question whether welfare recipients' increased bargaining power is
good or bad has turned on prevailing judgments about their citizenship status, typically
based on moral views about their race, gender, class, and sexuality. AFDC lost its
virtue in the 1960s not because it changed the behavior of single mothers, but because
(in the prevailing view) the behavior changes it facilitated were virtuous mainly when
targeted to white mothers with marital children.
To the extent it increased the bargaining power of recipients, the income support of
ADC and AFDC encouraged a change in conduct that threatened social, economic and
political stratification: more power to negotiate for different choices means more
power to resist the bad choices that represent and reinforce subordinate status.
Government officials originally construed the behavioral changes induced by ADC as
moral opportunities, not moral hazards, because of political interest in protecting the
citizenship status of white widows and their children (to a limited extent). In 1942, for
example, government officials advocated more generous benefits free of work
requirements precisely because they wanted to increase incentives for (presumably
white) mothers to "stay at home where they were needed."' 16 In theory, more income
support for certain parents can induce more of those parents not just to choose more
welfare income over other alternatives (more wage income or less family care), but
also can induce parents to reduce the costs of those other alternatives-allowing them
to hold out for better choices among jobs, child care, or intimate partners. In 1946, a
government handbook described ADC's incentive effects as a socially valuable
increase in choices for eligible mothers: reduced economic pressure for wage work
meant white mothers would have more power to decide how best to meet their own and
their children's needs."17
In contrast, increased choices for some women and children have counted as moral
hazards because of political resistance to improving their citizenship status. In what
legal scholar Dorothy Roberts explains as "a deliberate effort to maintain a Black
menial labor market caste in the South," '" 8 New Deal politicians and planners carefully
designed the original ADC to preserve and enhance racial stratification." 9 In 1939, a
southern field representative reported that race discrimination in welfare reflected a
unanimous feeling on the part of the staff and board that there were more work
opportunities for Negro women and to [the welfare board's] intense desire not to
interfere with local labor conditions. The attitude that "they always
have gotten
20
along," and that "all they'll do is have more children" is definite.'

116.

SOLINGER,

supra note 60, at 148 (quoting BLANCHE COLL, SAFETY NET: WELFARE AND

SOCIAL SECURITY, 1929-1979, 120 (1995).

117. BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ASSISTANCE Part IV, §§ 3401, 3401.1(1946), discussed in SOUNGER, supra

note 60, at 148.
118. ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 179.
119. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 118-76; NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 53.
120. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 39 (citing quote from WINIFRED BELL, AID To
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 34-35 (1965)).
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Another Southern welfare administrator in the 1930s justified race discrimination in
ADC by explaining that there is "no reason why the employable Negro mother should
not continue her usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefinite domestic service rather
than receive a public assistance grant."' 2' Some western states similarly excluded
Native American or Mexican American families from ADC
and AFDC to help
22
maintain the racial caste systems particular to those states.'
In addition to overtly racial exclusions and restrictions, many states have a long
history of devising facially neutral welfare rules to constrain black workers' labor
market and family choices. In 1943, Louisiana adopted a policy restricting ADC for
children when agricultural employers wanted them or their mothers for cotton
picking. 123 Through the 1960s (when federal courts ruled them unconstitutional),
residency restrictions on AFDC were designed to decrease African American workers'
interstate mobility, so that they would have less bargaining power in intrastate labor
markets. 124 In another example, Dorothy Roberts quotes Senator Russell Long's 1967
comments on work requirements aimed implicitly if not explicitly at encouraging black
women's domestic service:
Either I do the housework or Mrs. Long does the housework, or we get somebody
to come in and help us, but someone has to do it, and it does seem to me that if we
can qualify these people to accept any employment doing something constructive,
125
that is better than simply having them sitting at home drawing welfare money.
These examples of efforts to control AFDC's incentive effects-the so-called moral
hazard problem-show that reducing welfare's moral hazard is about distributing, not
maximizing, labor market choices and opportunities. Senator Long worries about who
does his housework (and perhaps about who has more time for leisure or family care),
not about making sure more or better work or less unpaid family care or leisure gets
done. The racial structure of ADC and AFDC has aimed not to promote wage work
among parents of color, but to channel those parents into low-waged work less
conducive to good family care. For example, although ADC and AFDC provided
relatively well-paying administrative and social work jobs, some states refused to open
these jobs fully to workers of color (at least until civil rights laws intervened).' More
recently, TANF was designed to increase pressure on women to substitute
low-waged
27
work for education and training for higher-wage opportunities.

121. Mary S. Larabee, UnmarriedParenthoodUnder the SocialSecurity Act, 1939 PROC. OF
THE NAT'L CONF. SOC. WORK, 454, availableat http://www.hit.umich.edu/n/ncosw/, quoted in
BELL, supra note 120, at 35, and cited in MIMI ABRAMOvrrZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OFWOMEN
318-19 (1988).
122. See NEUBECK &CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 55-56.
123. Id. at 58.
124. See id. at 61.
125. ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 179 (citing quote in Judith Olans Brown, The Mythogenesis
of Gender: JudicialImages of Women in Paidand Unpaid Labor,UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 457,
487 n.134 (1996)).
126. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 56-57.
127. TANF prohibits states from counting higher education toward work requirements,
limits participation in vocational education to twelve months, and prohibits states from having
more than 20% of their TANF work participants in secondary school or vocational education.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:783

Similarly, attention to ADC's and AFDC's incentive effects on family behavior has
long been a means of preserving a patriarchal social order by redistributing bargaining
power concerning family formation and family care. States often designed ADC and
AFDC rules to penalize unmarried mothers so that their families would have less
power to choose better child care, wage work, and household partners;' 28 TANF
continues the practice of stressing incentives to reduce unwed motherhood. 129 Rules
penalizing unmarried women and their children have reflected and reinforced
prevailing political judgments that women's nonmarital sexuality renders them
incapable of making good moral choices.' 3 Such restrictions controlled welfare's
alleged moral hazard (inducing increased unwed motherhood) not by giving unmarried
mothers and their children better alternatives (for income, child care or parenting
partners), but by reducing their decisionmaking power so that they are forced to accept
the costs of poor women's alternatives to single motherhood. 3' Dorothy Roberts
explains how recent "welfare reform" policies penalizing unmarried black mothers
continue a long caste-based history of hurting, not enhancing, black families-by using
welfare restrictions to induce the redistribution of black women's caretaking skills
from black children to white children, and to redistribute the care of black children
from their families to inadequate or abusive state custody in foster care and
incarceration. 132 Rickie Solinger describes how, during the 1950s and 1960s,
restrictions on ADC and AFDC benefits for unmarried mothers similarly operated
(along with other policies) to help redistribute mothering choices, shifting bargaining
power in the adoption market from unmarried white women to social service agencies
and white infertile married couples.' 3 After legal, political, and social changes
expanded access to welfare (and other rights) for unmarried mothers,' 34 this income
support probably helped white unmarried mothers' wrest more control over the
35
adoption process from both state agencies and adoptive parents.

42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2000). See Martha Davis, Testimony of NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, House Education and Workforce Committee, Hearing on "Welfare Reform:
Success in Moving Toward Work," Oct. 16, 2001 (discussing and criticizing this policy).
128. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 121, at 318-26; MINK, supra note 73, at 44-49.
129. See Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem":Welfare Reform and the
PersonalResponsibilityand Work Opportunity Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 117,
126 (1998) (discussing and criticizing TANF's focus on promoting marriage and discouraging
out-of-wedlock mothering especially among teenagers).
130. See SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 67, 99; Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible"
Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 345-64 (1996) (discussing how ideas about welfare
mothers' irresponsibility are tied to ideas about single mothers being fundamentally immoral);
FINEMAN, supra note 73, at 101-25 (discussing attacks on welfare as reflecting a patriarchal
construction of single mothers as deviant because of their threat to male authority).
131. See SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 195-96 (discussing how Reagan Administration
policies promoting both restrictions on AFDC and restrictions on day care funding were aimed
at reducing poor women's choices). These costs may include violence. See infra note 236.
132. See ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 173-200.
133. SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 68-71, 98-101, 186-87.
134. See id: at 93-97 (discussing changes leading to more acceptance of single mothers in
the 1970s).
135. See Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 490 (1996)
(explaining that state adoption policies became more open as birth mothers recognized they had
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Finally, political leaders have criticized and regulated the incentive effects of AFDC
and other family welfare programs because they viewed recipients' increased political
bargaining power as a threat to the political racial caste system.' 36 After the 1965
Voting Rights Act was enacted, for example, southern politicians recognized that
access to welfare income would create the incentive effect of increased voting and civil
rights activism by many impoverished African Americans otherwise dependent for
income on white employers and landowners who had made compliance with black
political subordination a condition of jobs.' 37 To control this supposed moral hazard
effect, southern politicians opposed expansion of family income assistance and state
officials attempted to exclude African American voters from existing welfare
programs--explaining that benefits would be restored only when blacks "surrendered
their uppity ideas about changing the local balance of power."' 138 Although the term
"moral hazard" tends to be used in contexts where it can more easily mask the moral
values it promotes, this example dramatizes how inherently moral citizenship visions,
rather than impartial "efficiency" calculations, determine whether the bargaining power
to resist bad choices is hazardous or helpful to society.
b. Employers' Bargaining Power
Neoliberal "moral hazard" arguments deceive not only by repackaging caste
constraints as individuals' market-based conduct, but also by narrowing our view of
costly market behavior. A second problem with the moral hazard concept is that it
tends to obscure the reciprocal nature of the incentive changes at issue.' 39 If AFDC
increases impoverished parents' bargaining power relative to employers, it reduces
employers' bargaining power relative to workers and families. Other things being
equal, if AFDC provides a substitute for wage-earning, employers in certain labor
market sectors will have to offer higher wages or better working conditions to employ
parents who can substitute welfare for work--or they will lose their supply of labor for
some jobs.

"a desirable commodity in short supply" and therefore could "think through the terms under
which they might be willing to part with it"); MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES,
MAKING FAMILIES 33 (2001) (explaining that with open adoption "the birth mother changed
from supplicant to partner in making a decision about the placement of her child; the terms of
adoption, once thought to be absolute, became negotiable to some extent"). In the Reagan-Bush
era, Republican politicians responded to the decline in white babies available for adoption by
trying to revive policies pressuring mothers on welfare to relinquish their children. See
SOLINGER,

supra note 60, at 198-99.

136. See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 71-73 (discussing the role of AFDC
policies in Louisiana's resistance to movements for desegregation and civil rights in the early
1960s).
137. See QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 129 (discussing evidence that black voter turnout
between 1965 and 1970 depended heavily on blacks' freedom from dependence on white

employers or landowners for income).
138. Id. (quoting U.S. Congress, Hearings on H.R. 16,311, p. 1512; Lester M. Salamon, The
Stakes in the Rural South, THE NEW REPUBLIC 18 (1971)).
139. Tom Baker has explained the reciprocal, or multisided nature of moral hazard. Baker,
supra note 101, at 275. However, as Baker observes, discussions of AFDC and social insurance
programs tend to oversimplify moral hazard by assuming it works only in one direction.
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The goal of protecting the bargaining power of employers dependent on cheap labor
has long motivated opposition to family income support programs. 140 Dorothy Roberts
reports that in the early 1970s, a Georgia Congressman opposed proposals to expand
AFDC into a guaranteed income system by warning, "There's not going to be anybody
left to roll these wheelbarrows and press these shirts." 141 This comment incorporates
unstated assumptions about welfare's effect on employers' choices. The congressman's
fear of a labor shortage depends on the premise that employers cannot or should not be
pressured to maintain the supply of labor by raising wages to a level competitive with
minimal welfare Support. That is, the congressman appears to assume that employers of
this cheap labor, rather than their low-waged workers, have a right to choose among
options that better suit their self-interest.
By considering incentive effects of AFDC on employers, as well as on
impoverished parents, neoliberalism's double standard becomes clearer. Increased
bargaining power for impoverished single mothers, but not for employers, counts as
moral hazard in the neoliberal view. As welfare for impoverished parents becomes less
available or less adequate, employers have more protection against the costs of labor
because the increased supply of labor (and of particularly needy labor) allows for
lower wages (up to the point of any mandated minimum wage) and for working
conditions less favorable to workers (for instance, less regular or convenient hours, less
comfort and safety, or higher productivity requirements). 42 This protection for
employers potentially increases costs to workers and others, leaving them with worse
choices. For example, this protection for employers' bargaining power might
encourage less care to avoid risks to the long-term physical and emotional health of
workers and their families, thereby impairing their future productivity as workers,
family members, and citizens; it might encourage workers to increase their demands on
charities, or to increase the social problems from children whose parents' low-waged
work leaves them without adequate parental supervision, nutrition, or housing; and the
increased supply of low-waged workers and resulting downward wage pressure might
trickle up the wage scale to increase economic insecurity for struggling middle class
43
families.
Without such protection against labor costs, other things being equal, employers
would have more incentives to reduce the costs of production in other ways, perhaps
through lower executive salaries, lower investor returns, more cost-effective
operations, or even by forgoing certain lines of business that are unprofitable without
cheap labor. For example, if better welfare benefits provided an alternative to lowwage work for black domestic workers, the men who wear the shirts the Georgia
Congressman feared would not get pressed might instead do the pressing themselves,
replacing some of their unproductive leisure time. Perhaps the shirts would be replaced
by apparel needing less costly maintenance. Or perhaps the shirts would be pressed by
more productive mechanized commercial laundries employing fewer but more highly

140. See GORDON, supra note 27, at 266, 276; MICHAEL B. KATZ,
POORHOUSE:

A

SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA

IN THE SHADOW OF THE

261 (1996).

141. Roberts, supra note 69, at 1584 (citing QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 130 (quoting Rep.
Phillip Landrum)).
142. See Robert M. Solow, Lecture II: Guess Who Pays for Workfare, in WORK AND
WELFARE 23, 26-30 (Amy Gutman ed., 1998).
143. See id.
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paid workers. Or, without international trade and human rights rules to control
incentives for cross-border cost-shifting, perhaps the shirts would be pressed by
workers in countries where wages were even lower and social welfare systems even
more inadequate.
Just as moral hazard by welfare recipients can create a "cycle of dependency,"
moral hazard by employers from the protection of inadequate welfare can create a
comparable vicious cycle, often termed the "race to the bottom," whereby employers
are increasingly dependent on keeping workers in poverty to maintain profitable
production. If cheap and docile labor provides an easy means of avoiding changes and
innovations that would lower overall costs in the long run by providing better working
conditions along with better profits, then that cost-protection will encourage employers
to choose investments and business plans that make such "high-road" production
strategies even more difficult to achieve, locking them into arguably less efficient
behavior.
3. From Double Standard into Market Forces
Neoliberal ideology rationalizes its double standard of moral hazard by attributing
employers' increased bargaining power from welfare restrictions to the efficient
market while attributing poor families' increased bargaining power from more
expansive welfare benefits to inefficient redistribution. How do we know which
incentive effects are efficient market results and which are redistributive? By deciding
whether the incentive effects internalize costs (as efficient market prices) or whether
they externalize costs onto others. But how do we distinguish costs that are internalized
from costs that are externalized? According to standard economic analysis, costs are
internalized to parties in a transaction when the private costs of the transaction
incorporate the total societal- costs of the transaction-thereby creating incentives to
maximize overall societal resources. If any costs of the transaction spill over to others,
then those costs are externalized-so that resources are redistributed rather than
maximized. But to decide what costs belong to whom (and therefore which are
internalized versus externalized), neoclassical economics tells us to look to efficient
markets for the answer---costs are internalized if a transaction represents efficient
market conditions.
Following this circular reasoning, neoliberal ideology assumes that the incentive
effects of employers' increased bargaining power from welfare reform are costinternalizing incentives, because any resulting benefits to employers reflect overall net
gains to society as a whole rather than a transfer of resources to employers at a net loss
to others. In neoliberal ideology, the premise that employers' increased ability to
escape labor costs takes place within the "market" also serves as a conclusion that
society as a whole benefits from this transaction. That premise locating employers'
increased bargaining power in the "market" correspondingly serves as a conclusion
that any resulting costs to workers are their private responsibility-the price internal to
a mutually beneficial labor contract. Similarly, the premise that increased bargaining

144. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contractand Care,76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1424
(2001) (explaining how the idea of the "market" separate from family or state has been a means
of constructing a misleading distinction between public and private).
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power for impoverished single mothers from AFDC is nonmarket "redistribution"
serves as a conclusion that the transaction comes at the expense of society as a whole.
This tautological reasoning masks the underlying citizenship question: Whose
ability to get more of what they want by shifting costs to others should count as a
societal gain, and whose should count as a private gain at the expense of others? By
making the market stand for the public gain, neoliberalism implicitly confers superior
citizenship status on those centrally identified with the market-they are members of
the public whose gains count. For example, if welfare cutbacks provide owners of a
credit card telemarketing company with more cheap labor, inducing increased earnings
from increased promotion of credit card debt, then the neoliberal view presents this
gain as the product of market "efficiency" that benefits the public, not just particular
shareholders or executives-regardless of the possible public harms from, for instance,
those families' inability to provide adequate care for their children. On the other hand,
if impoverished families gain from AFDC by escaping low-waged jobs, inadequate
child care, or abusive spouses, then neoliberalism tends to count those gains as
redistribution for private gain at the expense of the public-regardless of the possible
spillover benefits to overall economic or social well-being. By designating employers'
cost-savings from welfare reform as the efficient market price, not the result of
(upward) redistributive policies, the neoliberal analysis constructs this governmentcreated employer windfall as a cost-savings "earned" as part of a mutually beneficial
exchange that contributes to overall well-being.
Neoliberal reasoning presumes employers' protection from the costs of cheap labor
counts as a normal and voluntary resource-maximizing market, despite the role of
government policies in shaping the market price of that labor and in constraining the
choices of workers. And neoliberal reasoning presumes AFDC recipients' protection
from the costs of cheap labor counts as coerced government intervention, despite the
role of market incentives and rational self-interest maximizing in shaping their
choices. 45 Accordingly, welfare recipients do not have a right to cost-savings and
resulting behavior changes from cheaper, or better, child care comparable to
employers' right to cost-savings and resulting behavior changes from cheaper labor
costs from welfare reform. Which gains count as normal and voluntary and which as
abnormal and coerced interventions depend on unstated moral judgments about who
has the right to benefit from others' constrained choices in a normal market.
By locating employers', but not welfare recipients' gains, within the market,
neoliberal reasoning obscures its moral judgments about the distribution not only of
rights to personal gain, but also of responsibilities to avoid losses to others. In the
neoliberal moral hazard analysis, welfare reforms restricting benefits do not seem to
give employers inefficient protection against their labor costs-because this analysis
assumes that employers have no responsibility to cover the costs of working (aside
from minimum wage requirements and other wage laws, perhaps). In particular, the
neoliberal view assumes that capital owners do not owe workers, or the public, a living

145. For some examples of legal scholarship explaining the political contingency and
indeterminacy of the conventional division between market "freedom" and government
"coercion," see Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparisonof "Political"
and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149 (1935); STEINFELD, supra note 36, at 1415.
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wage capable of supporting workers' families or even single workers. In this view, any
cost-savings to employers resulting from cheaper labor due to welfare restrictions
belongs to employers as a matter of right without any reciprocal obligations: employers
can change their wage-paying behavior in response to this protection without being
perceived as irresponsible or dependent. In contrast, by identifying impoverished
families' benefits from AFDC as government redistribution, outside of the market,
neoliberal theory constructs the cost-savings from welfare received by those families as
protection against costs that are the moral responsibility of those families alone. The
moral hazard criticism of AFDC assumes that welfare recipients have a societal
obligation to assume the costs of supporting children themselves without compensation
(or to forgo the children). Their cost-savings and resulting behavior changes from
welfare benefits, therefore raise the possibility
of dependency and potential
46
irresponsibility that threatens good citizenship. 1
4. Reenvisioning Social Citizenship to Reverse Moral Hazard
This distribution of societal rights and responsibilities is by no means an inevitable
or uncontested vision of citizenship. This Part will highlight three examples of
alternative social citizenship visions that escape the double bind of neoliberal moral
hazard by rejecting its double standard, based on its hierarchical vision of citizenship
rights and responsibilities.
First, legal scholar William Forbath explains that, during the New Deal period, a
powerful and broad-based (though divergent) popular movement expressly called for a
new understanding of citizenship in which the government and capital owners were
obligated to support workers and their families and in which citizens were entitled to
"decent work, a measure of economic autonomy and democracy, and social
provision."'' 47 Though this social citizenship vision was not implemented in the New
Deal social security legislation that produced AFDC, it offers a counterpoint to the
currently prevailing neoliberal assumptions by suggesting that a work-centered view of
citizenship can embrace rather than constrain workers' bargaining power, based on a
citizenship vision where workers are given rights and status to promote their wellbeing.
The Supreme Court partly recognized this alternative citizenship vision when it
overturned its Lochner-era reasoning to uphold a minimum wage law in West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish.48 In part, Parrishexplained that the law was a reasonable (and
therefore constitutional) effort to correct for the harmful public effects of employers'
superior bargaining power. Previous doctrine in Muller v. Oregon had upheld
maximum hour laws for women as special protection deviating from a market
presumed to promote the public well-being. 149 Part of the Court's opinion in Parrish

146. See Fineman, supra note 144, at 1410 n.17 (comparing welfare "dependency" to
institutional support of armed forces members who are not labeled "dependent" as a result of
their rights to government compensation and other benefits for their service).
147. Forbath, supra note 27, at 4.
148. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
149. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Another Lochner-eracase, Adkins v. Children'sHosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923), struck down minimum wage laws for women on the ground that the Nineteenth
Amendment meant special protection for women was outdated.
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took the different approach of questioning the citizenship responsibilities incorporated
in the market. The Court rejected the view that employers had a constitutional right to
their gains from low-waged labor, and instead supported as reasonable (and therefore
constitutional) state legislators' view that employers are obligated to pay workers a
living wage. In effect, the Court portrayed the minimum wage law as reducing rather
than creating moral hazard, reasoning that the law internalized costs that employers
had wrongly spread to society. The Court explained, "[t]he community is not bound to
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers" and that the
community may "correct50 the abuse which springs from [employers'] selfish disregard
of the public interest.'
Second, alternative citizenship visions have questioned neoliberalism for its
problematic moral judgments not only about the distribution of the rights and
responsibilities of work, but also about what should count as work that makes a
valuable contribution to society. Feminists have long argued that family caretaking
work performed primarily by women in the home should be recognized and rewarded
for its important social, political, and economic benefits.15 1 For example, legal scholar
Martha Fineman makes a powerful case for expanding social citizenship rights to
include economic support for dependent care on the ground that such work provides a
substantial subsidy from family caretakers-most of whom are women-to the state
and market that is not sufficiently recognized or compensated.' 52 Fineman reverses the
neoliberal moral hazard analysis by explaining that the state and market are dependent
on unpaid or underpaid caretaking work that produces and reproduces society, and that
government and employers have avoided their responsibility to recognize and support
caretaking labor. 53 Fineman (and other feminist scholars) have renewed and improved
the early-twentieth-century maternalist social citizenship visions (expressed in original
ADC and earlier mothers' pensions programs) by making the family's value to society
labor rather than on the family's race, gender, marital, and
depend on its caretaking
54
1
status.
sexual
Third, alternative citizenship visions have challenged the neoliberal assumptions
about how the value of both market work and family care should be distributed among
families and workers. Scholars and advocates focusing on race and citizenship have
long presented the problem of subordinate citizenship for people of color not as a
matter of exclusion from state, market, and family, but as a problem of inclusion in a
state, market, and family defined and structured to privilege whites according to a
racial vision of citizenship.' 55 This vision suggests that strong social citizenship rights
support political and civil rights not because impoverished people lack personal

150. Parrish,300 U.S. at 399-400.
151. See McClain, supra note 61, at 1697-702; Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First
Woman's Rights Claims ConcerningWives' Household Labor,1850-1880, 103 YALEL.J. 1073
(1994).
152. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 Am.U. J.GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000).
153. Fineman, supra note 144, at 1410-11, 1410 n.17.
154. See Linda C. McClain, Citizenship Begins at Home: The New Social Contract and
Working Families, in PROGRESSIVE POLITICS INTHE GLOBAL AGE 95, 101-04 (2001).
155. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1575 (explaining America's unequal welfare state as a
problem of adherence to a racial definition of citizenship).
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capacity for participating in state and market,' 56 but because egalitarian social rights
help create incentives for a state and market that values equal political and civil
rights. 57
Legal scholar Dorothy Roberts, for example, explains that African American
women criticized for receiving AFDC have lacked full citizenship status because their
extensive contributions to society through work, family care, and political activism
have been valued less than white citizens' contributions. 58 Roberts reverses the
neoliberal moral hazard arguments by portraying the problem of AFDC as a cycle of
dependency among white citizens who have long relied on government protection for
cheap labor by people of color to maintain both market production and family
reproduction. 159 In this vision, white citizens have sought to achieve the supposed
"autonomy" and "responsibility" associated with good citizenship by constraining and
stigmatizing the economic gains of racialized others. 60 Welfare reform, in this view, is

156. See King & Waldron, supra note 1, at 428 (discussing a long history of political
theorists who argue that the poor cannot be good citizens because "desperate need is conceived
to interfere with the processes of reflection and deliberation that civic politics requires").
157. Discussing Jill Quadagno's history of the Great Society programs, Dorothy Roberts
notes the interdependence of social, civil, and political rights for both black activists and for
their white supremacist opponents. Roberts, supra note 69, at 1584-86. For example, Quadagno
explains that access to housing affects access to political representation-not because people
who lack safe houses are necessarily any less enlightened politically than people who live in
mansions or suburbs, but because residential segregation acts to systematically fragment and
impede effective political organization and coalition building by those denied residential
mobility. QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 59. Similarly, barriers to equal employment impeded
black voting in the South not because exploited low-waged (or unwaged) workers with no other
income options lacked political awareness or civic virtue but because their employers could use
economic and physical coercion to systematically discourage their voting. See Roberts, supra
note 69, at 1585-86 (discussing QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 129).
See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Moral Exclusivity of the New Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 555, 561-62 (2000) (discussing barriers to political participation in poor Black
neighborhoods as a problem not of individual character problems but of illegitimate legal and
economic institutions that systematically deprive poor residents of their well-being). Contrary to
standard social citizenship arguments, supranote 156, many impoverished peoples around the
globe have demonstrated high levels of political awareness and participation when offered the
hope of a government responsive to their material needs-for example, in 1999 millions of
impoverished South African blacks waited in long lines to exercise their newly won rights to
vote, outshining U.S. voting rates. See TOM LODGE, CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY: SOUTH
AFRICA'S SECOND POPULAR ELECTION 206, tbl.2 (1999) (reporting voter participation rates of

68% in South Africa's 1999 election and similarly high rates in a number of other African and
Eastern European countries); id. at 166 (describing voters in a black township waiting patiently
in a three-kilometer-long line to cast their ballots).
158. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1576 (discussing how Progressive Era reformers
advocating for maternal assistance ignored the value of black women's family care); id.at 1584
(discussing how welfare policies have been designed to minimize black wages); id. at 1572-73
(discussing how opposition to AFDC for black families in the 1960s was tied to opposition to
black political activism).
159. Id. at 1584 (explaining how welfare policy has been designed to maintain "a Black
menial labor force" that sustains white privilege).
160. Roberts contrasts AFDC with social security programs to demonstrate how a racially
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part of a long history of government policies targeted directly toward controlling the
freedom of people of color to make work and family choices in their interests, based on
a racial definition of the public interest.
For example, Roberts explains recent welfare reforms as part of a broader policy
change aimed not at withdrawing government support for families of color to make
them "independent," but rather at redirecting government expenditures on children of
color toward an expensive system of discriminatory state intervention designed to
reduce black families' power to support their own children and to increase their
children's dependence on a state that devalues their care.' 6' As part of a racially
stratified system of economic protections that limits many people of color to bad
choices, welfare reform helps to reinforce stereotypes of people of color as bad
choicemakers, thereby rationalizing the racially stratified citizenship vision that
produces such policies. 62 Roberts argues that ending the racial caste system in the
United States requires an explicitly antiracist system of broad supports for families and
for workers, including an increased minimum wage, guaranteed minimum income,
child care and preschool education,
national health insurance, subsidized high-quality
63
paid parental leaves, and affordable housing.
All of these alternative visions of social citizenship reject Lochner's substance by
recognizing "the market" as an inherently moral--or immoral-institution organized
around a particular and politically contingent distribution of rights and responsibilities.
Because these alternative visions refuse to define existing market structures as
necessarily and naturally efficient-in the overall societal interest-they escape the
problem that alternative distributions of rights and responsibilities are inherently
harmful to aggregate well-being. Each shifts the debate about the immorality of
government protection from assistance for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy
(based on class, gender, and race) to assistance for those at the top. Each reconstructs

stratified system of economic protections directs stigma and restrictions to welfare for families
of color based on their status as subjects, not citizens. "The very relegation of subjects to
inferior programs that supervise and humiliate them reinforces their lack of citizenship qualities

while bolstering the virtues of the citizens who receive dignified entitlements." Id. at 1578. Judy
Scales-Trent explains that dominant groups lose the moral autonomy they pretend to achieve
through their oppression of others: "How dependent are white Americans on the existence of
this group, black Americans, that they keep on the bottom?" Judy Scales-Trent, Oppression,
Lies, and the Dream ofAutonomy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 857, 863 (1999).
161. ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 174-207 (explaining how welfare reform works together
with recently changed child protection and criminal justice policies, administered in racially
discriminatory ways, to break up black families in particular and to transfer black children into
often inadequate, abusive, and costly state custody in foster homes and prisons).
162. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 5-6 (1997) (describing how AFDC "reforms" aim to restrict African
American reproductive choices as part of a broader policy to blame African Americans for their
own inequality in order to justify the racist structures that perpetuate that inequality).
163. ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 268-69; Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationalityand Sacrifice in
the Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607, 2623-24 (1995). Citing the history of
racist administration of supposedly neutral welfare programs, Roberts rejects a "universalistic"
strategy of designing such social supports to appeal to white self-interest and instead rests the
hope for an inclusive welfare system on directly confronting white privilege. Roberts, supra
note 69, at 1591-92.
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the increased bargaining power resulting from government protection for impoverished
families as socially beneficial moral opportunity, not moral hazard. And because each
focuses on poverty as a problem of harmful market privilege as well as harmful market
disadvantage, each of these citizenship visions includes not just a right to be free from
the most severe economic disadvantages, but a right to share in broader economic
privileges. 164

And these alternative visions each go further than the Keynesian justification of
"redistribution" because they each show that government protections altering existing
market behavior do not necessarily constitute an alternative to the market
(redistribution), or a correctionto an otherwise neutral market (efficiency), but instead
can be an alternative approach to structuring the market itself. As Fineman explains,
government protection of rights should not be viewed as a means of responding to
market failures, but as means of creating and sustaining particular markets. 165 These
visions recognize government "interference" with the market as the norm, not the
exception. They present the market as thoroughly structured by laws and ideologies
that represent and enforce particular citizenship values. Forbath explains how the law
of "laissez-faire" capitalism has not simply facilitated free-market contracts, but has
used coercive redistribution to enforce caste: for example, by giving employers'
property interests in workers' labor and obedience, by criminalizing unemployment,
and by restricting workers' collective bargaining rights. 166 Fineman argues that
ideologies and laws governing the family are integral to the market. 167 Roberts
recognizes that the long history of government policies engendering black poverty
(from slavery through Jim Crow and the more recent backlash against civil rights and
welfare) stem not from irrational prejudice that deviated from free market self-interest
maximizing, but from a political economy rationally and often successfully designed to
68
maximize white power.'
Although predominant public opinion may not go as far as Forbath, Fineman, and
Roberts in reenvisioning the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, there is hardly a
clear popular consensus in favor of the neoliberal assumption that the social good
requires markets structured to increase employers' bargaining power relative to
workers with children. 169 Nor is it obvious that the popular support for welfare reform
reflects general agreement that society will benefit from providing incentives for more

164. See Forbath, supra note 32, at 1887 (distinguishing true social citizenship that
transforms the labor market to provide broader economic equality from minimal welfare
assistance for those outside the labor market).
165. Fineman, supra note 144, at 1425.
166. See Forbath, supra note 27, at 21-22.
167. See Fineman, supra note 152, at 13-15.
168. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1589, 1596 (arguing that the problem of social
citizenship is a problem of institutionalized white privilege that pervades current economic
arrangements). See also NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 180-87 (analyzing evidence
that the late 1990s welfare reforms were designed to exacerbate racial control and race
discrimination in employment).
169. Roberts describes some ways in which welfare state proponents could capitalize on
broad interests in increasing government support for working families. Roberts, supranote 163,
at 2623. See also infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
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low-wage jobs and less parental child care. 170 Although white racism and patriarchal
values undergird much popular sympathy with neoliberal reform arguments, popular
disillusionment with AFDC's "redistribution" also may partly reflect the problem that
AFDC failed to go far enough to change the distribution of bargaining power of those
left insecure by the prevailing market. The three alternative visions of women on
AFDC take this popular criticism of welfare "dependency" in a different direction: they
recognize that social citizenship programs like AFDC have failed to support full
citizenship for its recipients but explain the problem as a failure to sufficiently increase
(not constrain) recipients' bargaining power (in state, market, or family).
Exposing the market as a construction of politics will not in itself change the class,
race, and gender antipathy that has helped construct the current market. However, by
removing the economic mask that has sheltered that antipathy and its resulting
privileges from direct debate, perhaps we can better challenge the inegalitarian
citizenship vision it represents. Defenders of social citizenship should look beneath the
line between redistribution and efficiency to directly address the question of which
distribution of private gains, encouraged through which government protections, will
produce the greatest public good.
C. CommunitarianCitizenship and Welfare Reform
Communitarianism presents one of the most politically powerful alternatives to
neoliberalism's emphasis on market efficiency.' 7' Although this ideological movement
takes a variety of overlapping but differing directions across a spectrum of political
views,172 in general, communitarians aim to balance individual rights with community
obligations and to promote73social institutions that actively cultivate moral character
and community solidarity. 1

170. For example, in a 1995 poll, 61% of respondents supported exempting from work
requirements single mothers on welfare with children under three years old. GILENS, supra note
73, at 187, 186 tbl.8. 1. However, Gilens shows that pervasive white racist beliefs that blacks
lack a strong work ethic mean that many whites single out blacks as undeserving of welfare and

are less likely to support welfare programs identified with black recipients. Id. at 67-79. Dorothy
Roberts argues that popular support for maternal care is racialized: predominant white racism
constructs black children as inherently unworthy of care and black mothers as inherently unfit
caretakers (unless under white control as domestic workers). See ROBERTS, supra note 65, at
179-180.

171. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS 63 (2000) (asserting that "The
communitarians have had a direct and visible influence upon the New Democrats and New
Labour, as well as upon social democratic parties elsewhere.").
172. See Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil SocietyRevivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2000) (analyzing and criticizing different strands of
conmunitarian ideas related to the "civil society" movement). Michael Sandel, for example,
distinguishes his civic republican ideas from "communitarianism" more generally. MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE ix-xvi (2d ed. 1998). For a discussion of
communitarian critiques of liberal rights-based discourse, see generally Linda C. McClain,
Rights and Irresponsibility,43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994).
173. See Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and
Responsibilities, in

THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY:

COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA

253 (1993).

RIGHTS,

RESPONSIBILITIES,

AND

THE
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Communitarians have often singled out AFDC and its reform as particularly
important to community well-being. They tend to join (or overlap with) neoliberals in
criticizing AFDC as a source of moral hazard, although communitarians typically use
overtly moralistic rather than economic terms to describe the problem of welfare's
destructive incentives.
But while neoliberal critics attribute moral hazard to policies that fail to give free
reign to market incentives, communitarian critics instead attribute moral hazard to
policies that fail to sufficiently restrain market incentives. Commentators often cite
AFDC to illustrate the problems of retreating from an emphasis on public obligations
of moral responsibility in favor of individual self-interest and entitlement.174 Like prowelfare liberals, communitarians reject the neoliberal claim that community well-being
is solely a matter of individual preference-maximizing determined through market
competition. Instead, communitarians generally believe that some75degree of protection
against economic need and insecurity can benefit communities.
1. Resolving Moral Hazard with Moral Control
The communitarian answer to the moral hazard problem of AFDC, therefore, is not
to reject policies promoting economic security, but to tie them to stronger regulation of
morality. 176 In theory, moral hazard can be reduced not just by reducing protection
against costs, but also by controlling the "insured's" behavior to prevent the effects of
incentives for increased costs. 177 In the predominant communitarian view, reviving

174. See, e.g.,

MICHAEL J.SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A

PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 285-89 (1996) (discussing liberal individualist justifications for AFDC);
William A. Galston, Civil Society, Civic Virtue and Liberal Democracy, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv.

603, 605, 609-10 (2000) (criticizing liberal notions of a "right to welfare" and defending the
1996 welfare reform legislation that eliminated AFDC); Douglas J.Besharov, The Moral Voice
of Welfare Reform, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring 1994, at 13 (criticizing emphasis on
rights rather than moral guidance by AFDC caseworkers); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights and
Responsibilities Viewed from Afar: The Case of Welfare Rights, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Spring 1994, at 33.
175. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS 4-5 (Institute for
American Values 1998) (criticizing growing economic inequality); Etzioni, supranote 173, at
264 (stating the "Responsive Communitarian Platform" position that "the community is
responsible for . . .ensuring the basic needs of all who genuinely cannot provide for
themselves."); Philip Selznick, Social Justice:A CommunitarianPerspective,in THE ESSENTIAL
COMMUNITARIAN READER 62 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998) (asserting that "collective responsibility
includes obligations of care for the vulnerable and disadvantaged"); see also SANDEL, supra
note 174, at 333 (communal provision of economic security would affirm civic identity of rich
and poor alike). Although Sandel disavows the communitarian label and distinguishes his civic
republican views, see supra note 172, he shares the interest in turning from individual rights to
community values that is relevant to my discussion here.
176. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, Introduction to THE GLOBAL THIRD WAY DEBATE 1, 8
(Anthony Giddens ed., 2001) (arguing for maintaining welfare rights by linking those rights to
responsibilities in order to reduce welfare's moral hazard and "culture of deceit").
177. See Steven Shavell, On MoralHazardand Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979)
(describing two economic solutions to moral hazard as, first, incomplete coverage against loss,
and second, regulation by the insurer of loss-producing behavior).
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social citizenship depends on moving away from AFDC's individual rights-based
approach to welfare to an approach grounded in enforcing responsibility and
morality. 178 For example, Anthony Giddens, advisor to Britain's New Labour party,
advocates a "Third Way" that claims to steer a course between what he says is the
left's failure to sufficiently
regulate families and neoliberals' failure to sufficiently
79
regulate the economy.1

In particular, communitarians have advocated conditioning welfare assistance for
parents of dependent
children on requirements for wage work or unwaged
"workfare."' 80 For example, the Responsive Communitarian Platform introduces its
section on "Social Justice" with the statement, "At the heart of the Communitarian
understanding of social justice is the idea of reciprocity: each member of the
community owes something to all the rest, and the community owes something to each
of its members."' 8' The first and foremost responsibility this platform lists for
individuals is "to provide for themselves and their families: honorable work contributes
to the commonwealth and to the community's ability to fulfill its essential tasks." 182A
Heritage Foundation publication recommends "reciprocity and work" as a major theme
of welfare reform.' 8 3 Left-leaning economic theorists Samuel Bowles and Herbert
Gintis argue that deeply rooted moral values of reciprocity could provide strong
popular support for welfare programs
if these were redesigned to encourage social
84
contributions such as employment. 1
Though many communitarians would no doubt disagree with the details, the 1996
federal welfare reforms embrace the general communitarian emphasis on linking
family income assistance to reciprocal obligations for wage work in addition to family
caretaking.18 5 Single parents of children under six receiving TANF are expected to
contribute twenty hours a week of work activities other than caring for their own child
(with some exceptions to account for child care problems),' 86 and are expected to
return to wage
work (or marry a wage earner) after a cumulative total of five years of
87
benefits. 1

In addition to conditioning welfare on participation in wage labor, communitarian

178. See, e.g., MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992); Etzioni,
supra note 173, at 263-64. For analysis and criticism of such communitarian calls to replace
rights (particularly welfare rights) with responsibility, see McClain, supra note 172, at 1014-17,

1023-24, 1014-17; McClain, supra note 130, at 372-95.
179. GIDDENS, supra note 171, at 49-50; see also Giddens, supra note 176, at 8 (warning
that giving welfare rights without welfare responsibilities "creates major problems of moral
hazard in welfare systems").
180. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP .124-26 (1986).

181. Etzioni, supra note 173, at 263-64.
182. Id.
183. RECTOR & LAUBER, supranote 86, at 4.
184. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe? Homo Reciprocans and the
Future of EgalitarianPolitics, BOSTON REV., Dec./Jan. 1998-99, at 4.
185. See supranotes 109-112 and accompanying text; McClain, supra note 154, at 97-99
(explaining and criticizing the mid-1990s welfare reforms as a new social contract based on

"Third Way" theories demanding mutual contributions in the form of wage work).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(2)(B) (2000).
187. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 7; 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000).
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efforts to control welfare recipients' behavior have focused on regulating sexuality and
family composition. For example, many communitarian arguments for reviving social
citizenship stress the importance of redesigning welfare to promote marriage, to reduce
pregnancy and sexual behavior by teens and unwed mothers, and to encourage paternal
income support. 188 TANF, along with the state welfare reform legislation it encourages,
incorporates this theme as well. For example, TANF requires states to give special
emphasis to reducing teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births. 18 TANF prohibits
federal welfare funds from supporting teen parents who do not live under adult
supervision or attend school.190 In addition, TANF requires states to reduce benefits to
mothers who fail to cooperate with efforts to establish paternity.' 9' Furthermore, many
states have taken advantage of TANF's discretion to implement other measures to
increased benefits for recipients who
regulate families, such as "family caps" denying
92
have additional children while on welfare.1
2. Moral Control as Moral Subordination
But this communitarian strategy of reducing AFDC's moral hazard through moral
control reinforces rather than resolves the conflict between good citizenship and
protection against poverty. Even if regulation succeeds in reducing the incentive
effects of welfare, countering its presumed public harm, the communitarian approach
to welfare still assigns recipients of family income assistance subordinate citizenship
status.
The communitarian approach to welfare implicitly measures good citizenship
according to the existing market. Although communitarians claim to value community
moral obligations over (or in addition to) market values of self-interested
individualism, they tend to make economic self-reliance a central moral obligation to
the community. And they define economic self-reliance as successful participation in
the existing labor market, without welfare assistance. That is, communitarian defenders
of social citizenship accept the core neoliberal assumption that government protection
of families through AFDC or TANF counts as "redistribution": a one-way transfer
external to and distinct from the reciprocal exchanges of the "market." Moreover,
communitarians, like neoliberals, generally assume that this unilateral, extramarket
gain provided by welfare is a detriment to others.
In this reasoning, welfare recipients can only be good citizens by accepting a
position of failed citizenship that requires correction. By using moral control to solve
the moral hazard problem, the communitarian approach to welfare remains within the
double bind of the neoliberal welfare critics: redistribution undermines the citizenship
qualities it seeks to promote. To make redistribution acceptable as a transition to selfsufficiency and moral responsibility, welfare recipients must sacrifice their autonomy
and moral agency-the very characteristics that have traditionally distinguished

188. RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 86, at 36-37; A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supra note 175
(recommending that states design their welfare reforms to promote marriage).
189. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 210.
190. Id. at 206; 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(4), (5) (2000).
191. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 206; 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2000).
192. Thomas L. Gais &Cathy M. Johnson, Welfare Reform, Management Systems &Their
Implicationfor Children,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1337 (1999) (eighteen states have family caps).
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citizens from subjects. Echoing Muller v. Oregon,193 the communitarian approach
carves out a space for redistribution for those undeserving of full citizenship status.
Socioeconomic rights stand opposed to civil and political rights as a mark of
subordinate membership in society.
The promise of communitarian social citizenship is that refashioning welfare into a
regulatory tool will help lead recipients from dependent status to full citizenship.
However, the communitarian emphasis on welfare as transition to social inclusion
obscures how communitarian moral regulation aims to revise not just welfare recipients
but also the market and society into which they are to be included. The communitarian
approach constructs the good society as one in which poor families-especially single
mothers-have relatively little bargaining power. By characterizing AFDC's incentives
for substituting wage work with parental child care as harmful "moral hazard,"
communitarians join with neoliberals in supporting an ideal of a society with less,
and
194
lesser, child care (especially by parents) and more, and cheaper, wage work.
The moral discipline promoted by many of the more conservative communitarian
approaches to welfare explicitly aims to correct not just AFDC's incentives for
replacing parental child care with wage work, but also to correct AFDC's incentives
for raising the market value of wage work-especially for African American
workers. 195 One study of the 1996 welfare reforms shows that tougher state work
requirements correlated with states with tighter labor markets and with states that had
high rates of incarceration of workers of color. 196 The "work first" approach,
advocated by some communitarians and incorporated into some states' welfare
reforms, promotes the idea that welfare recipients benefit from taking any job rather
than seeking training or education to secure better jobs.197 Marvin Olasky, whose
"compassionate conservative" approach to welfare influenced presidential candidate
George W. Bush, 198 writes that welfare programs went wrong during the 1960s when
"[s]uddenly it became better to accept welfare than to take in laundry" and when
"young men were told that shining shoes was demeaning, and that accepting
government subsidy meant a person 'could at least keep his dignity."" 99 Olasky is one
of several conservative communitarians who advocate making welfare shameful again

193. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
194. Linda McClain argues that the "Third Way" model of citizenship based on mutual
responsibility "requires a more explicit focus upon the public value of care and upon care work
as socially valuable work, work that the market insufficiently 'honours' or 'rewards."' McClain,
supra note 154, at 99.
195. Mississippi used tough work requirements in the 1990s to reduce largely African
American caseloads by 71% despite high poverty rates in that state, leading some commentators
to describe that policy as a racialized attempt to provide a "desperate and docile labor force,
with workers prepared to take slave wages." NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 191-92
(quoting Kensington Welfare Rights Union, The New Welfare Reform: Delivering Slaves to the
Auction Block 3 (1998), availableat http://www.universityofthepoor.org/library/kwruw-r.htm).
196. Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy choices in the
Devolution Revolution, 45 Am.J. POL. So. 378, 391 (2001).
197. See Davis, supra note 127.
198. Alison Mitchell, Bush Draws Campaign Theme From More Than the Heart, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 2000, at Al.

199. OLASKY, supra note 178, at 168-69.
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2°°
to correct this purported harm.
This approach to moral control enforces a vision of citizenship in which "some
people"-often racially coded, as in Olasky's shoe-shining and laundry examplesmust accept low-waged work as their place in society. 20 ' This vision aims to value
work not through policies designed to improve pay or working conditions, but by
reducing the citizenship status accorded those who do not engage in wage work
(increasing welfare's relative stigma). Although this vision offers persons in poverty
moral rewards-better citizenship status-for low-waged labor, that status comes at
the cost of forgoing material and emotional interests in different work and family
choices. As some advocates of welfare reform insist, beingpoor means being morally
obligated to refrain from bearing or raising children you cannot afford to support. 202
Having a family becomes a privilege allocated by class, race, and gender status, rather
than a basic expectation of citizenship.20 3

200. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980
178-84 (1984) (criticizing attempts to take the stigma out of welfare, and arguing that stigma
and status provide appropriate incentives for shaping the behavior of the poor); MYRON
MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIxTIEs' LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS 143
(1993) (arguing that the poor should not be viewed as victims of economic structures, but
should be morally judged because "if it is not blameworthy not to work, no definitive praise
attaches to someone who works and supports his [sic] family" (emphasis in original)).
201. The punitive approach to welfare reform correlates highly with the percentage of
African Americans receiving welfare. See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 184-87;
Soss et al., supra note 196, at 191.
202. See Kevin Butler & Charles Murray, Welfare's Woes and the Ills of Out-of-Welfare
Births, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 1, 2000 (quoting Murray's discussion comparing the
decision to bear a child "even though you have very little money, very little education and are
very young" to child abuse and neglect); Galston, supra note 174, at 608 (criticizing births by
poor, single teenaged mothers on the grounds that "[i]t is wrong to bring a child into the world
if one is not adequately prepared to raise the child"). For critical discussions of such arguments,
see McClain, supranote 130, at 352-57; Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, Do Poor Women
Have a Right to Bear Children?,AMERICAN PROSPECT, Winter 1995, at 43.
203. See ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 182-93 (discussing welfare reforms as part of a racially
driven policy of breaking up black families and penalizing black motherhood); SOLiNGER, supra
note 60, at 183-224 (explaining how welfare reforms have contributed to the ideology that
"motherhood [is a] class privilege in America"); CRITTENDEN, supra note 114, at 252 (reporting
that a business executive denied a high-level employee a work day reduced to eight hours by
saying that "any woman who can't afford a nanny shouldn't have children"); id. at 172
(contrasting divorced men's assumption of a right to a second family despite their financial
inability to continue supporting their existing children). A television documentary of welfare
reform in New York interviewed a woman who lost her children to state custody after losing her
welfare benefits, despite agreement that she was a good mother. See Julie Salamon, When Their
Bootstraps Just Aren't Long Enough, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at E5 (reviewing Take it From
Me, PBS television broadcast, July 24, 2001). Joan Williams has analyzed how domesticity
historically has been a class-based privilege. Joan C. Williams, Notes ofa Jewish Episcopalian:
Gender as a Language of Class; Religion as a Dialect of Liberalism, in DEBATING
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY

105-06 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998). For a discussion of the centrality of
freedom of family choices to citizenship, see generally PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED
STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997).
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Even when formulated in more supportive and less punitive terms, the emphasis on
welfare recipients' reciprocal obligation to work tends to undermine the citizenship
status communitarians hope it will build. The more progressive versions of
communitarian welfare reform attempt to reduce the degree of sacrifice required from
parents taking low-waged work by redirecting (or even increasing) government
protection to provide work-based assistance. Some welfare policies also take this
approach, for example through the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit for low-waged
workers.2° Wisconsin and other states have incorporated welfare reforms that offer
child care, transportation, health care, and training to low-waged workers or welfare

recipients seeking work.2 °5
3. Redistributing Moral Control
But reconstructing welfare as assistance with the obligation to work for wages still
divides government support for the poor from good citizenship because it retains a
double standard of moral hazard: poor families, but not employers and others, threaten
the public well-being when they have the power to bargain for a greater share of the
benefits of waged labor. That double standard creates a double bind that limits workbased social citizenship: employers and wealthier others, not families in poverty, have
the moral right to increased gains from increased wage work. Communitarian policies
of employment assistance tend to aim to increase welfare recipients' contributions to
the community through more wage work, not to make poor families better off
economically from wage work.20 6

204. See Jared Bernstein, Two Cheers for the Earned Income Tax Credit, AMERICAN
Summer 2000, at 64; HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 106-10. See

PROSPECT,

generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitationsof Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (questioning the EITC for attempting what she
sees as redistribution through the tax system).
205. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 117-26 (discussing programs

implemented prior to TANF); Governor Tommy Thompson, featured speaker, Manhattan
Institute, Next Steps in Welfare Reform Conference (1999), at http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/next.stepS_4.htm.

206. One analysis of state welfare reforms analyzes two possible purposes of employment
assistance: improving resources for poor families and improving families' supposed moral or
cultural environment through increased wage work. Gais & Johnson, supra note 192, at 1329.
They conclude that most states reforms are designed to promote the latter goal. Id. at 1346-47;
see also KATZ, supra note 1, at 337 (discussing evidence that welfare reforms moving families
from AFDC to wage work have left many working parents in poverty). One study of the effects
of TANF in three cities showed that 75% of women in 1999 who had been on welfare (TANF)
for two years or less had incomes below the poverty line. William Julius Wilson & Andrew J.
Cherlin, The Real Test of Welfare Reform Still Lies Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at A21.
Although a number of welfare recipients found jobs in the booming late- 1990s economy, many
of these jobs did not result in a long term net increase in spendable family income. See
ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 182-83 (summarizing studies). And although some studies suggest
that one-half of families leaving welfare for work may be better off financially, this result is
probably due to a combination of a strong economy, increased child care, and EITC assistance.
Wendell Primus, Comment, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 131 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron

Haskins eds., 2001). Black families are particularly likely to be worse off economically from
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If the purpose of employment-based assistance is to lead nonworkers into the
economic self-reliance that constitutes good citizenship, then those in need 2of
07
economic assistance to sustain their wage work will retain suspect status as citizens.
And if family-supporting wage work is the key to demonstrating personal responsibility
for public well-being, work-based family assistance will need to be limited and heavily
regulated to prevent recipients from benefiting at the expense of others.208 In practice,
state welfare programs that have implemented employment assistance programs have
made this assistance a short-term means to reducing welfare caseloads, and have
imposed cumbersome and often racially discriminatory reporting and recertification
requirements on recipients to determine eligibility and compliance with work
obligations.2 °9 In 2002, President George W. Bush proposed to increase most TANF
recipients' work requirements from thirty to forty hours a week and from 50% of a
state's adult welfare
recipients to 70%, without increased funding for child care or
210
other assistance.

Employment-based assistance protects employers as well as low-waged workers
from the costs of labor. Yet communitarian arguments for employment assistance
generally do not advocate comparable regulation of employers to ensure that their
individual gains are matched by community contributions. Instead, they implicitly
equate employers' gains from assistance with public gains, taking their good
citizenship status as an unconditional given regardless of effects on others.

work requirements because of race discrimination in employment and in state administration of
job requirements. See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 177-214 (discussing Gooden's
work along with other examples); Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal:Differences in
Caseworker Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. AFR.-AM. PUB.
POL'Y 23-33 (1998); Susan T. Gooden, The Hidden Third Party: Welfare Recipients'
Experiences with Employers, 5 J. PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL'Y 75 (1999).
207. For many, "leaving welfare" has meant a shift in welfare from TANF benefits to lowwaged labor supported by food stamps and the earned income tax credit. See Wilson & Cherlin,
supra note 206 (reporting results of a study of TANF in three cities). Numerous reports have
linked welfare reforms to dramatic increases in demand for charitable assistance for food and

housing. See ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 183. In contrast, Linda McClain argues for a view of
personal responsibility that makes improving families' ability to provide care for children a
community moral goal on par with participation in the workforce. McClain, supra note 154, at
101.
208. See McClain, supra note 154, at 100 (warning of "a real risk of the problem of
childcare being inadequately addressed if it continues to feature merely as incidental to
'supporting work"').
209. Gais & Johnson, supra note 192, at 1347-48; KATZ, supra note 1, at 332 (discussing
administrative problems of work assistance programs, including high rates of incorrect benefit
cuts for failure to comply with rules); see also NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 186-89
(discussing examples of race discrimination in local administration of TANF requirements, such
as requiring more documentation from Latina applicants than from white applicants); Gooden,
supra note 206, at 32 (reporting from a study of Virginia's welfare reforms that caseworkers
used discretion to provide assistance, such as job referrals and transportation aid, to white
welfare recipients far more than to black recipients).
210. Robert Pear, Study by GovernorsCalls Bush Welfare Plan Unworkable, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2002, at A8; see also Amy Goldstein, Bush Presses Lawmakers to Back Welfare
Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, at A4 (reporting the President's plans to pressure the new
Congress to adopt increased work requirements for TANF).
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Other things being equal, government assistance with working expenses such as
transportation and child care allows employers to benefit from increased reliability and
productivity from workers without raising wages or otherwise improving working
conditions, thereby encouraging a cycle of dependency on government assistance with
the costs of low-waged labor.211 Yet in the communitarian vision, employers'
additional profits from low-waged labor, even if facilitated by government assistance,
remain a matter of basic right requiring no additional community obligations in return.
If this assistance allows capital owners to gain at the expense of workers and their
families, by keeping wages lower than they would be otherwise, then they are simply
pursuing market self-interest maximizing which presumably maximizes resources for
all. Even the more progressive communitarian view of work obligations tends to
reinforce poor families' subordinate citizenship status by continuing to identify
employers' interests with a beneficial market but to identify poor families' interests
with socially deviant withdrawal from the market. And even the progressive
communitarian proposals for generous work assistance tend to incorporate an
individualized vision of workers as job consumers rather than as collective producers
of better jobs and communities. For example, one study of the impact of welfare
reform in Massachusetts found that some community-based organizations have
redirected their resources toward providing individual services for the transition from
welfare to work and away from strengthening neighborhood institutions, building
in2civic participation aimed at long-term community economic
coalitions, and engaging 21
development.
social
and
The alternative social citizenship visions of Forbath, Fineman, and Roberts differ
from prevailing communitarian views not because they reject the importance of work
and responsibility to community well-being, but because they value responsibility for
more egalitarian communities and work. Dorothy Roberts envisions antipoverty
programs that incorporate a vision of the poor not just as dependent individuals to be
included in "the community" through economic assistance, but as political and civic
213
actors deserving of the power to build communities to better meet their interests. For
example, the Great Society's social citizenship program provided not just individual
2 14
aid, but also government support for community action groups run by black activists.
Similarly, the New Deal-era social citizenship vision that William Forbath describes
focuses not just on individual economic rights, but on the importance of government
support for workers' collective political and economic action through policies

211. Anne Alstott discusses such market-changing effects from employment subsidies
designed to induce welfare recipients to increase their wage labor. Anne L. Alstott, Work vs.
Freedom: A Liberal Challengeto Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 1006-07 (1999).
My criticism, however, is not that such incentive effects are an artificial distortion of some
"real" market incentives, but that they represent a policy choice to favor a market structure that
reflects and reinforces a hierarchical vision of workers' and employers' citizenship status. See
infra notes 242-58.
212. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 203-04 (discussing study by James Jennings,
The End of Welfare As We Know It? Or Ending NeighborhoodsAs We Have Come to Know
Them?, NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP REPORTS (Washington, D.C.), Winter 1999, available
at http://www.nfg.org/reports/64welfare.htm).
213. Roberts, supra note 69, at 1596-97.
214. Id. at 1571.
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promoting cooperation and democratic community in the workplace. 1 5
Like contemporary communitarians, that New Deal-era social citizenship vision
asserted that public morality and good citizenship depend on work. Yet that previous
vision of work-based social citizenship differed from contemporary communitarian
visions by making employers' obligations the key to full participation in society.2 16
Similarly, Martha Fineman's feminist social citizenship vision stresses public moral
.217
-bsdlbra
responsibility toward caretakers.
She not only redefines family-based labor as
"work" central to a good society, but also advocates shifting responsibility for
sustaining that work from caretakers and low-waged workers to the state and the
broader market by obligating employers and governments to accommodate and reward
caretaking.21 s Dorothy Roberts analyzes how black feminist activists often have
presented welfare rights not as a substitute for either market rights or market
obligations, but as a means of transforming labor market rights structured to promote
white and male supremacy. 219 For example, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century
African American reformers advocated family assistance that would support wageworking mothers as fully deserving citizens and that also would support family
caretaking by treating that as work deserving of wages. 220 In an antiracist citizenship
vision, income support that allows parents of color to withdraw from racially
discriminatory waged labor can be a moral opportunity (not a moral hazard) increasing
pressure on employers and on white families to take responsibility for better valuing
workers of color both in and out of the home.22
In short, these three visions differ from the communitarian call to ground social
citizenship in public morality, because all demand additional moral responsibility from
those identified with the market. By challenging the morality of the market, these
alternative social citizenship visions shift deviance and blame for public harm away
from those who lose out under existing market conditions. Moreover, these alternative
visions recognize markets as fundamentally moral institutions-not fixed as a matter of
natural law, but shaped by ideology and power. Dorothy Roberts, for example, argues
that the prevailing communitarian emphasis on morality fails to recognize and redress
the immorality of economic institutions that perpetuate poverty through longstanding
barriers to housing, jobs, and political participation. 222

215. See Forbath, supra note 27, at 61.
216. Id. at 73-75. See MINK, supra note 73, at 26 (arguing that congressional feminists
supporting welfare reform "conflated their own right to work outside of the home with poor
single mothers' obligationto do so") (emphasis in original).
217. See Fineman, supra npte 144, at 1409-11; see also McClain, supra note 154, at 101
(arguing for a recognition of childcare as a component of responsible self-government so that
parents deserve societal help in providing both parental and nonparental child care).
218. Fineman, supranote 144, at 1436-39 (arguing for restructuring workplaces to support
family caretakers, not just as a "special" treatment, but as a basic right to work).
219. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1570-71 (discussing early-twentieth-century activism).
Id. at 1571-72, 1585 (discussing 1960s activism).
220. See id. at 1570-71; GORDON, supra note 27, at 136-37; Eileen Boris, The Power of
Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Redefine the "Political", 2 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 25, 26 (1989).
221. See NUEBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing how
welfare reforms reinforce racially discriminatory labor markets).
222. Roberts, supra note 69, at 560-61.
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The predominant communitarian vision fails to rescue social citizenship from the
neoliberal double bind, because it construes government support for poor families as
"redistribution" that departs from market responsibility,223 implicitly accepting the
given distribution of market responsibilities as generally moral or at least beyond
moral scrutiny. While more egalitarian communitarians such as Anthony Giddens
theoretically advocate enforcement of responsibilities from the rich as well as the
poor, 224 in practice they tend to accept the bargaining power of wealthy citizens as
market facts that must be accommodated, while condemning the bargaining power of
poor citizens as a cultural problem that must be regulated.
For example, Giddens notes that "entrenched interest groups" will resist welfare
reform aimed at controlling moral hazard among poorer citizens, but that enforcing
such responsibilities "is an absolute necessity" to sustain and strengthen those welfare
Giddens discusses the question of taxing billionaires
programs. 225 In contrast, when G
like Bill Gates to support "redistribution" to those facing increased economic
insecurity, he explains that high income tax rates for the rich are "no longer feasible or
desirable" because the rich have the power to evade taxes. 226 Giddens accepts a system
that imposes greater responsibility on the poor than on the rich for curtailing their selfinterest in maximizing personal gain, because Giddens assumes that the personal gains
chosen by the rich are inherently more moral-more conducive to the good societythan the personal gains of the poor. He explains that when the poor evade low-waged
work, they hurt society through excessive leisure (without considering the societal
227
value of increased child care or pressure for better jobs), and when the rich evade
taxes they help society by producing jobs (without considering the societal value of
those jobs or the possibility that tax evasion by the rich supports short-term speculation
228
or luxury consumption rather than productive investment). By identifying welfare
recipients' gains as inefficient moral hazard and tax cuts for the wealthy as promoting
an efficient market, Giddens implicitly affirms a citizenship vision in which the poor
have subordinate moral status. In contrast, by questioning rather than presuming the
moral superiority of those the market has traditionally privileged, Forbath, Fineman,
and Roberts provide stronger justifications for expanding individual social and
economic rights for impoverished families as a means of more fully enhancing
community responsibility.
D. Liberal Citizenship and Welfare Reform
The prevailing pro-welfare liberal approach to social citizenship rejects both
communitarian and neoliberal attempts to justify government economic support on the

223. See, e.g., Giddens, supra note 176, at 180 (arguing that equality of opportunity requires
"redistribution" for those "left behind" by the market).
224. Id. at 8 (arguing that the call for more responsibilities for people with welfare should be
extended to elites).
225. Id. at 11.
226. Id. at 184-85.
227. Id. at 180 (noting that high levels of social welfare encourage unemployment associated
with low self-esteem and an "oppression of surplus time").
228. Id. at 185 (arguing that high taxes "penalize effort and therefore job creation and
economic prosperity" and that tax cuts can "create more profit and more disposable income").
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ground of overall societal benefits, whether moral or economic. Instead, liberals tend
to defend social citizenship on the theory that the good of society depends on
individual well-being, not simply on aggregate gain or public virtue.229 In contrast to
mid-twentieth-century pro-welfare liberals, contemporary liberals generally have
moved away from relying on the Keynesian theory that redistribution promotes
aggregate gain.
Like neoliberalism, pro-welfare liberalism claims the goal of "state neutrality
toward competing visions of the good life., 230 Liberalism assumes a citizenship norm
of individuals who have the power to govern themselves by making choices as
autonomous agents. And like neoliberalism, liberalism assumes a market that generally
promotes the public well-being by allowing individuals to maximize their own welfare
through freely chosen exchanges. But liberals tend to depart from neoliberalism by
arguing that the aggregate good produced by market freedom is sometimes inconsistent
with individual well-being.
In the pro-welfare liberal view, state support can augment rather than diminish
freedom for individuals who lose out when the market produces aggregate gain. For
example, Anne Alstottargues for a liberal revision of welfare founded on the principle
23
that providing basic resources gives each individual "realfreedom to shape her life." 1
In their book True Security, Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw justify their ambitious
proposal for a comprehensive social safety net on the ground that the market's success
in achieving overall well-being should be balanced with individual security. 232 Framing
their proposal with the story of the three pigs, whose houses provide different degrees
of protection against wolves, they conclude that "[d]espite our nation's affluence,....
233
too many little pigs are still being gobbled up.
But contemporary liberals, like communitarians, tend to accept the two central
premises of the neoliberal attack on social welfare. First, the liberal defense of welfare
assumes that the market stands for efficiency principles that promote the overall
good-the public interest. Second, liberals tend to assume that AFDC's assistance for
single mothers in poverty deviates from those market principles to promote
redistribution, not efficiency. As a result, the liberal response to neoliberal welfare
criticisms, like the communitarian response, must grapple with the problem that
welfare threatens to harm both the public and, in the long run, its beneficiaries-the
moral hazard problem.
1. Resolving Moral Hazard with Freedom from Responsibility
The primary liberal response has been to defend or redesign AFDC as protection
against costs not attributable to individual behavior. If limited moral autonomy or

229. Alstott, supra note 211, at 980 ("In contrast to utilitarians, whose goal is to maximize
aggregate utility, liberals seek to ensure that every individual has the greatest possible freedom
to shape her own life.").
230. Id.
231. Id. (citing and discussing egalitarian theories of Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin,
John Rawls, and Philippe Van Parijs) (emphasis in original).
232. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
SOCIAL INSURANCE 8, 15-25 (1999).
233. Id. at 320.
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economic agency makes welfare recipients unlikely to significantly affect public costs,
welfare is possible without the harsh moral or economic discipline of either the
communitarian or neoliberal approaches. In the typical contemporary liberal view,
welfare recipients are not irresponsible agents of public harm; instead, they are freed
from responsibility for harm.
In reply to charges that welfare produces incentives for more children, less
marriage, and less wage work in impoverished families, liberals tend to argue that
these incentives do not in fact significantly affect welfare recipients' behavior. In True
Security, for example, Graetz and Mashaw explain that the problem of moral hazard
need not defeat comprehensive public assistance because incentives do not translate
directly into behaviors. 4 Liberal critics of restrictive welfare reforms often cite
empirical evidence suggesting that recipients of AFDC have not significantly altered
family composition or other behavior in response to benefits.235
In one explanation of the gap between the moral hazard theory and the actual
behavior of welfare recipients, decisions about childbearing, child raising, marriage,
and wage work are to a great extent out of recipients' control. For example, some
women on AFDC are forced to remain out of the work force or to bear children
because of violence, particularly by intimate partners. 236 Single mothers may resort to
welfare from lack of marriage or job opportunities, rather than from strategic choices
to substitute public assistance for wages or husbands. Poor physical or mental health,
failed contraception, random misfortunes, or absent, noncontributing fathers may put
families in unanticipated economic need. All of these arguments present women on
welfare as victims of external, arbitrary, or systemic forces, which prevent them from
exerting individual responsibility for their choices. 237
In another explanation of the gap between incentives and behavior, even if
recipients sometimes have control over their decisions about marriage, childbearing, or
wage work, they tend to make these decisions based on irrational or extrarational
grounds where economic incentives hold little sway. For example, women in poverty
might attempt to raise children and forgo job opportunities because of love, other
emotional needs, mental illness, addiction, or religious values.
Or, liberals sometimes try to present welfare recipients as innocent of any harmful
incentive effects by construing children rather than single mothers as the beneficiaries
of assistance. Graetz and Mashaw, for example, justify income support for

234. Id. at 296.
235. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 106 (1995); Lucy A.
Williams, The Ideology of Division: BehaviorModification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102
YALE L.J. 719, 739-40 (1992); McClain, supra note 130, at 382.
236. See Lisa D. Brush, Harm, Moralism, and the Struggle for the Soul of Feminism, 3
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

237,249 (1997) (explaining the problem that abusive partners use

violence to prevent women on welfare from gaining economic independence); Lucie E. White,
No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground,81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 198789 (1993) (describing examples of how violence-by family members, coworkers, employers

and others-restricts women's ability to escape from poverty and welfare).
237. In contrast to standard pro-welfare liberal efforts to focus on structural rather than
individual causes of economic need, Linda McClain uses liberalism and feminism to develop a
more sophisticated analysis of welfare mothers' choices that recognizes the interrelationship
between personal responsibility and social structures. See McClain, supranote 130, at 434-53.
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impoverished families as protection against "the risk of being born into the wrong
family,, 238 or more impassively, the risk of being raised by parents of limited earning
capacity.239
2. Freedom from Responsibility as Subordinate Citizenship
But these contemporary pro-welfare liberal arguments fail to escape the neoliberal
double bind that makes redistribution a threat to good citizenship. If welfare is
assistance for passive victims of circumstance who fail to achieve the liberal norm of
market autonomy, then welfare will be a mark of noncitizenship. Communitarians
make this argument when they criticize liberals for failing to treat people in poverty as
capable of taking personal moral responsibility as full citizens.24 ° While liberal
arguments discounting incentive effects offer an alternative to the subordination
implicit in communitarian moral control, these liberal arguments tend to support
welfare as a means of self-determination only for those whose self-determination is
limited. Once again, as in Muller v. Oregon,241 the price of redistribution is status as
"others" not capable or deserving of full membership in society.
In addition, because liberalism tends to make market autonomy the model for good
citizenship and to distinguish welfare support from market autonomy, it reinforces as
public-interested a market in which those in poverty have limited bargaining power.
For example, Anne Alstott makes a strong liberal case for basic income assistance
without work requirements as a means of enhancing individual self-determination,
particularly individual freedom to choose between work and family care or other
pursuits not valued in the existing labor market. 24 2 Alstott argues that work-based
assistance programs like TANF designed to encourage wage work by mothers in
poverty rely on a paternalistic moral vision that wrongly romanticizes low-wage
work. 24 3 By constructing increased alternatives to wage work for poor mothers as a
beneficial moral opportunity-an increase in individual freedom of choice-rather
than as harmful moral hazard, she begins to a construct a liberal vision of welfare that
does not depend on denying recipients' freedom to reshape the market in their interest.
Nonetheless, Alstott backs away from such a vision by advocating an income
assistance program designed to accommodate (or even to exacerbate) a market in
which low-income families are limited to the tough choice between below-subsistence
government income 22444 and low wages. 245 She argues that income assistance should be

238. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 124.

239. Id. at 119.
240. See Mitchell, supra note 198, at 24 (reporting President George W. Bush's campaign
remarks praising charities that use "demanding love" to treat aid recipients as "moral
individuals, with responsibilities and duties," and criticizing liberal welfare programs that
consider recipients "wards or clients or dependents or numbers").
241. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
242. Alstott, supra note 211, at 988-89.
243. Id. at 1011-12 (arguing that policies increasing low-waged work in place of maternal
child care do not necessarily enhance either societal well-being or individual freedom).
244. Id. at 979 (proposing a $6000 cash grant invariant to family size and below poverty
levels).
245. Id. at 1005-09 (explaining that no one "has the right to sell her labor for more than her
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combined with "deregulation" of the labor market, 246 which she explains as eliminating
"regulatory barriers" such as minimum wage laws that keep wages "artificially high for
low-skilled workers., 247 Her approach seems to depend on keeping basic income
grants, along with wages, low enough so that this assistance does not substantially
distort what she assumes are beneficial market incentives. 248 This part of her plan
embraces rather than rejects the moral premise that policies increasing low-waged
work enhance both overall social utility and individual freedom.2 4 9 She defends this
vision of the citizenship virtues of low-waged work by arguing that "[r]eal freedom
does not demand that everyone be given unlimited choices or that everyone be happy
the wage she commands, or
....Every individual is free to decide whether to work25for
0
to use her time elsewhere if the wage seems too low.

By assuming individual workers, not politically structured markets, "command" the
low (or high) wages they receive, she adopts the Lochner-era view that the market
naturally operates through voluntary, resource-maximizing exchanges rather than
through government distribution and enforcement of rights and responsibilities. And by
singling out minimum wage laws as a central barrier to virtuous labor market
freedom-rather than, say, laws that prohibit wages for spousal housework, 25' laws that
252
laws that provide large
protect employers who discriminate against mothers,
with family
wage-earning
replace
wives
men
whose
married
subsidies to wealthy
253
as natural a
assumes
254--Alstott
unions
labor
strong
discourage
care, or laws that

free counterparts will pay").
246. Id. at 1008.
247. Id. at 1004-05. Alstott does advocate strong enforcement of civil rights laws against
race discrimination in employment, implicitly distinguishing those laws from "artificial"
regulatory barriers, but she does not offer any specific details about how to prevent employment
discrimination from hindering her liberal vision of free choice between wage work and family
care. Id. at 1008. For discussions of how race and sex discrimination in employment prevent
such free choices, see NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 193-95; Vicki Schultz, Life's
Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1898-99 (2000).
248. See Alstott, supranote 211, at 1008 (explaining elimination of "mandates" such as the
minimum wage as a way of making "transparent" the "real wages for low-skilled labor"). Alstott
says she is leaving aside the question whether basic income should be set at a subsistence (rather
than below subsistence) level, id. at 979 n.46, but her justification for the income grant as
freedom-enhancing seems to rest on keeping the cash grant low.enough to avoid significant
reductions in income for upper earners (i.e., substantial economic equality), in part on the theory
that upper earners' income contributes more to society. See id. at 984-86.
249. Id. at 1008 (describing such a market as "freer").
250. Id. at 1006.
251. See generally Siegel, supra note 151 (discussing case law imposing status-based
contractual constraints on women's ability to negotiate for wages for family caretaking); Amy
Wax, Is There a Caring Crisis?, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 340 (1999) (book review)
(considering the reasons why societies have "uniformly frowned on the very notion of a free
market in women's work").
252. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment DiscriminationLaw, Women's
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 371, 391-419 (2001) (showing how narrow interpretations of sex discrimination law
have perpetuated employment discrimination against pregnant women and caretaking mothers).
253. The federal income tax law's marital income-splitting scheme provides a tax shelter,
worth about $33 billion annually, for middle and upper income wage earners married to
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market governed by policies that constrain the bargaining power of many family
caretakers and low-waged workers compared to wealthier others.255 While her plan
challenges neoliberal citizenship norms by demanding a "little bit of extra freedom and

nonearning or low-earning spouses. Congressional Budget Office, For Better or Worse:
Marriage and the Federal Income Tax (1997), discussed in Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something
About MarriagePenalties:A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000); Deborah
Sandorfy, The "MarriagePenalty" and Innocent Spouse Provisions, 71 CPA J. 66 (2001)
(describing the income splitting bonus as a tax shelter). The taxpayers who gain financially from
this provision are disproportionately upper-income white men (and their families). See also
Dorothy A. Brown, The MarriagePenalty/BonusDebate in Black and White, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTs. 168 (1999) (analyzing the racial disparity in subsidies for marriages that do not share
wage-earning equally and the failure of proposed reforms to correct it). This bonus provides
incentives for the lower-earning spouse to withdraw from substantial wage labor especially in
upper income families (and it encourages lower earning parents to remain single). See EDWARD
J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 17-19, 66, 218-19 (1997) (discussing incentive effects of the
federal income tax law's marriage bonus and marriage penalty). While recent legislation
gradually phases out the related marriage penalty on many married couples with two relatively
equal earners, it increases the marriage subsidy so that high-earners are still better off married to
a noneamer than they are if they remain single or if they divide wage earning and family care
equally. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§§ 301-303 (codified at various sections of 26 U.S.C.); Marvin J. Williams, The Marriage
Penalty Dilemma: Some Relief on the Way, 46 NAT'L PUB.AcCr. 32 (2001) (explaining that this
law reduces tax penalties on low and middle income married couples but retains the joint filing
system and related rate structures that provide the marriage bonus). While some construe the
marriage bonus as a recognition of the value of women's caretaking labor, see Anne L. Alstott,
Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
2001, 2032 (1996), others argue that this scheme's direct effect is to reward breadwinners in
certain families with unequal labor division and that women's caretaking labor (both waged and
not) would be more directly and equally rewarded by taxing married persons as individuals. See
JULIE A. NELSON, Feminist Theory and the Income Tax, in FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND
ECONOMICS 97-117 (1996).
The Social Security system similarly subsidizes the traditional breadwinner/homemaker
family, arguably penalizing married women's work both in and out of the home. See NANCY
FOLBRE, INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 98-99 (2001). "A large majority of
women pay social security taxes for years, but.., receive the same benefits they would have
had had they never held a paying job at all" because of rules assigning benefits based on a
choice between primary breadwinner or "dependent" status. CRITrENDEN, supra note 114, at
297-98 n. 12 (citing How WELL Do WOMEN FARE UNDER THE NATION's RETIREMENT POLICIES?,
H.R. DOC. No. 102-879, at 12 (1992)).
254. See, e.g., James Atleson, ConfrontingJudicialValues: Rewriting the Law of Work in a
Common Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435 (1997) (giving an overview of the moral
assumptions that have shaped U.S. labor law so that it restricts workers' freedom and control
relative to employers).
255. Another "regulatory barrier" Alstott mentions is import restrictions. Alstott, supra note
211, at 1008. Again, this view singles out government protections for some workers as
"barriers" and "mandates" that impede market freedom while not questioning government
protections for wealthy capital owners like new international regulatory protections for
intellectual property rights. See McCluskey, supra note 15 (criticizing the assumptions of "real"
versus "artificial" market prices in the debate over international trade policies).
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dignity" for "low-earners ' 256 it also accommodates those norms by accepting that
freedom and dignity must still largely vary by economic class (and possibly by race
and gender)217-implicitly associating a market that fosters high rates of inequality
with good citizenship. In sum, Alstott's social citizenship scheme would increase lowincome individuals' freedom to choose low-income family care (or other activities)
over low-income wage work, while embracing a market2 8designed to constrain
individuals' freedom to work for a family-supporting wage. 5
In contrast, Graetz and Mashaw adopt a liberal vision of welfare that would increase
impoverished parents' power to support their family through wage work, but would not
substantially increase their power to choose family caretaking over wage work. Graetz
and Mashaw acquiesce in TANF's work requirements on the traditional liberal theory
that welfare must aim to benefit those perceived as "innocent," like children, and to
avoid too much freedom for those perceived as "indolent or inattentive parents. 259
They would support children in poverty through comprehensive assistance with
housing, health insurance, and child care costs for working families.26 ° This scheme,
like Alstott's, falls short of its liberal ideals not because it reflects a moral preference
for wage work over family care (or family care over wage work in Alstott's case), but
because both liberal visions continue to assume that the public benefits from a market
which constrains workers' and parents' power to bargain for substantially better
choices for both wage work and family care. Neither challenge the neoliberal double
standard of moral hazard that makes employers' increased dependence on low-waged
labor an efficient market and families' increased dependence on government support
potentially inefficient redistribution.
Graetz and Mashaw's liberal effort to target welfare to support true "innocence" not

256. Alstott, supra note 211, at 984.
257. See id. at 1008 (acknowledging that income assistance will do little to counter race
discrimination).
258. A basic income guarantee of $6000, as Alstott describes, would add some significant
support to low-waged workers by providing supplemental income that could offset the costs of
low-waged work. Id. at 1008 (noting that the grant could help pay for low-waged workers'
transportation and child care). It would also provide incentives for employers to improve wages
and working conditions: in an effect that could be described as a "moral opportunity" (rather
than "moral hazard"), the guaranteed income would serve as a substitute for work that allows
workers to "strike" to improve their power to bargain for better wages and working conditions.
See id. at 1011 (noting that the cash grant would help the poor "weather a period of
unemployment"). But if the minimum wage law were eliminated, this would provide a
somewhat countervailing increase in employers' power to bargain for low wages-an effect
which Alstott's plan embraces as a moral opportunity (rather than moral hazard) on the theory
that a market with more jobs at lower wages is more "free" and beneficial (at least as long as the
government provides a low-income alternative to low-income jobs). The net effect of these
changes on individuals' ability to "choose" work that allows them to escape poverty would
depend (among other things) on what other "regulatory barriers" were removed to enhance
employers' "market freedom" and on what other government protections for low-waged workers
remain available (Medicaid, food stamps, housing assistance, and child care assistance).
259. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 229, 312 (asserting that political support for
family income security is easier because "[miost people view children as economically
vulnerable through no fault of their own").
260. See id. at 227-54.
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only requires restricting single parents' choice of child care over work. Their attempt
to carve out a claim for innocence as the basis for public support seems destined to
remain a losing battle, since welfare critics almost always can respond by describing a
plausible way in which different and arguably more responsible individual choices
might have avoided the need for welfare support. If TANF's work requirements reflect
the premise that impoverished parents (unlike children) are responsible for engaging in
wage work to support themselves in the market, then (as neoliberals and conservative
communitarians would ask) why should we protect impoverished parents against the
costs of market work? After all, if it is good to discourage parental moral hazard by
restricting support for those who do not work, then it might seem even better to further
discourage parental moral hazard by restricting support for those who do not work hard
enough or well enough to support a family, or who do not constrain their family
choices to fit their market earnings.26 '
Moreover, if the goal is to truly separate support for innocent children from support
for irresponsible parents, and if parents who have children they cannot support are
irresponsible, then some will logically conclude that the solution is to remove children
from parents incapable of supporting them. Graetz and Mashaw are wrong when they
assert that support for children must necessarily be provided through parents.262
Historically, policies removing children from impoverished parents to state custody or
to work or adoption in wealthier families have often been a means of enforcing the
subordinate citizenship status of poor families, Native Americans, and other racial and
ethnic minorities. 263 Dorothy Roberts shows that recent welfare reforms have worked
together with changes in child welfare policy to create a system particularly aimed at
breaking up black families. 264 Rickie Solinger reports that, in the 1980s, Republican
of poor children by wealthier families as a strategy
policymakers promoted adoption
265
for reducing welfare costs.

In short, popular ideas of welfare recipients' "innocence" have long depended on
racial, gender, and sexual status. Without directly challenging the inegalitarian
ideologies underlying beliefs about who deserves economic protection, it is likely that
the generous and comprehensive family income support systems Graetz and Mashaw
advocate will be skewed or limited by the assumption that some children are more

261. In 2002, for example, President Bush stated he was making a priority of pushing for
further welfare reforms that would strengthen Work requirements. Robin Toner & Robert Pear,
Bush's Planon Welfare Law Increases Work Requirement, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2002, at A23.

Although Bush's plan would allow states additional flexibility to count substance abuse
treatment or job training toward work requirements, it made no mention of additional funding
for assistance with family needs. Id.

262. See GRAETZ

& MASHAW,

supra note 232, at 314.

263. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION (1999).
264. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 65; see also id. at 186 (giving example of California
county which uses TANF sanctions cutting welfare payments as a trigger for scrutiny by child
protection services); Nina Bernstein, Side Effect of Welfare Law: The No-ParentFamily, N.Y.
TIMES,

July 29, 2002, at Al (reporting that research on the effect of welfare reforms shows that

a rising share of black children receiving welfare live in no-parent households); Jason DeParle,
Wisconsin Welfare OverhaulJustifies Hope and Some Fear,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at Al
(reporting that 5% of mothers removed from welfare were forced to "abandon their children").
265. SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 198.
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innocent than others, and that those "others" may be more deserving of incarceration,
state supervision, or work than of family assistance.
3. Redistributing Freedom from Responsibility
Graetz and Mashaw do, however, partially recognize the importance of ideology
about citizenship status in deciding whose economic need is considered beyond their
control and therefore deserving of assistance. They support the change from AFDC's
support for nonworking mothers to TANF's preference for maternal wage work on the
ground that the change reflects new social norms about moral responsibility for wage
work. 266 Now that most middle-class mothers depend on their own wage labor to
support their families, Graetz and Mashaw agree that the public as a whole will no
longer accept
AFDC's premise that mothers in poverty need protection from wage
7
work.

26

But by concluding that "working mothers [have become] the norm for all
families, 268 Graetz and Mashaw make maternal wage work requirements seem to be a
benign matter of equalizing moral responsibilities for wage work across class lines and
perhaps across gender lines. This egalitarian construction of TANF's work
requirements belies the deeper class, race, and gender inequalities that these
requirements reflect and reproduce. The increased substitution of wage work for
parental child care in white middle-class families is not simply a matter of changing
gender roles but of the declining economic security of middle-class breadwinners, as
Graetz and Mashaw appear to recognize. 269 To a great extent, the rise in working hours
by middle-class mothers (and many fathers) at the expense of family care in the United
States has been the result of employers' increased bargaining power in relation to many
workers, due to falling or stagnant wages throughout the 1980s and 1990s, increased
job insecurity from downsizing, deunionization, and changing global competition.270
Consistent with the theory that rising class inequality (not just falling gender
inequality) has increased mothers' wage work, responsibility for child care remains
heavily gendered-as does primary responsibility for family wage earning. 27 1 Of

GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 230.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. See id. at 30-3 1.
270. See id. at 31-33. By the 1990s, Americans worked for wages nine weeks more each
year, on average, than Europeans--even though in the 1960s, Americans averaged shorter work
weeks than any other industrialized nation. Louis Uchitelle, How to Succeed in PoliticsWithout
Really Working, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1999, §4, at 3 (citing Labor Department data), discussed

266.

in CRITENDEN, supra note 114, at 260; see also ROBERT PERRUCCI &EARL WYSONG, Prefaceto

THE NEW CLASS SOCIETY x (1999) (concluding that the American class structure has changed to

replace the large middle class of the mid-twentieth century with a society bifurcated into a new
working class comprised of 80% and a wealthy privileged class consisting of 20% of the
population).

271. In her study of contemporary motherhood, journalist Ann Crittenden concludes that
"rising income inequality in the United States has brought with it increasing genderinequality"
in work/family choices (emphasis in original). CRITTENDEN, supranote 114, at 117. See also id.

at 139-40 (stating that most married Americans with children still have a "semitraditional
arrangement, with the husband the primary breadwinner and the wife the primary homemaker-
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course, traditional gender norms never exempted all American women from
responsibility for noncaretaking work to sustain their families. Women of color have
been traditionally expected to combine parenting with wage work (or to forgo
motherhood).272 Most American women traditionally engaged in substantial productive
noncaretaking labor at home as farmers, craftspersons and entrepreneurs.273 AFDC

even if she also works outside the home"). For example, a study on Social Security estimated
that even by 2030, only 40% of women will earn enough to qualify as earners rather than as
"dependents" for purposes of old age benefits. See How WELL Do WOMEN FARE UNDER THE
NATION'S RETIREMENT POLICIES?, H.R. Doc. No. 102-879, at 12 (1992), discussed in
CRITTENDEN, supra note 114, at 195, 297-98 n.12. More than one-quarter of American wives

with children earn nothing, and the average married woman earns only about half of what her
husband earns. CRITrENDEN, supranote 114, at 110, 290 n. 1 (citing unpublished data for 1995,
Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census). More than one-third of married women
with children under six earn no wage income. Kessler, supra note 252, at 386 (citing Press
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Characteristics of
Families in 1997, tbl.4 (May 21, 1998), available at http://stats.bls.gov/blslnewsrels.htm).

Families at the top of the economic scale, where two incomes are not necessary for survival,
show a strong, and increasing tendency toward traditional gender divisions of labor: in 1998,
nearly half of upper income marriages had just one breadwinner, and 90% of the breadwinners
were men. Nancy Ann Jeffrey, The New-Economy Family, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at W1,
discussed in CRITrENDEN, supra note 114, at 117, 291-92 n.15 (citing statistics that at the
highest income levels, male-breadwinner/female-homemaker marriages are even more
predominant). A survey of college-educated women in 1991 showed that fewer than 20% had
achieved both motherhood and career by their late thirties or forties. CLAUDIA GOLDIN, CAREER
AND FAMILY: COLLEGE WOMEN LOOK TO THE PAST (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working

Paper No. 5188, 1995) (studying 1,200 college graduates and defining a career as earnings of
$11 an hour), discussed in CRITrENDEN, supra note 114, at 32. On the other hand, rising class
inequality may sometimes contribute to gender equality in lower-income married couples with
children. See FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED PARENTING
WORKS 169-94 (1999) (analyzing results of interviews with working class dual-earner married
parents who, despite embracing traditional gender ideologies in theory, often demonstrated more
actual equal sharing of housework, child care, and job investments than wealthier couples who
professed more egalitarian gender beliefs).

This is not to deny that changing laws (and norms) have reduced gender inequality in the
workplace, thereby encouraging more women to work. However, many barriers to women's
equal employment still persist, particularly for women who do not conform to the dominant
norm of the ideal worker as a man without family responsibilities (or much of a nonwork
personal life). See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 1-6 (2000) (proposing eliminating the "ideal-worker

norm" in market work and family entitlements); Schultz, supra note 247, at 1894-97 (arguing
that women's lower pay and labor market participation is due to discrimination and segregation
rather than to women's "choice" of family care over wage work).
272. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE
MEANING OF LIBERTY 203-07 (1997) (discussing how black women have generally been
excluded from policies designed to support women's caretaking labor); ABRAMOVITZ, supra
note 121, at 123-24 (discussing how black women were unable to fit new nineteenth-century

gender ideals emphasizing women's role in the home).
273. See CRITrENDEN, supra note 114, at 45-53 (tracing the historical development of the
idea that housewives' labor is economically unproductive); Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The
First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Women's Household Labor 1850-1880 103 YALE
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benefits are set low enough so that most welfare recipients need to engage in (often
unreported) waged or bartering work for others to help their families survive.274 In the
1990s, much of the political support for work-based welfare reforms was based on a
highly inegalitarian citizenship vision that valued not maternal wage work, but instead
275
the redistribution of mothers' work to benefit some families at the expense of others.
Contrary to Graetz and Mashaw's benign picture, the prevailing citizenship vision
driving welfare reform appears to make poor single mothers, especially mothers of
color, morally responsible for replacing care for their children with wage work for
others, but to make married middle class mothers, especially white mothers, morally
276
responsible for forgoing substantial wage work to care for their own children.
But while Graetz and Mashaw accommodate what they perceive to be changing

L.J. 1073, 1086-91 (1994) (describing women's critical role as workers in the antebellum
economy and explaining that industrialization did not displace home-based nonwaged
production).
274. See

KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LoW-WAGE WORK 6 (1997) (reporting that interviews with nearly 400

welfare-reliant mothers show that all but one engaged in income-generating activities, and the
one exception who did not, risked losing her child for neglect because she could not provide
enough food and clothing).
275. See MINK, supra note 73, at 109 (criticizing TANF as grounded in an ideology "giving

social approval to [single mothers'] care-giving work only when it is provided for other people's
children"); id. at 129-31 (criticizing welfare-to-work requirements for "institutionalizing [poor
and single] mothers as a caste of providers for other people--of goods, services, and care for

other people and their children"). Dorothy Roberts quotes a cartoon that shows how TANF's
work requirements aim to promote a redistribution of work's value, rather than simply
increasing valuable work: A politician explains that an AFDC recipient is a bad mother because

she "hang[s] around the house taking care of the kids" and that she will be cut off welfare if she
doesn't take a job. "Doing what?" the welfare mother asks. "Taking care of someone else's
kids," the politician answers. ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 180 (quoting Wasserman's View,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1995, at 10). See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black
Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871-73 (1994).

276. Similarly, Amy Wax explains TANF's work requirements as a way of making the
division between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor gender neutral, ignoring how these
requirements reflect new race, class, and gender norms aimed at constructing many women as

deserving of fewer rewards from both work and family. Amy L. Wax, Somethingfor Nothing:
Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, University of Pennsylvania Law School,
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 02-11 2 (Mar. 2002). See MINK,

supra note 73, at 23-25 (explaining that "Many welfare reformers view work requirements as
necessary not because all mothers should be in the labor market, but because poor single

mothers ought to be" and because prevailing racial mythology cast black women in the role of
"other people's workers rather than their own families' mothers."). See also NEUBECK &
CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 174-76 (arguing that popular support for welfare's work
requirements had the purpose and effect of maintaining racial stratification rather than
advancing gender equality for poor mothers). Rickie Solinger similarly shows that the political
view driving welfare reforms in the 1990s aimed not to promote a new class equality based on a
public norm favoring working mothers, but to making motherhood a class privilege unavailable
to poor women and to encourage middle class women to stay at home with their kids.

SOLINGER,

supranote 60, at 216-17 (contrasting Congressional glorification of nonworking middle class
mothers with Congressional castigation of welfare mothers' caretaking).
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popular values making welfare mothers' caretaking a moral hazard, they dismiss
changing popular values about others' responsibility for labor market changes
perceived as harmful to society. Many Americans view the rising economic insecurity
of the middle class as a problem not only of irresponsible families, but also of
irresponsible markets and irresponsible political processes. For example, one 1996
survey found that 83% of average (nonwealthy) Americans agreed (and almost threefifths strongly agreed) that "average working families have less economic security
today, because corporations have become too greedy and care more about their profits
than about being fair and loyal to their employees." 277 Popular opinion has shown
substantial concern about the harmful effects of policies governing international trade
and campaign finance on families dependent on wage income.278
Graetz and Mashaw acknowledge that economic changes have produced hardship
for many American families, 279 but they assume this hardship is the product of
inevitable, and generally beneficial, market forces. 280 By identifying widespread
economic insecurity as a problem of random market risks. 28 Graetz and Mashaw take
the typical liberal strategy of attempting to relieve impoverished families from
responsibility for their hardship to justify government aid in the face of moral hazard
concerns. But by failing to attribute responsibility to anyone else for that hardship, this
liberal defense of welfare undermines its case.
If economic insecurity comes from the market, and if the market is taken as

277. Robert L. Borosage & Ruy Teixeira, The Politicsof Money, NATION, Oct. 21, 1996, at
21-22, discussed in PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 270, at 174. In a BusINEss WEEK/HARRIS
poll of 1100 Americans, 95% said they agreed more strongly with the statement that "in
addition to being concerned about shareholders, corporations should be concerned about their
employees, the communities in which they operate, and sometimes they should sacrifice the
interests of shareholders for the benefit of employees and the communities in which they
operate" rather than the statement that "corporations should only be concerned with maximizing
profits for shareholders, and if they do, everything will be right with the American economy."
Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, A Corporate Lawyer Speaks Out, available at
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/corp-focus/2002/0001 10.html.
278. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, Government Responsiveness in Decline,
12 PUB. PERSP. 50 (2001) (arguing that government policies increasingly fail to reflect public

opinion, and giving public views about campaign finance reform and trade policies as
examples); Deepak Gopinath, Rewriting the Rules, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 2001, at 45
(reporting polls showing that 52% of the public sympathized with Seattle protests against the
WTO while 39% were opposed); The Politics of Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1999, at 27

(reporting popular resistance to "free trade" and support for human rights, labor, and
environmental standards instead, and citing poll data showing 46% of respondents agreed that
"the U.S. should slow the trend toward globalisation because it hurts American workers"); see
also PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 270, at 123-26 (discussing working class resistance to
economic protections for the privileged class in trade policy and election reform policy).
279. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 31-33.

280. See, e.g., id. 219-20 (summarizing how a changed political economy has "heightened
our anxieties about our individual economic fortunes, notwithstanding our strong economy" but
concluding that "[d]espite our nation's affluence, we have yet to adequately protect Americans
from the many wolves that come to call-both inevitably and unannounced").
281. See, e.g., id. at 48 (describing the purpose of their social insurance scheme as protection

against "the risk that circumstances or events will make one unsuccessful in the free market for
labor").
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beneficial to the public in general, then deviating from the market to assist market
"losers" will appear to risk deviating from the public good-no matter how excusable
the failings of those who lose. And by relieving others--employers, wealthy capital
owners-of responsibility for increased burdens on workers' families, this liberal
strategy assumes these market "victors" deserve to pursue self-interested gains at the
expense of many others' well-being. In contrast, this liberal strategy concedes that
welfare recipients' self-interested gain-seeking produces undeserved harmful moral
hazard. The liberal vision affirms a double standard of self-interested gain by which
support for those harmed by the market is suspect while support for those identified
with the market is normal and publicly beneficial.
Graetz and Mashaw view policies creating incentives for capital owners to shift
costs to low-wage and middle-class workers not as harmful moral hazard, but as
beneficial moral opportunity. For example, they insist that protecting employers'
"flexibility" to control workers' hours and other working conditions (without, for
example, accommodating family care demands) will promote economic growth that
will trickle down to benefit the public. 282 Their vision accommodates popular
disapproval of low-income parents who seek to reduce work in favor of family time,
but dismisses popular disapproval of capital owners who seek to reduce wages and
workers' flexibility in favor of greater shareholder wealth.
It is true that Graetz and Mashaw's expansive income security proposals would
require wealthier taxpayers to take more responsibility for the social costs of a market
structured in their favor.283 But their vision depends on the willingness of those
wealthy taxpayers to view others' market losses as worthy of their sacrifice. They hope
to expand the potential for political support by designing their work-support system to
benefit much of the shrinking middle class as well as the working poor. But their
proposals will also require substantial sacrifice from politically powerful upper-class
and upper-middle-class taxpayers 28 because their scheme redirects government
support away from upper-class and upper-middle-class families (who
disproportionately benefit from current tax breaks for housing, dependent care, and
health insurance).285 They hope to sell this redistributive change as a benefit for the
public in general on the theory that the risks of income loss are widely shared. 286 In
their view, market success or failure is a product not only of individual effort and
merit, but of luck and random circumstances; 287 those who are now affluent would
therefore benefit from a society that protects those who are not.
But the success of the currently affluent may reflect not just their superior luck and
merit, but their superior power to establish comprehensive government policies
288
promoting upward redistribution and protection against market risks for the wealthy.

282. See id. at 284-85.
283. See id. at 304 (explaining that some of their policy proposals would "shift support from
the affluent to the less affluent").
284. They acknowledge that "[slupports for the affluent must be redirected, at least in part,
to the needy." Id. at 231.
285. Id. at 290, 304.
286. See, e.g., id. at 23, 304-05.
287. See id. at 284.
288. See PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 270, at 121-36, 143-76, 252-62 (explaining the
many ways the privileged class of wealthiest Americans has mobilized the media and other
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If those who might lose by sharing economic protections more broadly understand their
wealth as a product of political design as well as market accident, the prospect of
redirecting income protection to low-waged and lower-middle-class workers seems a
difficult sell. This liberal political project seems particularly difficult given that it rests
on a liberal vision that accepts the premise that, unlike impoverished families, those
who succeed in the market have no citizenship obligation to sacrifice their self-interest
for others. Instead, the political viability of broader support for working families
probably depends on the political power of those who would directly gain from
downward redistribution. However, the policies that might remove current barriers to
shifting political power from the more affluent minority to the struggling middle and
working class-such as campaign finance reform and limits on capital mobility 2 -- lie
outside the scope of Graetz and Mashaw's social citizenship vision as matters of the
market separate from redistribution.
In sum, contemporary liberal efforts to defend social citizenship as a departure from
the market to support individual well-being conflict with liberal efforts to defend that
market as the ultimate route to maximum individual freedom and well-being. In
contrast, the visions of social citizenship offered by Fineman, Forbath, and Roberts
aim to defend individual freedom and well-being by changing the market. AFDC and
TANF both have failed to promote social citizenship not because they have
encouraged mothers to make the wrong choices between work and family, but because
neither affirms as socially valuable the increased bargaining power that would allow
mothers (and others) more freedom to control the conditions, timing, and rewards of
both their wage work and their family formation and care.
Legal scholars Vicki Schultz and Linda McClain both show how liberal notions of
individual dignity (or communitarian notions of societal responsibility) can be used to
push for a richer vision of citizenship that would allow more mothers to avoid tough
tradeoffs between wage income and family care. In McClain's citizenship vision,
policies that better recognize the societal value of family caretaking will better enhance
individual freedom and fulfillment (as well as community well-being).29 ° In Schultz's
citizenship vision, policies that better recognize the societal value of wage work will
better enhance individual freedom and fulfillment (as well as community wellbeing). 29 1 But both visions converge by recognizing that either approach to good
citizenship requires major government restructuring of the market and family to better
value mothers' work both in and out of the home, both waged and unwaged.
For example, McClain argues that meaningful government support for caretaking
must go beyond either individual income or capital grants that would allow individual
mothers (or others) to opt out of wage labor for family care.292 Instead, she advocates a

resources to increase government protection of their interests at the expense of most
Americans).
289. See, e.g., id. at 262-73 (describing efforts to resist the policies promoting class
inequality by changing rules governing labor organizing, media concentration, elections, and
corporate charters).
290. See generally McClain, supra note 154.
291. See Schultz, supra note 247, at 1886-92.
292. Linda C. McClain, Toward a Pormative Projectof Securing Freedomand Equality, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1251-53 (2000) (discussing BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999)); see also Handler, supra note 3, at 799 (arguing for a social

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:783

government and market restructured to give public support to recognize family care as
a public, rather than just an individual value, based on its importance in creating a
society of self-governing individuals: for example, she advocates enhanced public
health and education services to support parents,293 and employment law changes that
would allow individual parents to better combine wage work and family care. 294 Vicki
Schultz recognizes that meaningful government support for wage workers must go
beyond assistance that encourages individuals to substitute wage work for other
pursuits; she advocates policies that encourage a shorter work week as standard to
allow both men and women to integrate wage earning with caretaking, community and
political involvement, and pleasure.29 5 As many black feminists have long suggested,296
poor mothers' have lacked equal citizenship status not from insufficient participation
either in work or family care, but from a market designed to limit their individual
freedom and dignity for the benefit of others. Without challenging the market as well
as welfare as a source of government constraint and redistribution, as McClain and
Schultz both do, the conventional liberal approach to welfare remains caught within the
double bind that defeats social citizenship goals.
For most of its history, Western citizenship theory has presented market labor as a
major barrierto the individual autonomy and responsibility it deemed necessary for a
democratic society. 297 Recognizing the employment relationship as a status of legal and
economic dependency, political theory and practice traditionally made capital
ownership a key to good citizenship. 29 It was this traditional vision-embraced in
American law--of citizenship centered on capital rather than labor that was challenged
by the early-twentieth-century labor activists Forbath describes. 299 Despite the now
prevailing rhetoric of wage work as freedom, 300 it is this traditional vision privileging

citizenship vision that recognizes the importance of collective solutions to poverty, rather than
the individualized stakeholder solution proposed by Ackerman & Alstott).
293. McClain, supra note 292, at 1256.
294. See McClain, supra note 154, at 102-03, 96-107; see also WILLIAMS, supra note 271, at
64-113.
295. Schultz, supra note 247, at 1955-57. In addition to proposing that the right to work
include a living wage, she proposes "vigorous anti-discrimination, affirmative action, and pay
equity measures" to ensure equal access to fulfilling work. Id. at 1955-56.
296. See, e.g., GORDON, supranote 27, at 136-43 (discussing black women activists' views
of collective support for mothers in the early 1900s).
297. King &Waldron, supranote 1,at 429-31 (giving examples from the theories of Plato,
Locke, Burke, and Hegel).
298. See id.; see also Forbath, supra note 27, at 19-20 (noting that "The political theories of
the Framers confirmed that the hireling's status of dependence and submission disqualified him
for citizenship" and that even after white working men won political rights they retained
subordinate status shared-though not equally-by women of all races and men of color);
Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of 'Dependency':A Keyword of the U.S. Welfare
State, 19 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 309 (1994) (tracing historical
understandings of the term dependency).
299. Forbath, supra note 27, at 19-23 (describing the subordinate caste status of"free" white
male wage laborers), 66-67, 89-91 (describing an unimplemented New Deal Constitution ideal
based on an alternative distribution of citizenship rights more favorable to workers).
300. See generally STEINFELD, supranote 36 (discussing the modem conception of free wage
labor as a relatively recent construction of state policy and of contingent historical and

2003]

EFFICIENCYAND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

capital citizenship-intertwined with race and gender privilege-that continues to
undermine egalitarian social citizenship ideals. 301 Without questioning the prevailing
norms that equate market and state freedom with capital owners' freedom to remain
dependent on constraining employees' and unpaid caretakers' bargaining power,
liberal citizenship visions will perpetuate the subordinate (and gendered and racialized)
citizenship status of both wage work and unpaid family caretaking.
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION

The neoliberal critique of social citizenship has reached beyond AFDC to a broad
array of welfare programs. Workers' compensation, the state program protecting
against income loss from work-related disability, also has been the target of a powerful
benefit-cutting reform movement in the late-twentieth-century United States.3" 2
Although workers' compensation contrasts sharply with AFDC, its purported
differences have not shielded it from neoliberal attack.
Looking at these parallel welfare reforms together underscores the flaws of both the
communitarian and liberal attempts to defend social citizenship without disrupting
neoliberalism's core premise of the primacy and impartiality of the market. This
broader view of welfare state reform gives further evidence that the neoliberal-inspired
policy change from AFDC to TANF does not reflect a new social citizenship ideal
emphasizing wage work as the means to full membership in the community. Instead,
the parallel attack on workers' compensation again shows how neoliberal policies
represent and reinforce a vision of citizenship in which wage workers, not just welfare
recipients, are also subordinate and suspect
members of the community, deserving of
30 3
only minimal public economic support.
Workers' compensation is a classic example of a program promoting social
citizenship rights grounded in wage work. Workers' compensation traditionally has
been viewed as conferring benefits based on market contributions, not government
charity. 304 In the conventional story, workers' compensation is a voluntary compromise
where injured workers give up their right to tort suits against employers in exchange

ideological judgments about what constitutes labor market freedom).
301. See Forbath, supra note 27, at 89-91.
302. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12.
303. For an analysis of how recent restrictive changes in another social welfare program,
unemployment insurance, also rely on reconstructing workers as deviant, see Lucy A. Williams,
Unemployment Insurance and Low-Wage Work, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN.THE

POST-WELFARE ERA 158-74 (Joel Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999).
304. REP. OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 36 (1972)

[hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N REP.] ("Workmen's compensation must be an insurance program,
not a welfare program."); DAVID A. MOSS, SOCIALIZING SECURITY: PROGRESSIVE ERA
ECONOMISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 57 (1996) (explaining history of

workers' compensation as part of a broader effort to establish social insurance distinct from
poor relief); John D. Worrall & David Appel, Some Benefit Issues in Workers' Compensation,
in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY

11 (John D.

Worrall & David Appel eds., 1985); Emily A. Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers'
CompensationReform: A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers' Compensation
Legislation, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 23, 130-31 (1995).
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for more limited no-fault compensation of medical costs and lost wages:305
This story portrays workers' compensation as an economically efficient "bargain": a
reciprocal exchange that produces an overall gain, not a redistributive one-way
transfer.30 6 According to the traditional theory, workers' compensation maximizes
overall resources compared to the prior fault-based tort system, because it simplifies
claims administration (reduces disputes), and because it improves safety incentives by
regularly and predictably internalizing some of the costs of work injuries to employers
and consumers. 0 7
Workers' compensation's distinction as economically efficient reflects and confers
a perception that it deserves superior status among welfare programs in the United
States.30 8 The story of the efficient workers' compensation bargain affirms workers'
standing as virtuous citizens. As equal cocreaters of a "social compact," 30 9 workers are
autonomous and rational citizens participating in governing society. Workers "earn"
their protection through a reciprocal contribution, the sacrifice of workers' civil right
to tort damages. By accepting a compromise, workers demonstrated responsibility for
society and shrewdly cut a better deal for themselves at the same time.
Nonetheless, the history of workers' compensation is one of social citizenship rights
subject to continuous challenge and rarely delivered. From the beginning, narrow
definitions of covered injuries meant many work-related injuries and illnesses were not
compensated at all, despite persistent efforts by workers. 310 Disability benefits often
consisted of temporary subsistence or token payments rather than meaningful wage
replacement, 311were often limited by procedural and evidentiary barriers, 312 and were

305. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of
IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 71-72 (1967).
306. See, e.g., ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 3 (1991) ("society as a whole benefits" from workers'

compensation); McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 672.
307. At its origins, proponents of workers' compensation explained it as internalizingthe
costs of work accidents into the costs of production and resulting consumer prices so that "the
price of the product bears the blood of the workingman." HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE
RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHABILITATION

282 (1954). In the typical explanation, this cost internalization
produces incentives that promote overall cost-savings, since consumers seeking cheaper
products will pressure employers to improve safety. See KRAMER &BRIFFAULT, supra note 306,
at 2.
308. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 672.
309. See KRAMER &BRIFFAULT, supranote 306, at 1 (describing workers' compensation as
"a truly great social compact").
310. See McCluskey, Illusion, supranote 12, at 770. It is a mistake to think that this narrow
view of injury reflected a cultural consensus or ignorance that failed to recognize the potential
work-relatedness of occupational illnesses and gradually-occurring injuries. Id. at 771, 771
nn.449-50.
311. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 306, at 23 (asserting that the goal of early workers'
compensation systems was to prevent hardship, not to replace lost wages); LINDA DARLINGHAMMOND & THOMAS J. KNEISER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 8
(1980) ("[T]he goal of compensation was not to reimburse the injured worker for all of his
losses but to 'tide him over' until he could return to work."); See PHILIPPE NONET,
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY

ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY

19-20 (1969).
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significantly eroded due to inflation during the decades after 1940. 3 13
In 1972, a bipartisan national commission found that state workers' compensation
systems provided grossly inadequate benefits, and recommended comprehensive state
reforms, or if those failed, a new federal workers' compensation system.314 That report
helped push state legislatures to increase and improve workers' compensation benefits
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, though nationwide benefits still fell short of the
recommended expansions. However, those benefit expansions sparked a reform
movement led by employers and insurers that produced the most significant period of
benefit cutbacks in the history of workers' compensation. From the late 1980s through
the 1990s, the majority of states enacted comprehensive reform legislation that has had
the effect of reducing disability benefits (especially for permanent injuries), restricting
or eliminating compensation for certain types of injuries, and reducing procedural
protections for claimants whose claims are denied. 1 6
The example of workers' compensation shows the difficulties of defending social
citizenship on economic efficiency grounds. Workers' claim to protection against work
injury costs at the expense of employers rests uneasily next to employers' claim of
rights to maintain profits and control productivity. Even though the efficiency rationale
explains workers' protection as a public benefit, that rationale at the same time
supports restricting that protection to avoid public harm. As a result, workers'
compensation remains caught in the double bind that makes social citizenship
inconsistent with good citizenship.
Workers' sacrifice of their civil rights in tort law is what justifies workers'
compensation as a publicly beneficial reciprocal exchange instead of a redistributive
transfer. Yet, in the conventional understanding, that exchange of a civil right for a
social citizenship right relocates workers' claim for benefits outside of the efficient
market. From that position, protection for workers at the expense of employers will
tend to appear inefficient and, therefore, detrimental to the public. Without going
further to question the Lochner-eratheory that employers' right to a market structured
in their favor is a fundamental citizenship right, workers' claims for governmentmandated protection in the employment relationship will remain suspect and
subordinate.
The example of workers' compensation, like AFDC, helps show how the question
of social citizenship rights does not simply raise the tension T.H. Marshall famously
described between supplementing the market with substantive economic protection and
contradicting the market's emphasis on civil rights based on individual contractual
freedom. 317 More fundamentally, the question of social citizenship poses the problem

312. See Glenn Merrill Shor, The Evolution of Workers' Compensation Policy inCalifornia,
1911-1990, 119 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley)
(available from the UMI dissertation reprint service).
313. See NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 304, at 19 (stating that, in most states, from 1940
to 1972 maximum benefit levels decreased in proportion to average wages).
314. Id. at 119.
315. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 683-84.
316. See id. at 684-90, 809-16.
317. See MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 68 (describing how "social rights... imply an invasion
of contract by status"); KATz, supra note 1, at 344 (explaining that "Marshall stressed the
conflict between civil and social citizenship at the heart of the welfare state.").
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of which rights should count as "civil"-part of normal market freedoms-and which
as "social"-part of political protections external to that market. 318 The example of
workers' compensation shows how neoliberal ideology aims not just to reject social
rights, but to redefine citizenship rights as a whole by constructing certain market
structures as essential civil rights (employers' immunity from workers' torts) and
others as expendable social subsidies (employers' strict liability for workers'
injuries).319
A. Neoliberal Citizenship and Workers' CompensationReform

1. Moral Hazard from Expanded Benefits
In recent state campaigns for benefit restrictions, reform advocates often relied on
neoliberal economic theory to argue that workers' compensation deviated from its
efficiency-based origins to become a redistributive "welfare" program. How did
workers' compensation, like AFDC, change from being perceived as a program
producing positive to negative spillover effects on society-from a means of enhancing
to eroding good citizenship? Just as with AFDC, the neoliberal concept of moral
stressed that
hazard was key to this conceptual change. In particular, reformers
320
problem.
hazard
moral
a
created
workers
for
protection
increased
Reformers argued that benefit expansions increased coverage of claims for which
the cause or severity of the disability appears uncertain-occupational diseases,
In the
gradually developing strains, or psychological stress, for example.:
conventional moral hazard analysis, as more generous and accessible benefits provide
a less costly alternative to work, they produce incentives for workers (and their
advocates) to exploit this uncertainty in their favor by filing more claims, and by filing
claims for greater losses. 322 Reform advocates argued that, because of expanded
benefits, workers are more likely to seek compensation for nonwork injuries (including
problems from general health conditions, leisure activities, or aging) 323 or for wage
loss unrelated to disability (such as from economic downturns or lack of motivation to

318. Marshall did recognize that one answer to the question of the conflict between social
and civil rights is that "the replacement of free bargain by the declaration of rights" is a
principle "entrenched within the contract system" ofthe market. MARSHALL, supranote 1, at 68.
319. See Baker, supra note 101, at 275 (explaining that assumptions about which market
distributions count as legal entitlements and which count as political "redistributions" underlie
recent economic arguments about the harmful incentive effects of expanded workers'

compensation benefits).
320. See id. at 238-39, 273 & n.178; McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 744, 816-17; see
also PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE
ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 201-02 (2000) (explaining recent reforms limiting
benefits as an effort to reduce moral hazard problems created by the benefit expansions of the
1970s).

321. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 767-88.
322. See id. at 742-45.
323. See id. at 788-94.
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return to work). 324
As a result, the expansion of workers' compensation benefits in the 1970s and
1980s became an example of the standard neoliberal theory that departing from
economic principles for social welfare purposes, however well-intentioned, leads to
public harm. Insurers, employers, and other supporters of reforms complained that
benefit expansions have threatened jobs and economic competitiveness by burdening
employers with costly benefit costs beyond their control,325 and that expanded
opportunities for filing illegitimate claims have added costly "friction" to the process
of administering claims.326 Reform advocates insisted that although individual workers
might suffer harm from benefit restrictions, such sacrifices are the price of protecting
overall economic growth and of keeping the system affordable for the benefit of
injured workers and society as a whole.327
In response to these concerns, many states have attempted to reduce claimant moral
hazard by restricting compensation for losses perceived to result primarily from costincreasing by workers rather than from workplace harms or actual disability. For
example, some reforms change disability benefit calculations to reduce or restrict
328
payment for wage losses exacerbated by workers' skill levels, age, or education.
Other recent law revisions require claimants to prove that work is a "primary" or
"major" or "substantial" cause of their injury, changing the traditionally loose
causation requirement that (in theory) had allowed compensation for injuries with any
nontrivial connection to work. 329
2. Redistributing Moral Hazard Through Benefit Cuts
But the late-twentieth-century problem of moral hazard in workers' compensation
(as in AFDC) was not a problem of a change in incentive effects but of a change in
moral judgments about the social value of those incentive effects. By attempting to
distinguish and control claims attributable to workers' "personal" attributes or
behavior, recent neoliberal reform arguments helped reshape the goal of workers'
compensation from a purportedly no-fault system that partly compensates work injuries
regardless of workers' responsibility to a system which holds workers responsible for
avoiding a larger share of accident costs. By weeding out claims for injuries to which
workers' lifestyle, skill levels, leisure activities, age, preexisting health conditions, or
job choice may have contributed, recent reforms reintroduce employers' nineteenthcentury fault-based
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, to
33
some extent.

324. See id. at 809-43.
325. See id. at 689-90.
326. See id. at 857-60.
327. One lawmaker responded to concerns about harm to injured workers from benefit cuts
by saying, "Is it a perfect system? The answer is no. But it's as fair as the system can afford."
Stuart Steers, Still Hurting: Injured Workers' Have Borne the Brunt of Workers' Comp
"Reform" in Colorado, DENVER WESTWORD, Mar. 28, 1996 (quoting Colorado House Majority
Leader Tim Foster).
328. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 830-34.
329. See id. at 792-93.
330. See id. at 798-99; Martha T. McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistributionof
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In the traditional theory of workers' compensation, those old fault-based tort
defenses were the source of inefficient moral hazard, not its solution. According to the
old theory, the public benefits fromprotecting workers from responsibility for accident
costs because the old fault-based defenses encouraged employer moral hazard by
providing incentives for the employer to take less care to avoid accidents or wasteful
litigation. 331 In the conventional wisdom, this original no-fault theory was based on a
system where the consequences and causes of traumatic industrial injuries were more
therefore less subject to claimants' cost-inflating "moral hazard"
certain and
33 2
behavior.
But the change from the traditional no-fault approach to the recent fault-based
reforms does not reflect a change in the difficulty of weeding out illegitimate claims
of
for injury compensation. In fact, workers' compensation developed from a period 33
vigorous controversy about the legitimate causes and effects of workers' injuries)
The prevailing early-twentieth-century advocates of workers' compensation rejected a
fault-based approach precisely because they believed the industrial revolution had
introduced great uncertainty over responsibility for work accidents. Just like today,
early disputes about work injuries were impossible to resolve with "objective" medical
evidence, because, both then and now, the underlying "uncertainty" about causes and
effects of work accidents inherently involves questions of moral responsibility. 335 For
example, strongly contested issues in the early debate over workers' compensation
included whether to attribute limbs severed by industrial equipment to employers'
failure to spend money on safer machines or to workers' failure to work more
carefully, to choose a safer occupation, or simply to workers' bad luck;3 36 or whether
to consider workers' post-injury loss of wage income a cost of workers' preinjury
workplace, or a cost of
wages, a cost of employers' decision to profit from a risky
337
workers' failure to procure alternative income sources.

Social Insurance, in EMBRACING

RISK: CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY

146, 157-58 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) [hereinafter Rhetoric of Risk].
331. See CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 14-15 (1910) (arguing that

replacing this tort system with workers' compensation would protect valuable labor resources
and reduce charity); Moss, supra.note 304, at 64-65, 74-75 (discussing economic arguments
that workers' compensation would better internalize the costs of work and therefore would
prevent accidents and reduce injury costs).
332. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 306, at 18 ("Since the place and physical cause of
most injuries are readily apparent [in the early industrial accident case], it was assumed that
employers and administrators could easily distinguish between'work-related and non-workrelated accidents, without resort to protracted dispute resolution processes, litigation or
attorneys.").
333. For an example of a famous effort to discuss and resolve this debate, see EASTMAN,
supra note 331.
334. Moss, supra note 304, at 121.
335. For discussions of how legal disputes over "causation" are about questions of value,
despite attempts to construct them as questions of scientific fact, see MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960, 51-53 (1992); Mark Kelman, The Necessary
Myth of Objective CausationJudgments in Liberal PoliticalTheory, 63 CHi.-KENTL. REv. 579,
580 (1987).
336. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 796-97.
337. See EASTMAN, supra note 331, at 128-31 (disputing arguments that workers' actual
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The early-twentieth-century change from tort law to no-fault compensation for
occupational injury represented a moral judgment to resolve those uncertainties about
responsibility for work accident costs partly in workers' favor, on the theory that the
public as a whole will benefit from treating the costs of work injuries as an inevitable
fact of industrial employment regardless of workers' cost-avoiding efforts. 338 In
workers' compensation, as in AFDC, recent reforms supposedly directed at reducing
moral hazard instead are directed at redistributing moral hazard. The reforms change
the relative distribution of bargaining power through which workers or employers can
exploit uncertainty at the expense of others, reflecting and reinforcing a change in
prevailing views of workers' and employers' relative citizenship status.
As workers' compensation benefits become high enough (or accessible enough) to
substitute for wage income, they become an alternative to wage work that increases
workers' elasticity of demand for work.3 -9 That increased elasticity means workers
have the bargaining power to pay a smaller share of the costs of work: the alternative
income source afforded by workers' cohpensation allows them to work less when
work imposes greater health costs. For instance, workers may extend their recovery
period after an injury to lessen the risk of further health problems, or they may seek
compensation for injury costs that they would otherwise have suffered on their own. Or
their increased elasticity of demand for work may allow them to pressure
employers' to
34
raise wages or otherwise improve employees' rewards from work.
In contrast, the recent workers' compensation reforms (like AFDC reforms)
increase employers' (or insurers') moral hazard by increasing their bargaining power
relative to workers (assuming other things are equal). As disability benefits become a
less adequate or accessible alternative to work for workers, employers (and insurers)
will have more power to pay less of the costs of work injuries. Lower (or less
accessible) disability benefits give employers (and insurers) more incentives to avoid
work disability costs: they have more power to substitute minimal or no compensation
for prevention, to force workers back to work before they are sufficiently recovered, or
to avoid mitigating injury costs by providing good and prompt medical care or work
modifications to accommodate disabled workers. 34 As benefit restrictions shift
bargaining power from workers to employers, the ability to take less responsibility for
reducing work injury costs shifts from workers to employers.342

economic loss was insignificant because wage premiums for risky work already compensate this
loss).
338. See Rhetoric of Risk, supra note 330, at 158; McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at
898-99.
339. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 760-62; see also Emily A. Spieler,
PerpetuatingRisk? Workers' Compensationand the Persistenceof OccupationalInjuries, 31
Hous. L. REv. 119, 217-20 (1994) (arguing that high costs of filing claims often affect this
benefit calculation).
340. See McCluskey, Illusion, supranote 12, at 762; see also MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. Kip
VISCUSI,

COMPENSATION

MECHANISMS

FOR JOB RISKS

67-68 (1990) (explaining this

redistribution of bargaining power but attempting to construct it instead as a problem of
inefficiency to justify benefit reforms).
34 1. See Baker, supranote 101, at 274-75, 280; McCluskey, Illusion, supranote 12, at 74748.
342. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 764-65.
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3. Reenvisioning Employers' Moral Hazard as the Beneficial Market
Just as with AFDC, reducing moral hazard--or bargaining power-for benefit
recipients increases moral hazard-or bargaining power-for employers. By counting
workers', but not employers', increased cost-shifting as inefficient moral hazard,
neoliberal arguments for reform incorporate a double standard that measures workers'
increased bargaining power as a civic threat and employers' and insurers' increased
bargaining power as a civic virtue. As in AFDC, this double standard for moral hazard
is grounded in moral judgments about workers' and employers' relative rights and
responsibilities as citizens. And like the neoliberal AFDC reform arguments, the
workers' compensation reform arguments rationalize these citizenship judgments by
identifying employers' interests with a market that furthers the public's interest while
343
identifying employees' interests with deviations from that market.
In the traditional theory of workers' compensation, workers earned the no-fault
system's limited freedom from responsibility (elimination of employers' fault defenses)
by granting tort immunity to employers and accepting limited damages. In contrast, as
a result of some recent state reforms, workers owe even more for their workers'
compensation benefits: they must contribute not just tort immunity but also (for
instance) good physical and mental health not hampered by nonwork demands, preexisting weaknesses, or age; and they must contribute the skills, attitudes, occupational
choices, and labor market value sufficient to prevent most permanent injuries from
344
resulting in substantial income loss.
The one-sided view of moral hazard incorporated into recent reforms not only
increases workers' obligations in the imagined social compact, but also diminishes
employers' obligations. Recent reforms partially adopted the idea that payment of nofault compensation (claims that workers arguably could have avoided) is an inequitable
burden on employers instead of their reciprocal responsibility. In the prevailing
analysis, employers' tort immunity became not a government protection subject to
inefficient moral hazard and contingent on mutual social contribution, but a right basic
to the normal free market. 345 During the recent period of benefit-cutting reforms, states
generally have sustained or even strengthened strict employer tort immunity rules,
often cutting off tort remedies even for work injuries excluded from workers'
compensation. 346
Neoliberal "economic" arguments singling out workers' moral hazard are about
redistributing citizenship status, not maximizing aggregate growth, because these
arguments are about revaluing workers' and employers' relative worthiness as

343. See Rhetoric ofRisk, supra note 330, at 164-65 (using workers' compensation as one of
several examples of how neoliberal ideology has reconstructed self-interest maximizing by some
as harmful moral hazard while glorifying similar risk-increasing behavior by others as marketenhancing activity).
344. See id. at 151-58 (discussing how reforms making physical "impairment," rather than
lost wages, the standard for determining disability awards represent a policy of requiring
workers rather than employers to bear the costs of many of the uncertainties in workers'
compensation).
345. See Baker, supra note 101, at 275; Spieler, supra note 339, at 232.
346. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 893-95.
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members of the public. 347 By moving back toward the nineteenth-century tort system
that made employers' protection from most occupational torts a civil right and
workers' protection from most occupational injury a personal responsibility (or at best
a public charity), recent reforms reflect and reinforce what historian Christopher
Tomlins explains was the traditional legal assumption that workers were not citizens,
but servants excluded from membership in the deserving public. 348 In the early
twentieth century, in contrast, proponents of workers' compensation helped justify
better protections for workers by idealizing injured workers as heroic veterans who
have strengthened the nation by braving the risks of waging the Industrial
Revolution.349
The late-twentieth-century reformers revised this image of injured workers by
justifying reductions in workers' bargaining power with anecdotes of claimant fraud,
demonizing workers as greedy criminals. Widely publicized fraud stories frequently
used prejudicial race, class, gender, and other stereotypes to portray claimants as
deviant others with antisocial morals. 350 For example, an NBC news story exposing an
allegedly fraudulent workers' compensation payment identified the claimant as "a
recent Polish immigrant., 351 This news report quoted an insurance company
investigator's angry comment, 'This is the only job this guy ever had in America, and
this is what he did with it," and concluded that he has now learned that "in this
country" being caught at such behavior "can get you jail time.' 352
While these moral hazard stories depict workers as selfish and antisocial when they
pursue benefit claims, they depict employers and insurers as public-spirited good
citizens when they contest claims. In the same NBC report, news anchor Tom Brokaw
automatically identifies the insurance industry's interest in reducing claims fraud, and
employers' interest in reducing insurance premium costs, with the public interest.353 He
describes the alleged claimant fraud as "an outrageous example of the fleecing of
America," that such fraud costs insurance companies "more than five billion dollars a
year" (relying on insurers' highly speculative numbers), 354 and that "we all end up

347. See Rhetoric of Risk, supra note 330, at 155-58.
348. CHRISTOPHER L. ToMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 384 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1993).
349. For example, in 1893 Interstate Commerce Commission Secretary Edward A. Moselely
compared "hardworking and faithful railway employees" to Civil War casualties, saying that
"more of the grand army of railway men of this country were cut and bruised and maimed and
mangled last year than all the Union wounded and missing on the bloody field of Gettysburg."
Melvin L. Griffith, The Vindicationof a National PublicPolicy Underthe FederalEmployers'
LiabilityAct, 18

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

160, 163 (1953), cited in JOSEPH W. LrrrLE ET AL.,

WORKER'S COMPENSATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

3 (4th ed. 1999).

350. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 885-86.

351. Tom Brokaw &John Larson, False Claimfor Workers' CompensationDiscoveredby
Hidden Camera (NBC Nightly News, May 30, 2000).
352. Id.
353. See id.
354. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce circulated this figure, stating that it was based on
estimates by the insurer-financed National Insurance Crime Bureau and Insurance Information
Institute. See Stephen Blakely, Fighting Fraudin Workers' Comp, NATION'S Bus., Apr. 1,
1998, at 14. However, the insurance industry appears to have derived this highly speculative
number from surveys gauging popular attitudes about fraud rather than from direct evidence of
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355
paying through higher premiums."
Why, in this view, does workers' gain-seeking from increased benefit claims count
as "fleecing" the public, while insurers' and employers' gain-seeking from reduced
benefit claims count as saving the public's money? These stories erase insurers' and
employers' power to bargain in their own interest and instead identify their actions as
passive reflections of neutral market processes that enhance aggregate gain.356 When
insurers and employers deny claims as illegitimate, in these stories, they are not
seeking to maximize their benefits at the expense of others; instead, they are simply
impartially implementing an efficient market bargain-the basic quid pro quo of
workers' compensation. By giving employers and insurers this passive role, these
stories can then suggest that the gains from denying claims flow naturally to the public,
including consumers (who get lower prices for insurance and other products) and other
workers (who have more money left for legitimate claims), thereby promoting both
efficiency and equity.357
In contrast, these stories highlight workers' power to bargain for personal gains.
When workers pursue questionable or contested injury claims, these stories emphasize
that workers (and their lawyers and doctors) have the power not just to follow market
rules, but also to manipulate the rules in their interest-exploiting uncertainties in the
claims process to violate the terms of the efficient workers' compensation bargain. As
a result, these stories obscure the possibility that workers' gains from maximizing their
injury claims also might flow through to others. For example, through more pressure
on employers and insurers to minimize other workers' injuries, through workers'
willingness to accept offsetting wage decreases, or, more indirectly, through more
spending power by injured workers that increases consumer demand for employers'
products.35 s
A more complete view of recent antifraud campaigns, however, shows that insurers
and employers, as well as workers, exercise their self-interested power to reshape as
well as follow the rules of the presumed workers' compensation bargain. Employers
and insurers have promoted these popular stories about workers' fraud not simply out
of abstract or altruistic concern for the public's well-being, but because stories
portraying workers' compensation claimants as undeserving have been a politically and

fraud. See Ruth Gastel, Insurance Fraud,INS. INFO. INST. INS. ISSUES UPDATE, Mar. 2002
(repeating the $5billion figure and generally citing a series of studies in the 1990s showing the
percentages of respondents who believe workers' compensation fraud is widespread or who
believe it is often acceptable to stay out of work even after a doctor has authorized a return to
work); AFL-CIO, Fraud,Fraudand More Fraud,WORKERS' COMP NOTES, Mar./Apr. 1998 (no
pagination on electronic copy) (criticizing the $5 billion estimate for having "absolutely no
relationship to fact" because it is based only on survey respondents' opinions that they know
someone capable of working while receiving workers' compensation).
355. Brokaw & Larson, supra note 351.
356. See McCluskey, supranote 15 (explaining how neoliberal "economic" arguments rely
on narrative strategies to construct employers, insurers, and elite executives as passive receptors
of policy and workers as powerful agents).
357. See Rhetoric of Risk, supra note 330, at 156 (discussing how recent workers'
compensation reforms reflect an ideology embracing public solidarity with employers and
insurers but not with workers, on the assumption that the public shares in employers' and
insurers' gains but not in workers' gains).
358. See id.
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economically powerful strategy for increasing their profits at the expense of injured
workers' arguably legitimate claims. That is, the recent political focus on claimants'
moral hazard can be a form of employer and insurer moral hazard: a strategy for
protecting them from paying the costs of claims for legitimate work injuries. In many
states, subjective, exaggerated, and even false accounts of claimant fraud helped
convince lawmakers to enact sweeping benefit cuts. 359 Employers' and insurers' efforts
to combat worker moral hazard have served not so much to increase benefits for more
deserving workers, but more to reduce claims in general-by increasing potential
stigma and penalties attached to claims filing. 360 Indeed, most evidence suggests that
the costs of claimant fraud are small (less than one percent of total claims costs) and
by the problem of false reports of claims fraud (often for harassment
are overshadowed
36 1
purposes).
In sum, the neoliberal claim to restore efficiency through recent workers'
compensation reforms instead should be understood as a claim to restore a vision of
the good society as one in which employers and insurers, but not workers, are entrusted
with the power to distribute the costs of work accidents to their benefit. To challenge
this neoliberal citizenship vision, critics must reject rather than accommodate the
underlying assumption that equates employers' and insurers' self-interest with the
public good and workers' self-interest as a public threat. Defenders of strong workers'
compensation protections will not escape the neoliberal double bind that makes
workers' protections increase harm to both workers and to society as a whole without
challenging the neoliberal double standard that makes workers, not employers,
primarily responsible for sacrificing their self-interest for the public good.
Though they do not specifically discuss workers' compensation reforms, Forbath,
Fineman, and Roberts offer a different citizenship vision that makes human beings'
physical and mental well-being, not just employers' and insurers' profit making,
central to the public well-being. For example, in an article comparing social insurance
programs for disability to welfare assistance for the nonearning poor, Dorothy Roberts

359. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 873-86; Ted Rohrlich & Evelyn Larrubia,
Anti-Fraud Drive Proves Costly for Employees Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2000, at Al.
360. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 887-93 (arguing that the main purpose and
effect of the emphasis on claimant fraud has been to benefit insurers and employers at the
expense of workers); Ted Rohrlich & Evelyn Larrubia, Public FraudUnit Favors Those Who
PrivatelyFund It, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at Al (explaining that California's antifraud law
giving insurers and employers a role in controlling and funding state criminal fraud
investigations has worked to detract attention from employer and insurer fraud and to harass
workers with legitimate claims).
361. An insurance industry research institute using California state data found that 1000
fraud referrals per quarter resulted in about 60 convictions, out of nearly 70,200 total quarterly
disability claims. See Workers' Compensation Notes (AFL-CIO Dep't of Occupational Safety
and Health, Washington, DC), May/June 2000, at 2 (citing the California Workers'
Compensation Institute). A study by the state of Wisconsin found that "[m]ost claimant fraud
allegations are made anonymously, by telephone, and from people who identify themselves as
former friends or spouses, relatives, co-workers or neighbors of the person alleged to be
committing claims fraud," and that in nearly a third of the allegations, the persons accused were
receiving no workers' compensation benefits. See Allegations of Workers' Compensation
Fraud,1999 Wis. Dep't of Workforce Dev. (2000) (studying an average of 60,000 annual losttime injuries from 1994 to 1998).
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and coauthor Jennifer Pokempner criticize the theory (often violated in practice) that
privileges workers' disability as deserving of government assistance but treats poverty
a personal failing. 362 Roberts and Pokempner recognize that public discourse has
reconstructed disability benefit programs, like welfare programs, to emphasize benefit
recipients' responsibility for minimizing their economic disadvantages. 363 In both, this
focus on claimant moral hazard distracts attention from the others' protections
institutionalized in the market structures that produce the (interrelated) economic
disadvantages of both disability and family poverty. 364 They note that in disability
compensation as in welfare, the risks of economic loss-whether from occupational
injury or poverty-are distributed not by neutral market processes or individuals' free
contracting, but by a race, gender, and class status hierarchy institutionalized through
law.36 5 They argue that both for disability and welfare, work will be better valued by
and more valuable to society as a whole not by denying full citizenship to those unable
to benefit from or contribute to the labor market, but by reenvisioning market labor so
that it promotes health and well-being more equally. 366
B. Communitarian Citizenshipand Workers' CompensationReform
Despite rhetoric celebrating the virtues of work and workers, communitarian
messages about public morality tend to reinforce rather than resist the neoliberal vision
of workers as subordinate citizens. In the prevailing communitarian approach to social
citizenship, a viable welfare state must cultivate public morality by encouraging those
in economic need to take personal responsibility for wage work. But by building on,
rather than challenging, the neoliberal division between the market and morality, the
emphasis on work's public virtue in even some of the more progressive strands of
communitarianism cuts against workers.
The most prominent communitarian writings define moral virtue as a question of
individual character, shaped mainly by the family and other voluntary civil society
institutions. 367 As Martha Fineman and Dorothy Roberts each critically observe, most
communitarian discussions of morality devote less attention to questions identified
with "the market," such as the terms and conditions of employment.368 Accordingly,

362. Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and the Meaning
of Disability,62 OHIo ST. L.J. 425, 426, 445-46 (2001).
363. See id. at 429-30 (discussing examples of increasing perceptions of fraud and waste in
Supplemental Security Income benefits for children with disabilities).
364. See id.
365. See id. at 430-45 (discussing the interrelatedness of poverty, race, gender, and
disability); id. at 458 (concluding that "[tihe interplay of race, poverty, and disability, highlights
the degree to which state action creates and intensifies patterns of illness and impairment that
reflect inequitable social and economic structures").
366. See id. at 458 ("Welfare and disability programs have been superimposed upon a
market structure that reflects the inequalities in our society.... [D]isability and antipoverty
programs that leave these structures intact will neither help individuals escape poverty nor allow
them to fully enter the political and social world as valued citizens.").
367. See generally Benjamin Stein, Work Gets No Respect on TV, THE RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY: RTs. AND RESP., Vol. 3, Issue 4, Fall 1993, at 32-37 (discussing the role of

television in shaping societies views of work).
368. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531,
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workers' compensation reform (unlike AFDC's reform) 369
has not been a significant
subject for communitarian scholarship or policy analysis.
Despite this silence, the predominant communitarian vision of social citizenship
sends a general message that reinforces the neoliberal double standard of moral hazard
in recent workers' compensation reforms. The communitarian attempt to recenter
society on moral responsibility rather than on market self-interest falters on its equation
of morality with participation in a market structured to further employers' and wealthy
capital owners' self-interest at the expense of many workers and communities. The
most prominent communitarian visions assume that citizens have a moral responsibility
not only to work, but ,also to work in an employment relationship that
disproportionately sacrifices their interests to those of employers.
1. Double Standard of Moral Responsibility
Communitarian literature often portrays protection for workers, but not for
employers, as the central threat to public well-being. As a result, the communitarian
solution to occupational health and safety problems tracks the neoliberal solution by
focusing on increasing workers' responsibilities.
The Responsive Communitarian Platform ("Platform"), a public summary of key
communitarian principles endorsed by many academic and policy leaders, 370 has a
section titled "Public Safety and Public Health" that emphasizes individual worker and
consumer behavior as the central threat to community well-being. 37 The public health
hazards it considers consist of alcohol abuse, gun violence, and AIDS 372
. To protect
against these threats, the Platform recommends controlling individual freedom in the
interest of public well-being. For example, it advocates drug and alcohol testing for
workers such as pilots and train engineers who affect public safety.373 In contrast, the
Platform says nothing about potential threats to public safety from managers,
employers, shareholders, or from social or economic institutions. Nor does it consider
furthering the public well-being through any comparable regulatory controls on
businesses or capital owners, 374 such as recommending better regulation of work hours
and conditions to ease occupational pressures for drug use, restoring tort liability for

535-36 (2000); see generally Roberts, supra note 157, at 560-61.
369. For example, the Responsive Community, a leading journal of communitarian ideas,
lists no articles with titles addressing occupational health and safety, wage levels, or collective
bargaining law, compared to numerous articles with titles focusing on matters such as family,
education, AFDC, religion and immigration.
370. This Platform is reprinted in AMrrAi ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 253-67
(1993), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/rcplatform.html.
371. See id. at 264-65.
372. Id.

373. Id.
374. The Platform does obliquely suggest some responsibilities on businesses when it says
that certain privacy rights of carriers of sexually transmitted diseases like AIDS "should be
scrupulously protected." Id. at 265. However, the passive voice avoids holding any particular

actor responsible for this problem, and the failure to suggest any concrete regulatory strategy to
control this threat underscores the primary emphasis on individual rather than business
responsibility. See id.
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employers who violate health and safety regulations, improving OSHA standards or
subsidies or tax breaks for companies that
enforcement powers, or denying corporate
75
violate health and safety regulations.
In another example of a communitarian approach to workplace moral responsibility,
the Christian Institute in Basic Life Principles specifically addresses workers'
compensation issues through a widely promoted and well-funded moral education
program called "Character First!" adopted by many private businesses, public schools,
and local governments.376 Although the Institute takes a more overtly conservative
approach than many academic proponents of communitarianism, its transparently
hierarchical citizenship vision shares similar assumptions about whose personal
responsibility-and whose freedom from responsibility-is most important to the
public good. The "Character First!" program teaches that submission to authority is a
central part of good character,*77 drawing on the Institute founder's theology of divine
378
support for authority figures in church, government, and corporate management.
to
"Character First!" features a manager training program encouraging employers 379
evaluate workers' job performance by measuring their "character qualities."
Advocates of the "Character First!" program focus on high workers' compensation
claims as evidence of character problems among employees, and they boast
that the
38
program leads to dramatic reductions in workers' compensation claims. 0

375. See David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at Al (reporting how weak regulatory oversight contributed to deaths and
serious injuries in one corporation); Marc Breslow, Improve CorporateStandards, BANGOR
DAILY NEWS, July 3, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 22129078 (reporting that several corporations
heavily subsidized by Maine taxpayers in 1998 and 1999 have. repeatedly violated
environmental, OSHA, or labor laws, and advocating legislation tying corporate welfare to
higher standards of corporate citizenship).
376. The Character First program has been officially adopted by the state of Oklahoma, as
well as by cities such as Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Augusta, Georgia; and Aiken, South Carolina,
leaders of the program say it has been presented (though not necessarily implemented) in over
100 cities. Virginia Norton, Mayor Launches CharacterProgram,AUGUSTA CHRON. (GA), May
5, 1999, at C12, available at 1999 WL 17575656; see also Lisa Miller, CharacterFirst!
Volunteers, with Links to Religion, Teach TraditionalValues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at Al
(discussing the "wave called 'character' education that's sweeping the nation's schools"
including 600 schools using Character First! often funded by businesses and groups like the
Kiwanis).
377. Jenny Slater, CharacterCity ProgramTaking Root, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane,
WA), May 11, 2000, at At, available at 2000 WL 6761325 (reporting a Fresno, California
official's defense of that city's Character First! program on the ground that "bringing the
community back to an authority-based structure" makes life better).
378. P.J. Lassek, CouncilorWants CharacterTaught to City Workers, TULSA WORLD, Apr.
15, 2001 (reporting that the Character First! program adopted by numerous schools and city
councils has raised concerns about the program's ties to the religious views of Institute leader
Bill Gothard).
379. Id.
380. See Norton, supra note 376 (reporting program staff's claims that a carpet manufacturer
reduced its workers' compensation claims from $476,000 to $47,000 in eighteen months after
using Character First); Russ Pulliam, CharacterQualitiesDo Count, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov.
19, 1999, at D2 (editorializing enthusiastically about the successes of the program); Julia
Silverman, LR Mayor Backs Plan of Ministry, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAzETTE, Apr. 7, 2000
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As one critic notes, the "Character First!" program implies that workers are morally
on the job or to shoulder the pain and income loss
obligated to avoid getting
• • injured
381
resulting from work injury. In contrast, the program appears silent about employers'
possible moral duties to promote health and safety. Such duties might arguably include,
for instance, paying compensation claims promptly, generously, and respectfully;
refusing to relocate operations to states or nations with less stringent compensation or
safety laws; complying with or exceeding OSHA standards; lobbying for better health
and safety laws; or encouraging labor organizing and worker control of safety-related
production decisions. Nor does this program appear to recommend that investors,
financial analysts, or purchasers make comparable measures of moral characteristics in
evaluating corporate stock or contractors' performance. The program does not appear
to address the moral question of how managers or corporate shareholders should
reconcile any conflicts between profit-maximizing and workers' health and safety.382
2. Excusing Employers' Irresponsibility as the Market
As in the neoliberal view, the prevailing communitarian view tends to portray
employers' rights as economic and therefore natural and inevitable, while workers'
rights are social and contingent on performance of social responsibilities. By
identifying the interests of wealthy capital owners with the market, communitarian
morality depersonalizes and universalizes their interests, thereby excusing them from
moral responsibility.
In a recent book advocating a 'Third Way" balance between state, market, and
community, communitarian author Amitai Etzioni distinguishes his views from
neoliberalism by asserting that "market forces" must sometimes be restrained to
promote public well-being. 383 Nonetheless, he warns that concern for "social problems
created by market forces" such as overwork or unemployment "should not blind us to
the basic merit of strong economic growth" 384 and should not lead to state interventions
that "disable the economic engines of innovation and change. '385 After a public talk on
his "Third Way" approach to economic policy, Etzioni responded to an audience
question about occupational health hazards
by warning against the costs to employers
36
of increased health and safety regulation. 8
Etzioni's analysis elides capital owners' interests and moral agency by portraying
business profit-seeking as inhuman "engines" or "forces" that operate primarily to
benefit the general public. He equates government support for multinational capital's
interests, such as neoliberal international trade policies, with the growth-producing
market and, therefore, with the community well-being. In contrast, he presents support

(reporting a claim that one of the first employers to adopt the program reduced its workers'
compensation claims by 80%).
381. John Brummett, Back Off,Mayor, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Apr. 18, 2000, at B7.
382. The program stresses that employee character-building increases productivity. See
Editorial, Good Characteron the Job, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Apr. 15, 1999, at A14.
383. AMITAI ETzIONI, THE THIRD WAY TO A GOOD SocIETY 43 (2000).
384.Id. at 47.
385. Id.

386. Amitai Etzioni, The Future of the Third Way, Address at the Plenary Session of the
12th Annual Meeting on Socio-Economics, London School of Economics (July 7, 2000).
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for workers' interests-labor standards or security against unemployment-as 87"social"
regulations that tend to run counter to the presumptively beneficial market.:
As invisible drivers of a basically virtuous market, in Etzioni's view, employers and
shareholders can take their status as good citizens for granted. In contrast, Etzioni's
vision suggests that good citizenship for individual workers and consumers requires
them to take additional responsibility for avoiding or bearing costs that affect society.
In his "Third Way" proposal for public health, Etzioni mentions that a good society
requires that the state assume responsibilities such as vaccinations, water fluoridation,
and food and drug safety:388 He then stresses that citizens also have the responsibility
to contribute individual "changes in lifestyle" such as more exercise and less
smoking.:3 9 As an example of the communitarian demand for responsibility "from all,
for all," Etzioni mentions that people with quadriplegia should be expected to do tasks
for themselves as much as possible rather than receiving public support for nursing
assistants:.9 0 However, he omits any discussion of "the market's" or capital owners'
responsibilities for public health.3 9'
When Etzioni acknowledges the potential costs to workers from the global "private
sector" and its pursuit of economic efficiency, he urges the state and civil society to
take (limited) steps to ameliorate these costs, for instance, by retraining redundant
workers, by targeting assistance to workers hurt by global job relocations, or by
forming international coalitions to limit corporate law-breaking.3 92 He does not
mention, however, any specific responsibility by the private sector (either businesses or
capital owners) to avoid such problems. In a USA Today essay, Etzioni notes that
President George W. Bush's proposal to change laws to permit arsenic in drinking
water was not "especially encouraging" in light of communitarian ideals, but he
concludes by approving what he sees as Bush's strategy of promoting community
morality over market profits through modest symbolic exhortation rather than
legislation: a9 3And while Etzioni advocates public shaming of some people to assert the
priority of community standards over personal preferences, 39 4 he assumes community
moral standards must defer to some others' freedom to make personal moral choices,
however harmful to the community as a whole. He explains that vigorous attempts to
require the wealthy to contribute to others' material well-being "will cause a flight of
wealth and damage the economy in other ways." 395 As a result, Etzioni asserts that the

387. ETzIONI, supra note 383, at 47.
388. Id. at 42.

389. Id. at 43.
390. Id. at 30.
391. Id. at 42-43.
392. Id. at 47-48.
393. Amitai Etzioni, Bush's Community-basedPlan FacesBumpy Road, USA TODAY, Aug.
30, 2001, at 13A.
394. AMITAi ETZiONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY, at xv (2001) ("The good society is not a
neutral one that leaves it up to its members to decide on their own whether or not they wish to
pollute the environment, abandon their children, abuse their spouse, drink and drive, and so
on."); AMITAi ETZIONI, NEXT: THE ROAD TO A GOOD SOCIETY 22-23 (2001) (arguing that a good
society must curb some kinds of behaviors, preferably through approbation and censure rather
than through government coercion).
395. ErzIONI, supra note 383, at 56.
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"tantalizing problems plaguing modem societies" must await a spiritual awakening
through which
"the affluent would be willing to support serious reallocation of wealth
396
and power."
In an essay on health policy, Etzioni argues that superior health care for the rich is
unavoidable, asserting that "[n]either America nor any other country has ever been
egalitarian. Those that tried-the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea-had to rely on the
massive use of force." 397 He insists that the problem that some people lack health care
or other basic needs is not caused by "hard-earned or inherited" gains by the rich or,
for example, by physicians who substitute personal gain for principles of professional
(or civic) morality. 398He explains, "[o]ur no. 1 employment problem is not that some
people are paid more than others, but that millions cannot find jobs. Our most urgent
housing problem is not that some people buy mansions and summer houses, but that we
have people who cannot afford even marginally adequate housing."399 Like the
neoliberal efficiency-oriented vision, Etzioni's communitarian moral vision assumes
that freedom from community responsibility for wealthy individuals and corporations
is an inevitable fact of life in a free society that must be accommodated by others'
increased suffering and community obligation.
By conceding (like Etzioni) if not celebrating (like Character First!) the moral
authority of those who gain the most from a market that sacrifices public health, the
prevailing communitarian moral order ends up endorsing market inequality as a public
virtue despite community harms. Martha Fineman offers a contrasting vision of how to
recognize the public value of encouraging workers to take more responsibility for
caring for their own health (physical and mental). 4 She suggests restructuring market
labor (with shorter hours and higher minimum wages, for example) so that employers
do not require workers to sacrifice so much of their lives for work.4 °1 In contrast to the
predominant communitarian revival of moral authority, Fineman-like Forbath and
Roberts-sees the problem of the market's harm to communities not as a problem of
individual workers' or employers' lack of good moral character, but as a problem of
government distribution of market authority to promote the wrong moral order.40 2
C. Liberal Citizenship and Workers' Compensation
The traditional no-fault theory of workers' compensation parallels the liberal
justification for AFDC: government protection fosters individual autonomy when it

396. Amitai Etzioni, The Good Society: Goals Beyond Money, 35 THE FuTuRIST, July-Aug.,
2001, at 68.
397. Amitai Etzioni, Critics of "Boutique" Doctor Care Miss the Point, USA

TODAY,

Jan.

24, 2002, at 15A (not discussing, for example, Scandinavian egalitarian policies).
398. Id. (criticizing proposals to make second-rate care a violation of professional ethics or
to tax premium care for the rich).
399. Id.

400. Fineman, supra note 144, at 1439.
401. Id.
402. See Roberts, supra note 157, at 581-82 (arguing that social inequities are "our chief
moral problem" but that communitarians tend to reinforce a long tradition of defending those
inequities in the name of community values).
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ameliorates economic losses beyond individual control.4 °3 If work accidents are largely
inevitable and random facts of industrial life, then a broad requirement that employers
compensate work injury regardless of fault does not increase workers' moral hazard.
The traditional liberal view distinguishes workers' compensation from AFDC as
efficiency-oriented, not redistributive. Workers' compensation corrects a failure in the
market system of individual contractual freedom. In the standard analysis, workers'
compensation's no-fault principles of strict liability and limited compensation properly
internalize the costs of work accidents to the inherently risky employment relationship.
Accordingly, in this theory, no-fault compensation not only helps individual victims
but also benefits society overall by maximizing incentives for accident deterrence. 40 4
1. Separating Compensation from Responsibility
Nonetheless, in their book True Security, Graetz and Mashaw point out a tension in
liberals' embrace of the efficiency rationale for no-fault protection from work injury
costs. 40 5 By making responsibility for social well-being (deterring social harm) the
basis of this social citizenship right, rather than individual need or entitlement the
efficiency rationale brings back the problems of fault-based systems that workers'
compensation was supposed to avoid.
Graetz and Mashaw astutely observe that even when the goals of compensation
(redistribution) and deterrence (efficiency) appear to coincide, as in the workers'
compensation's no-fault rationale, deterrence goals will create pressure for reduced
compensation in the long run.40 6 If social welfare programs aim to induce overall costsavings, those with the least market power will end up bearing the responsibility for
that cost-savings, despite attempts to target incentive effects toward others. As a result,
the focus on overall cost-savings will lead to less protection for those most vulnerable
to market risks and will frustrate the goal of compensating those most in need.
Consistent with the prevailing liberal strategy, Graetz and Mashaw accept as inevitable
the conflict between efficiency-oriented deterrence-maximizing overall resourcesand distribution-oriented compensation-helping those who lose out from that overall
resource-maximizing. They then try to resolve this conflict by defending compensation
as a separate, supplementary redistributive goal worth a small loss in efficiency.
Graetz and Mashaw summarize the history of workers' compensation as a bad deal
that has delivered inadequate benefits at exorbitant administrative cost with dubious
effects on occupational health and safety.40 7 In contrast to neoliberal reformers,
however, they claim workers' compensation's flaw is an excessive rather than
insufficient focus on efficiency. When workers' compensation replaced employers' old
fault-based tort defenses with a strict obligation to (partially) compensate injuries, that

403. See, e.g., Philip Harvey, Joblessness & the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON
1(1999) (explaining the liberal view that joblessness is largely a structural
problem beyond individual control).
404. See Moss, supra note 304, at 60-74 (discussing the American Association for Labor
Legislation's theory that workers' compensation would be a means of internalizing
externalities).
405. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 58, 82-87.
406. See id. at 58, 85-86.
407. See id. at 83-85.
POVERTY L. & POL'Y
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change did not substantially diminish employers' labor market bargaining power
relative to workers. As a result, workers' compensation left open other opportunities
for employers to use their power to escape responsibility for sharing the costs of work
injuries.
Graetz and Mashaw explain that workers' compensation has not internalized work
injury costs to the employment relationship, but instead has produced incentives for
employers to reduce or resist compensation claims. 4 8 They observe that employers
tend to avoid high workers' compensation insurance premiums not by reducing work
accidents or by adapting the workplace to support injured workers, but by exploiting
uncertainties about work injuries to avoid paying the high costs of work injuries. For
example, employers may aggressively deny or discourage workers' injury claims,
reduce wages for high risk work (especially for workers with few options), replace
covered "employees" with noncovered "independent contractors," lobby state
legislatures to reduce benefit levels, or threaten to move to states (or nations) with
lower benefit costs. 40 9 As a result of these incentives for employer moral hazard,
Graetz and Mashaw conclude that workers' compensation has failed both to increase
deterrence and to adequately compensate injured workers.
The lesson of Graetz and Mashaw's story of workers' compensation is that, in both
the fault-based tort approach and the no-fault workers' compensation system,
compensation gets sacrificed when tied to responsibility. 4'0 Their solution is to give up
on attempting to refashion social citizenship protections into an efficiency model, and
to instead trim down social citizenship to fit the needs of individual compensation
rather than overall responsibility (whether moral or economic).
Accordingly, they propose a kind of super-no-fault approach that would offer
workers minimal compensation for total disability regardless of work-relatedness and
that would be funded by spreading more of the costs of disability from employers to
workers and to taxpayers in general.41' In particular, they advocate replacing temporary
workers' compensation benefits with a new federal temporary disability compensation
limited to total work incapacity, whether work-related or not, lasting up to a year.4 2
For permanent total disability, they propose partly replacing workers' compensation
with the existing Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") scheme, supplemented
for nonearners or for very low-earners
with the existing means-tested Supplemental
4 13
Security Insurance ("SSI") program.
But Graetz and Mashaw's liberal plan for buttressing social citizenship by
subtracting responsibility from workers' compensation has the same flaw as the
communitarian plan for adding responsibility. Both incorporate rather than challenge
the neoliberal double standard of moral hazard that treats employers' cost-increasing

408. See id. at 58 ("[Workers' Compensation's] effort to serve compensatory justice forces
workers' compensation programs to adopt an inappropriate and inefficient adversarial process
for deciding claims.").

409. See id. at 86.
410. See id. at 211-12 (stating that security and opportunity may be at cross-purposes,
because of recipient moral hazard).
411. See id. at 287 (explaining that this program would be funded by a tax on employers
based on a percentage of payroll financing).
412. Id. at 219-21.
413. Id. at 221-23.
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behavior as normal and workers' cost-increasing behavior as deviant. Both aim to
accommodate rather than challenge a market structured to make overall accident costsavings disproportionately the personal responsibility of workers. As a result, this
classically liberal claim to strictly separate security from responsibility instead serves
to redistribute both: workers get less security and more responsibility, while capital
owners get more security and less responsibility. Graetz and Mashaw miss their mark
by viewing the ideological barrier to workers' security as the conflicting goal of
"efficiency" rather than as a conflicting vision of workers' citizenship status.
2. Double Standard of Responsibility
First, Graetz and Mashaw shift deterrence requirements from employers to workers
and call this shift a necessary feature of redistribution. Regulation of worker moral
hazard is fundamental to their compensation proposal, even though this requires
sacrifices in compensation. 414 They carefully tailor their proposed redistributive
protections to minimize (though not eliminate) incentives for compensation of
disability
costs they attribute to workers' personal characteristics, like motivation and
4 15
skill.
For example, their federal benefits proposal excludes compensation for permanent
partialdisabilities, which account for the bulk of workers' compensation benefit costs
and the vast majority of the claims for permanent disability.41 6 Because of the
uncertainty of distinguishing this source of income loss from general personal
"failures" such as "demoralization," "declining energy," or poor education, they leave
these injuries to be compensated by a residual workers' compensation system where
benefits are likely to be denied, delayed, or sharply limited. 7 The failure to improve
this system means workers will retain a significant risk that disability will bring
financial crisis and destitution sufficient to rob them of their homes, cars, savings,
families, health, and even their lives.
To receive the Social Security system's permanent total disability benefits, which
Graetz and Mashaw present as an alternative to workers' compensation, workers must
prove they are unable to perform any job in the national economy that provides
"substantial" income (in the late 1990s, defined as $500 a month). This strict eligibility
requirement for permanent disability gives seriously injured workers responsibility for
assuming the burdens of retraining, moving away from established connections with
family, community, and medical providers, and accepting virtually any job no matter
what the conditions, hours, or wages. Eligibility requirements for their proposed
temporary disability insurance scheme are less stringent, requiring workers only to
prove they are unable to perform their "usual" job, but this program still regulates
worker behavior through requirements of periodic medical recertification, participation

414. "We have attempted to design social insurance protections to minimize the
disincentives that many aspects of today's U.S. social insurance policies embody." Id. at 297.
They conclude that too much attention to "security" goals as opposed to "opportunity" goals
leads to "runaway costs" and "withdrawal of individual work effort." Id. at 211.
415. Id. at 213.
416. Id. at 217.
417. Id. at 218.
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41
in rehabilitation, and a one-year time limit.
In Graetz and Mashaw's plan, even workers compensated by the federal total
disability programs must absorb a large portion of the costs of their injuries: both their
temporary and permanent disability benefit proposals aim to provide subsistence-level
income, not substantial wage replacement. Workers can expect to assume increased
responsibility for financing this protection against the risk of permanent disability
because the shift from workers' compensation to an expanded social security disability
4 19
program would likely increase workers' payroll or general income taxes, or both.
In sum, Graetz and Mashaw impose steep responsibilities on injured workers for the
costs of work disability in order to "balance" their need for security against efficiencybased deterrence concerns. 420 Ironically, this liberal attempt to move away from
workers' compensation to a more purely no-fault redistributive system instead ends up
adopting some of the worker-fault provisions revived by the efficiency-oriented
neoliberal workers' compensation reforms.
In fact, when Graetz and Mashaw claim to shift the goal of disability protection
from deterrence to compensation, they really mean that they aim to reduce employers'
responsibility for disability costs. Why is deterring cost-increasing behavior by
workers, but not by employers; integral to their system? Because they identify
employers' cost-increasing behavior, but not workers', with an efficient market. When
Graetz and Mashaw discuss the problem of workers' compensation's incentives for
employers (or insurers) to manipulate the system's uncertainty by shifting work injury
costs to workers and taxpayers, they do not explicitly name this behavior "moral
hazard."i42 Instead, they use that term exclusively for workers' incentives for behavior
that increases injury costs. 4 22 They construct workers' opportunistic cost-shifting as
personal gain-seeking at the expense of public well-being, produced by redistributive
protections against market risk. For example, they explain that disability benefits
encourage some workers to avoid work by "faking disability" or at least "accentuating"
their impairments.423
In contrast, they depersonalize capital owners' role in avoiding responsibility for
preventing or mitigating the costs of work injuries and illnesses. They identify personal
gain-seeking by workers, but not by employers, as a cause of work disability. They
generalize risks resulting from employers', insurers', and shareholders' profit-seeking
(or law-breaking)---or from workers' race and class status424--as "environmental"

418. See id. at 220-21.
419. Whether reduced workers compensation insurance rates will be passed on to workers
depends on their bargaining power relative to insurers and employers.
420. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 211.
421. See their discussion of employers' resistance to paying adequate workers'
compensation benefits, id. at 85-86; employers' tendency to game the system when faced with
benefit mandates, id. at 293-95; employers' tendency to "shift the costs of employer mandates,"
id. at 285.
422. See id. at 296-99.
423. Id. at 296.
424. See Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 362, at 435 & n.44 (citing Gary King & David
R. Williams, Race and Health:A MultidimensionalApproach to African American Health, in
SOCIETY AND HEALTH 93, 110 (Benjamin C. Amick et al. eds., 1995)).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 78:783

factors or as abstract labor market structures. 425 Aside from workers' behavior, they
as a matter of the "inherent risks of
describe the problem of work disabilities 4simply
26
working and living in a market economy."

Graetz and Mashaw similarly turn other forms of opportunistic cost-shifting by
capital owners into background forces, sometimes using the passive voice to obscure
the underlying human and corporate agency. For example, when they refer to
employers' and insurers' strategic efforts to resist expansion of workers' compensation
benefits, they state that "[o]ne state legislature after another has been importuned to do
something about rising insurance rates", 427 and that "states areforced into a race.., to

the bottom in terms of the adequacy of workers' compensation coverage and
benefits. 428 In addition, they blame flawed "systems" for the costly intervention of
lawyers, doctors, and legislators, 429 obscuring the self-interested actions of the
employers and insurers who fund or provoke this intervention through questionable or
arbitrary claims denials and who also promote media campaigns to shift popular blame
for high injury costs from employers or insurers to such "special interests. 430
By portraying capital owners' incentives for moral hazard as a neutral fact of life,
Graetz and Mashaw make it seem more reasonable to accommodate rather than to
regulate that moral hazard. In contrast, by making workers' moral hazard seem to be
the result of a contingent policy choice-the design of redistributive programsregulating that moral hazard by limiting compensation seems reasonable and politically
practical. But their plan helps create the limits they presume are inevitable. Workers
would not need to assume so much responsibility for the costs of work disability if
there were other ways of minimizing those costs. With effective regulation of
occupational health and safety and disability discrimination, and with widespread good
wages and working conditions, generous compensation of permanent partial disability
might seem much more practical and inexpensive.43'
Indeed, Graetz and Mashaw do partially (and implicitly) recognize that regulating
employers' moral hazard is critical to designing effective compensation systems. They
insist on federalizing compensation programs, recognizing that fragmented systems
increase employers' power to strategically avoid compensation by provoking a race to
the bottom in state benefit levels. But their effort to control employer moral hazard is
half-hearted because they defer to the dominant neoliberal view that capital owners'
strategic cost-shifting is not an inefficient moral hazard, but a moral opportunity
promoting efficiency. For example, Graetz and Mashaw acknowledge that trade
policies deregulating the international movement of capital have increased employers'
bargaining power,42 and that such policies may have helped capital owners reap a

425. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 213-14.
426. Id. at 8.
427. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
428. Id. (emphasis added).
429. Id. at 85.
430. See generally Rohrlich & Larrubia, supra note 360.
431. Some U.S. companies have taken this approach to reducing high workers'
compensation costs of permanent partial disability, at least in the short term and at least with
more skilled employees. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 923 n. 1117.
432. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 285.
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larger share of the gains from production than workers.433 But in contrast to their
efforts to restrain a nationalrace to the bottom, they urge giving free reign to this
internationalrace to the bottom. 434 Though they note that this market structure change
has probably increased the risks they seek to compensate,435 they contradict that
observation-and much outside evidence 43 6-by asserting that unrestrained global
capital power will bring the best protection to workers in the long run.437 That is,
following the conventional neoliberal wisdom, Graetz and Mashaw identify capital
owners' opportunity for strategic gains with public-spirited growth. They take on faith
(despite recognizing evidence to the contrary) that those gains "ultimately" will trickle
down to workers in the form of lower prices and more jobs.43 s
This double standard of moral hazard built into their compensation proposal helps
sap its strengths. In recent years, wealthy corporations and taxpayers often have used
their growing political and economic bargaining power to advocate decreased federal
funding for social welfare spending that would improve security for most workers and
their families. 439 Graetz and Mashaw vaguely attribute this political movement against
"redistribution" to "[i]deological opponents," "economists," or "critics,"' 44 who are
motivated by abstract and altruistic principles such as "individual responsibility" and
"economic productivity" rather than by personal gain. 44 They hope to appease that
opposition by fashioning protections that accommodate rather than threaten "efficient
markets and high productivity. ' '4 42 But by presenting the interests of those who benefit

433.
434.
435.
436.

See id. at 31-32.
See id. at 284-85.
See id. at 31-32.
First, during the 1980s and 1990s, as international policy has increasingly followed

neoliberal prescriptions for capital mobility and flexibility, economic growth has declined in

most of the world compared to the 1960s and 1970s-with the exception of East Asia,
particularly China. Mark Weisbrot, et al., Growth May be Goodforthe Poor-Butare IMF and
World Bank Policies Good for Growth?: A Closer Look at the World Bank's Most Recent

Defense of Its Policies (May 2001), at http://www.cepr.net/globalization/GrowthMay-BeGoodforthePoor.htm. Second, even if neoliberal policies increasing wealthy capital owners'
bargaining power did promote economic growth, gains from growth may be distributed
primarily to the rich. Id. at text between footnotes 7-9 and Fig. 3. In the United States, for
example, per capita income has risen since 1973 while median wages and bottom-quintile
income has fallen. Id. See also discussion infra Part III.
437. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 285.

438. They state that prices of many of the most important necessities have increased, Id. at
36-37, and that the standard of living of many workers has fallen, Id. at 31 (implying that falling
wages are not offset by falling prices).
439. See David Callahan, $1 Billion for Ideas: Conservative Think Tanks in the 1990s,
(National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, Mar. 12, 1999), at http://www.ncrp.org/psrl
pressreleases/thinktanks.htm (estimating conservative think tanks spent over $1 billion during
the 1990s to argue for "privatization of the public sphere and elevation of the market as the
prime mechanisms for social arbitration and resource allocation"); PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra
note 270, at 107-36 (describing many well-funded lobbying efforts aimed at resisting expansion
of health insurance, occupational health and safety regulations, and other worker protections
and redirecting government spending toward upper class interests).
440. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 4-5.
441. See id. at 23.
442. Id. at 310.
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from upward redistribution as public values to which workers' needs must be
subordinated-rather than challenging these interests as private greed or public harmthe liberal argument for workers' social citizenship instead supports its demise.
3. Double Standard of Security
By shifting the focus of deterrence from employers to workers, Graetz and
Mashaw's liberal approach also ends up redistributing security from workers to capital
owners. In effect, their proposal trades hopes for improved compensation for the
largest group of workers with serious occupational injuries-those with permanent
partial disabilities-for better temporary compensation for a wider range of injured
workers. In keeping with the liberal view of "redistribution" as a market gap-filler,
their compensation scheme provides transitional assistance to help smooth bumps in
labor market participation rather than to replace market income.
But again, Graetz and Mashaw rest their analysis of security on a double standard.
After struggling with the question of what should count as redistributive social
insurance," 3 they decide to narrow the concept to refer only to protections against loss
of wage income for workers and their families, 444 not to government protections
against risk of profit loss to employers and capital owners, like crop insurance 445 or
general fiscal or monetary policies. 446 By leaving government security for corporate
and capital interests off their "redistributive" table, they implicitly privilege
compensation for these interests as part of the background rules of a normal market. 447
Because employers' protections do not count as redistributive social insurance,
these protections need not be sharply limited in deference to competing "efficiency"
values. For example, Graetz and Mashaw do not discuss whether tort immunity for
employers should be eliminated as part of their plan to partially replace (and otherwise
give up on) workers' compensation. Their analysis implies that this protection is a
that
separate regulatory concern, rather than a form of social insurance for44employers
8
raises moral hazard concerns comparable to disability compensation.
Indeed, employer protections take on the guise of efficiency in conventional liberal
analysis, which typically construes their resulting moral hazard as beneficial moral
opportunity ("flexibility") that drives the market. In this analysis, protections of wage
income confer private gain to workers, but protection of corporate profit spills over to
benefit workers and the overall public. For example, Graetz and Mashaw assume that
their plan to partly replace workers' compensation will result in "redirecting" resources
to support disability benefits elsewhere. 449 But it seems as likely that advocates for

443. See id. at 56-60.
444. See id. at 58.
445. See id.
446. See id. at 56.
447. See Martha T. McCluskey, Whose Risk, Whose Security?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT,
Jan. 31, 2000, at 38-41 (describing and criticizing neoliberal policies that increase social
insurance for wealthy capital owners).
448. See Baker, supra note 101, at 272-73 (explaining that insurance is a broad concept not
limited to the products of traditional insurance companies, and that as a result, the moral hazard
issues are correspondingly broad).
449. GRAEMZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 224.
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business and insurer groups, and others who seek gains from upward redistribution,
will use their disproportionate political power to try to redirect any savings in workers'
compensation benefits toward increased capital earnings (perhaps in the name of
economic competitiveness and maintaining investor confidence). 450 Graetz and
Mashaw are not as willing to assume that gains in workers' security from, say,
generous federally funded permanent partial disability benefits, might spill over to the
public through increased productivity from better worker health and morale or through
pressures for higher wages and safer workplaces.
If, instead, capital owners' protections are as likely to produce moral hazard as
workers' protections, then more security for capital owners will produce more
incentives for further constraining workers' security. For example, Graetz and
Mashaw's plan to protect employers against the costs of permanent partial disability
will produce incentives for employers to shift more of those costs to workers through
unsafe working conditions, with the result that workers will bear even more of the risks
of permanent partial disability. And without an adequate alternative to wage income,
injured workers will become less able to avoid the health costs of returning to work in
jobs that exacerbate their injuries. In another example, Graetz and Mashaw reject
regulation of employers' employment decisions as outside the scope of social
insurance and part of employer "flexibility" necessary for "robust economic
growth. ''4 l But although laws protecting employers' freedom to fire workers may
reduce risk of profit loss, this protection also gives employers more bargaining power
with which to limit workers' access to disability benefits. In practice, employers'
relatively broad freedom to fire workers will probably deter many workers from taking
advantage of Graetz and Mashaw's proposed temporary disability protections, at least
beyond the twelve-week period currently protected (for some workers) by the Family
and Medical Leave Act.
In sum, the liberal solutions to the problem of work disability show that protection
for workers gets sacrificed when supposedly severed from efficiency as well as when
tied to it. Graetz and Mashaw wisely recognize that the old social citizenship vision of
workers' compensation failed because it did not sufficiently constrain employers'
relative power to profit from workers' insecurity. But then they rest their hopes for
reviving workers' social citizenship on yielding to that power, conceding a social order
in which wage earners' security derives from and takes second place to security for
capital owners. If policies promoting workers' security constitute protection for market
losers, or even protection against market failures, while capital owners' security counts
as protection within the beneficial market, then workers will retain subordinate
citizenship status.

450. In the 2000 Presidential campaign, both major party candidates made reducing
government spending (and debt) a top priority, following the neoliberal economic theory that
overall economic well-being depends on catering to wealthy global investors who fear rising
interest rates or a falling dollar value. See Susan Page, When It Comes to Economics, the
Differences Are Hardto Find,USA TODAY, June 26, 2000, at IA (discussing comments by Al
Gore and George W. Bush). A survey of Fortune 500 executives found much stronger support
for reducing taxes, especially individual taxes, and for reducing the federal debt than for new
federal spending. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, How CEOs Will Vote: Almost All the Way with Bush,
FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at 68 (describing phone survey of 195 CEOs in January, 2000).
451. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 285.
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III. CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the twentieth century, American law was the field of a struggle
over the transformation of citizenship in a reintegrated and reconfigured national
political economy. 452 The questions of how government should distribute the risks and

gains of that economy, and whose market freedom should be central to a national
economy built on and still entangled with slavery, were answered in part by Lochnerera judicial rulings. Those rulings privileged some economic protections as
fundamental citizenship rights central to both societal well-being and individual
freedom, but jeopardized other economic protections by positioning these outside the
bounds of good citizenship as the product of special interests and individual
dependence.453
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, American law is again the field of a
struggle over the transformation of citizenship in a reintegrated and reconfigured
international political economy. The questions of how government should distribute
the risks and gains of this economy, and whose market freedom should be central to a
global economy grown from racialized colonialism, has been answered in part by a
powerful neoliberal "Washington consensus" that has worked to restructure social and
economic rights in developing countries. 454 As in the Lochner era, the recently
triumphant free-market ideology promotes some government economic protections as
fundamental personal freedoms essential to aggregate well-being, but disparages and
jeopardizes other economic protections as special interest paternalism that endangers
global welfare. 45 5 And, as in the Lochner era, the dominant wisdom insists that the

452. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 4 (1992) (discussing "fantastic social and economic changes" that

shaped the controversy between classical legal thought and progressive legal thought).
453. See supra notes 22-53 and accompanying text.
454. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 236 (identifying the "Washington
Consensus" with free-market development policies first used in Latin America); Iglesias, supra
note 2, at 384 (criticizing this supposed consensus as a contested ideology of subordination).
The International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") neoliberal policies, shaped by the U.S. government,
conditioned loans to developing countries on "structural adjustment" measures designed to
protect international capital and reduce social spending. See Joseph Stiglitz, Thanks for
Nothing, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2001, at 36 (describing how the IMF's undemocratic
and "fundamentally unsound" policies penalized Ethiopia for directing aid to schools and health
clinics and for reducing high-interest debt, rather than building up reserves to protect certain
international investors); ROBIN HAHNEL, PANIC RULES: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 50-66 (1999) (explaining IMF policies and their failures); see generally
GARY TEEPLE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM: INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY (1995) (linking neoliberal structural adjustment policies to restructuring of economic
rights and welfare state policies in developed nations like the U.S.).

455. For example, New York Times writer and best-selling author Thomas Friedman belittles
opponents of global neoliberalism as backward "turtles," incompetent workers, and irrational
criminals who mistakenly perceive that their self-centered economic interests should count as

rights.

THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,

THE

LEXUS

AND THE OLIVE TREE:

UNDERSTANDING

GLOBALIZATION 271-75 (1999). In contrast, Friedman gives Enron as an example of the

beneficial market forces driving the neoliberal global economy with "relentless, coherent, wellfunded, and efficient business plans." Id. at 242. He presents Enron as one of the transnational
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greatest equality will eventually come from markets that are free to reward and
reinforce the privileges and penalties of race, class, and gender stratification.456
But as the neoliberal promise of a new global community of peace and prosperity
horribly eludes much of the world,457 cracks in the supposed "free market" consensus

corporate "Electronic Herd" that exercises global market power to pressure local governments
for access to cheap labor and natural resources, tax breaks, and social spending cuts. Id. at 11013, 231. However, these demands represent not self-serving special interests or criminal greed,
but a superrational democratic accountability that "turns the whole world into a parliamentary
system," id. at 115, and that creates progress bringing "hope for salvation" to those it threatens,
id. at 231. See generally McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 5 (presenting critics of the World
Trade Organization's supposed "free trade" policies as anti-democratic "special interests" who
threaten global well-being with protectionist regulation and contrasting proponents of this new
international regulatory body as public-interested and democratic advocates of freedom).
In his book criticizing neoliberal policy, Gary Teeple explains that it represents a global
movement for new government protection of property rights in the guise of "free market"
deregulation. TEEPLE, supra note 454, at 76-94. For an in-depth deconstruction of the
supposedly natural law of comparative advantage used to justify and mystify neoliberal "free
trade" law, and the parallels to the Lochner-era mystification of freedom of contract, see
Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade
Practice,Global Economics and Their Governing Principlesof PoliticalEconomy, 69 UMKC

L. REV. 733,763-64 (2001). See also MaIjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization:Elevating
PropertyInterests Above Human Rights, 29 GA. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 427 (2001) (explaining the
debate over so-called "free trade" as a conflict between competing views of fundamental legal
rights).
456. See Iglesias, supra note 2, at 384-86 (countering arguments that racial subordination
and other human rights violations will follow from supporting neoliberal economic policies
rather than human rights standards). For a brilliant exploration of the ways in which the latetwentieth-century Supreme Court has used free market ideology to reverse the gains of the civil
rights movement, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The
PoliticalEconomy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearingof the Civil Rights
Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247 (2000).
457. One best-selling version of this promise was Francis Fukuyama's The End of History
and the Last Man, which cheered on capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union with a
prediction that this new free market consensus would solve the world's conflicts once and for
all. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). Others
tempered this story by arguing that this progress would come more unevenly through a dialectic
balancing of the dominant force of the neoliberal global market against countervailing pressures
from government and tradition. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 455, at xvii-xviii (affirming
Fukuyama's faith in the "new triumph of liberalism and free-market capitalism as the most
effective way to organize a society" but noting a continuing threat from what he describes as old
"power politics" rooted in an antiliberal tradition). Friedman presents the neoliberal promise as
his "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention," which holds that "No two countries that
both have McDonalds had fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald's." Id.
at 195. He explains that neoliberal globalization constrains war-making because interdependent
markets spread wars' costs more broadly and because neoliberal markets create large middle
classes composed of people who "[do not] like to fight wars anymore, [because] they prefer to
wait in line for burgers." Id. at 196-97.
For descriptions of how and why this neoliberal promise deludes, see generally BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD
(1995) (arguing that neoliberal free-market policies exacerbate and even require increasing
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have widened to admit new discussions about the societal benefits of other approaches
to economic security. 45s Nonetheless, most mainstream U.S. "experts" who discuss the
global market's shortcomings remain critical of the prominent protests against the costs
of the policies promoted by the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary
Fund, and other organs of global market governance. 459 Though many share the
concern for those left out of global market gains, many fear the protestors' concerns
are misdirected. 460 Why challenge the market just because some are left out? 46 1 In the

prevailing wisdom, harm to market losers is best addressed by supplementing the
market with protections that alleviate that harm while preserving the market's
presumed overall benefits.462

insecurity from sectarian conflict); Iglesias, supra note 2, at 385 (countering that the neoliberal
strategy of making basic human rights subordinate to so-called market freedoms means that
"Third World countries will remain susceptible to the cycles of military authoritarian
dictatorships, government takeovers, and civil war, all of which destroy the free market ....
);
WIM DIERCKXSENS, THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM: AN APPROACH TO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT

NEOLIBERALISM (2000) (analyzing data showing how neoliberal global market policies have
decreased economic growth and increased economic inequality); HAHNEL, supra note 454
(showing that average world economic growth per capita along with the annual growth rates of
most countries decreased during the neoliberal era-and that neoliberal policies create not a
growing middle class but extreme inequality and poverty); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalism's
Discontents, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Special Supp. Winter 2002, at Al 6 (explaining that the
few countries with increased economic growth and reduced poverty have succeeded by rejecting
the Washington Consensus policies of market fundamentalism).
458. See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Challenging the Dogmas of Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2002, at B7 (reporting that the World Economic Forum allowed a small group of experts to
offer alternative strategies to neoliberal globalization but kept such discussions sharply limited);
Louis Uchitelle, Globalization Marches on, as U.S. Eases up on the Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17,2001, at C 12 (reporting that "the economic theory that justifies globalization is increasingly
debated these days" and that as a result the Doha meeting of the World Trade Organization
included some concessions to opponents of neoliberal policies).
459. See, e.g., Juan M. del Aguila, The Politicsof Free Trade in Latin America, 50 EMORY

L.J. 759, 762-63 (2001) (criticizing "violent protests" in Seattle, Washington D.C., Vienna, and
Quebec for showing "appalling ignorance of what it takes to integrate weak economies into
global processes" but acknowledging the need for more convincing evidence of the concrete
benefits of neoliberal trade policies to appease the growing "hostility" among "important
segments of Latin American societ[y]"); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protests: The
Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 257,282 (2000) (characterizing protestors as
"ancients" resisting modernity but arguing that unemployed workers who lose out from what she
presumes are inevitable overall gains deserve some compensation).
460. See, e.g., Editorial, Stopping the World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2000, at A16 (arguing
that "misguided but heartfelt" protests against the neoliberal policies of the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization represent a "growing popular
unease" that would be "dangerous to ignore," but that "there is no realistic--or beneficial-way
to reverse or even slow the forces that are driving the world economy").
461. See Jim Chen, Globalizationand Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 216 (2000)
(imagining neoliberal trade policies as part of a natural and inherently good evolutionary
process so that, "In a world full of losers, the case for trade liberalization becomes all the
stronger.").
462. See, e.g., GARY BURTLESS ET AL., GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN
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EFFICIENCYAND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

However, attempts to revive social citizenship as a complement or balance to the
neoliberal market are caught within a double bind. In the mainstream view, the welfare
state is both the only cure for the neoliberal market's devastating casualties and the
critical disease the neoliberal market must constantly fight off.463 Protection against
market losses always threatens to disrupt that market. 464 As a result, either the
protection, or the market losers (or both) must be sharply restrained. 465 This double
bind descends from the market fundamentalism of Lochner that still spooks the project
of moving egalitarian economic protections from the margins to the center of

127-32 (1998) (denouncing attacks on neoliberal "globalization" as meritless and futile,
but suggesting that the "winners share some of their gains with the losers"); Greenspan, supra
note 4 (arguing that "those displaced by 'creative destruction"' should be assisted by private retraining programs, or "[i]f necessary, selected income maintenance programs... where
retraining is problematic" rather than "protectionism"); McGinnis &Movsesian, supra note 5,
at 525 (asserting that "with the wealth generated by free trade, society can provide transfers to
people with less income, including those for whom trade provides no advantage or even a net
disadvantage").
463. For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan suggests the answer to the
problem of neoliberal market "losers" is income support programs, not changes in trade or
development policy. See Greenspan, supra note 4. But Greenspan has devoted his career to
blocking increased government social spending by insisting that markets depend on reduced
government debt (except for tax breaks for the wealthy) and on worker insecurity to prevent
TRADE

inflation. See Jeff Faux, Bait and Switch: How Alan GreenspanSnookered the Democrats,THE

Feb. 25, 2002, at 17-18 (analyzing Greenspan's contradictory positions
on balancing the budget as a strategy to entice Democrats into supporting his underlying project
of promoting upward redistribution); see also, Chen, supranote 461, at 166-67 ("Traditional tax
and spend responses to globalization inflict 'Eurosclerosis,' a cure arguably worse than the
disease of industrial decay."); TEEPLE, supranote 454, at 69-74 (explaining how neoliberalism's
shift to monetarism through increasingly powerful central banks results in government's
declining ability to finance the welfare state).
464. See supra notes 103-146 and accompanying text (explaining that moral hazard effects
can be redistributed, or revalued as moral opportunity, but not reduced or eliminated in an
AMERICAN PROSPECT,

absolute sense); see also supra note 463; Rhetoric ofRisk, supranote 330, at 158-64 (analyzing

how neoliberal policies depend on reducing government spending on social insurance for
workers as a central means of increasing investor security); Lucy A. Williams, Property, Wealth
and Inequality Through the Lens of Globalization:Lessonsfrom the United States and Mexico,

34 IND. L. REV. 1243, 1260 (2001) (advocating more analysis of the interrelationships between
neoliberal welfare reforms in the U.S. and global economic policy).
465. In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, some commentators and policy
experts suggested that the war on terrorism is at least in part a war on global market "losers"
who oppose neoliberalism's "winners." Interview by Mike Schuster with Strobe Talbott,
Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and former deputy Secretary of State,
Attacks on Sept. 11 Considered to Be Possible Attacks on Globalization, (All Things

Considered, National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 14,2001), availableat http://search.npr.org.
Many critics have noted the irony that neoliberal policymaking, despite its claim to represent
voluntary choices made by free individuals, has become increasingly dependent on insulation
from normal democratic processes (like fast-track trade authority) and restraints on free
expression (relying on police state controls to reduce protests). See Matthew Rothchild, Why
Qatar Was Chosen as the Site of the Next World Trade Organization Meeting, (All Things

Considered, National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 1, 2001), availableat http://search.npr.org
(explaining that Qatar bans human rights organization and free speech).
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citizenship.
To escape this double bind, advocates of social citizenship must be willing to
change rather than accommodate the neoliberal market and the race, gender, and class
hierarchies it embraces. Social citizenship ideals cannot remain outside the market as
complementary goals because those ideals are inextricable from the structures of
government rights and responsibilities inevitably internal to markets. Helping market
losers will always seem to threaten the public good if that good is identified with
market winners' gains. Social citizenship ideals have been sidetracked by the debate
between pro-welfare liberalism and communitarianism over whether to focus on
protecting individuals or on protecting communities. Instead, we should focus on the
underlying question of which individuals and what kinds ofcommunities our markets
should be structured to protect and to benefit.

